374. Telegram From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State1
2842. Subject: High Level Dialogue with GOES: Second Meeting. Ref: (A) San Salvador 2597,2 (B) State 39568.3
1. (S-Entire text)
2. Begin summary. Ambassador began second session of high-level dialogue by emphasizing gravity of situation and USG concern over El Salvador. In elaboration of USG position, he translated instructions contained in para 8 ref B, outlining views on individual, political, and economic and social rights as well as possible U.S. response to any GOES progress in these fields. Ambassador then discussed manipulation of “popular organizations” by smaller terrorist groups, resulting in GOES confrontations with relatively innocent masses, where violent GOES actions are resulting in “disastrous” image abroad. Ambassador cited eyewitness accounts of unprovoked and unwarranted violence and quoted remarks made to him that in “civilized country” these would not take place or if they did occur, would be properly investigated. Ambassador also emphasized that suppression of legitimate political expression was contributing to growth of radical organizations. He concluded that while his remarks might be construed as interference, they were not so intended. Vice President Astacio expressed appreciation for frankness of conversation and termed it helpful to hear USG positions and ideas in order that effective solutions might be found. Comment: Dialogue in sense of genuine exchange of ideas and opinions has really not begun. Stage, however, has been set for GOES response which should largely determine future course of dialogue. End summary.
3. Second session of bilateral, high-level dialogue, originally scheduled as working luncheon May 23 but postponed because of extended Cabinet meeting that decided on state of siege, was held evening May 25 at Ambassador’s residence. New date had been proposed by Vice President Astacio who emphasized GOES interest in continuing dialogue. Astacio, Supreme Court President Chavez, Minister of Planning Reyes, and Sub-Secretary of Defense Col. Iraheta, represented GOES. [Page 934] Foreign Minister Rodriguez Porth was absent because of illness. Ambassador, DCM, and Pol Off were present on U.S. side.
4. Ambassador opened substantive discussion, stating Washington had received with great deal of interest report of beginning of bilateral dialogue. He said there were two points he wished to make initially:
1) USG lamented violent acts of past week including assassination of Minister of Education and death of fourteen in incident near Venezuelan Embassy.4
2) Costa Rican meeting of USG officials and Ambassadors had been called because of great U.S. concern regarding deteriorating situation in Central America.5 President Carter himself had asked for study. Principal concern was situation in Nicaragua, but immediately second was El Salvador, with [garble] that because of dangerousness of situation, El Salvador could at any time replace Nicaragua as number one problem.
5. Ambassador then recalled that in previous session of high level dialogue he had pointed out that if there were no improvement in situation here, U.S. bilateral relations with GOES could face historic change leading to disassociation. He was now prepared to elaborate on U.S. views. To avoid possibility of error, he explained, he would translate directly from Department instructions. Ambassador then gave detailed translation of points contained in para 8 ref B, which states gravity with which USG views human rights situation in El Salvador, commenting on individual, political, and economic and social rights situation and outlining possible U.S. response to any progress GOES might achieve. Ambassador summarized that foregoing gave idea of what USG has in mind and that Salvadoran response in future would be welcomed.
6. Ambassador continued, saying that speaking for himself and Embassy we believe El Salvador is facing extremely serious national crisis. We are trying to follow, study, and understand situation, but it is a difficult and dangerous moment. FPL, FARN, and ERP have [Page 935] obtained a certain control over “popular organizations”. Small lethal groups are manipulating larger organizations not really so radical in character. This was situation in occupation of cathedral and Embassies.
7. GOES, ambassador said, confronts difficult dilemma. First, it is facing relatively innocent groups of people who are being manipulated. If GOES reacts violently it is condemned abroad to is own detriment and to advantage of radical opposition. But on other hand if GOES does nothing, it will lose control of situation here. Present GOES conduct is creating “disastrous” image abroad. People in U.S. and other countries not even knowing where El Salvador is are demanding that their representatives insist on sanctions against the country.
8. Ambassador continued that he did not want to disguise certain realities. He had told President Romero in matter of cathedral shooting there was new element. U.S. television and press had been on scene and reported that demonstrations had been entirely peaceful before police opened unprovoked attack. Ambassador quoted foreign observers as having told him that “in any civilized country” there would have been suspension of police involved and investigation of whole affair.
9. Ambassador then related that President Romero had phoned him in connection with May 22 shooting incident near Venezuelan Embassy to say that security forces were being attacked by BPR. Press, however, reported BPR was only trying to take food and water to occupiers of Embassy when were fired upon. It is difficult to ignore some witnesses who have described incident to embassy. One member of U.S. Mission saw policemen apparently give coup de grace to wounded marcher. Other witness saw three policemen take girl into gulley near Embassy. Three shots were heard. Policemen returned to street, but girl did not. Ambassador reiterated that such things should not happen in “civilized country”, and emphasized that this raised serious question of whether security forces are really under control of GOES.
10. To illustrate widespread revulsion toward situation, Ambassador related that he had recently been visited by European Charge d’Affaires accredited to El Salvador but not resident here. Latter had said was impossible to imagine indignation events in El Salvador were creating in his country, resulting in public demands that its government take some action against El Salvador on ground of its violation of human rights.
11. In conclusion, Ambassador said there are certain realities that must be recognized. The BPR has approximately 60,000 members more or less. Many observers assert GOES is contributing to growth of BPR and other radical groups by its suppression of legitimate political expression. In this respect, Ambassador noted that certain parties have been saying USG is trying to give Salvadoran Government to Christian [Page 936] Democratic Party because of USG encouragement for democratic opening. This was not at all the case. We support no specific political party but rather an open, participatory political system in which all parties can compete. If Salvadorans are not permitted to express themselves or make themselves otherwise heard politically, they will fall by default into power of BPR and similar or more radical organizations. GOES objective should be to dissuade and divorce people from radicalism. If that is not done, situation can only continue to deteriorate.
12. Ambassador concluded that GOES might construe his remarks as interference, but they were certainly not intended that way. If corrective measures were not taken, it would be extremely difficult for U.S. to maintain satisfactory bilateral relations with GOES and avoid disassociation. Ambassador thanked GOES contingency for patience and turned floor over to them.
13. Vice President Astacio expressed appreciation for Ambassador’s frank presentation. He then asked for copy of message from Washington giving points Ambassador had translated. It was agreed GOES could be given suggested corrective measures in form of “blind memorandum” with no identification nor attribution.6 Astacio, without being specific, went on to say that GOES strategy is similar to that outlined in Department message. GOES is aware of situation and of U.S. point of view. He again expressed appreciation for frankness that marked meeting and said GOES expects to enter into subject matter in depth. Situation in El Salvador is indeed difficult. There is a conjunction of national and international forces compounding situation and GOES suffers from frustrations. But no one, including international public opinion, had perfect truth. It was important to find methods of cooperation. U.S. also had interest that local problems not expand to complicate problems of whole area. It was helpful to hear USG positions and ideas in order that effective solutions could be found.
14. Ambassador replied that real, not cosmetic changes were essential. He asked Salvadoran group to feel free to inform President Romero of this discussion, and said he personally would be glad to inform the absent Foreign Minister. Finally he said if an understanding could be reached it would be of great benefit for US-Salvadoran relations.
15. Comment: As a real exchange of ideas and opinions, high-level dialogue between USG and GOES technically has not yet begun. Salvadoran participants in both sessions have sat quietly, not making significant comment or contribution except for the Vice President’s [Page 937] rather unorganized and seemingly positive but vague response at conclusion of each session. (In informal conversation over drinks and light buffet at conclusion of second session, Salvadorans did loosen up and begin expressing views about national scene although of a rather defensive nature and only peripherally responding to the dialogue. Highlights of these side conversations will be reported in septels.) Of the group, only Col. Iraheta has taken notes. Although he has done so very diligently, there has been no indication as to whether his notes are to be shared or for what end-use they are destined.
16. The U.S. position has now been clearly and forcefully presented; it is virutally inconceivable that Salvadoran participants are unclear as to U.S. intent. Stage has been set for GOES response. Its form and content should largely determine future course of dialogue.7
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790250–1060. Secret; Priority. Sent for information to Bogotá, Caracas, Guatemala City, Managua, Mexico City, Panama City, San José, Tegucigalpa, USCINSCO Quarry Heights, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.↩
- See Document 373.↩
- See Document 370.↩
- For information about the violence at the National Cathedral in San Salvador, see footnote 4, Document 373. The Popular Revolutionary Bloc occupied the French and Costa Rican Embassies on May 4. (Alan Riding, “Militants in El Salvador Undettered by the Death of 22,” New York Times, May 10, 1979, p. A1) On May 12, the Popular Revolutionary Bloc occupied the Venezuelan Embassy. On May 21, the Salvadoran police fired on protesters outside of the Embassy killing at least 9 demonstrators. (“Embassy Seized in El Salvador,” Washington Post, May 12, 1979, p. A21; and “Police Fire on Protestors in El Salvador; 9 Killed,” Washington Post, May 23, 1979, p. A17) Karen DeYoung reported that on May 23 “Salvadoran revolutionaries assassinated the minister of education and his driver today in apparent retaliation for the killing by police of 14 youthful protesters last night.” (Karen DeYoung, “Minister Slain After Killings in El Salvador,” Washington Post, May 24, 1979, p. A1)↩
- See Document 466.↩
- In telegram 2994 from San Salvador, June 4, Devine indicated that he had sent the five members of the Salvadoran high level commission a Spanish-language version of the “list of the specific human rights measures,” requested during the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790253–1102)↩
- See Document 380.↩