Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

424. Telegram From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State¹

San Salvador, March 13, 1980, 1730Z

1886. State for Bowdler, NSC for Pastor. Subj: Assistance to GOES; Timing and Composition. Ref. Brown-Dion Telcon 3/12/80.²

1. (S-Entire text)

2. Despite brief time here,³ I have gained several impressions about situation that I would like to record. First, the Revolutionary Governing Junta (JRG) is composed of honorable men who are committed to finding a moderate solution and recognize that our support will be key to survival of non-Communist society in El Salvador. Second, they face two formidable enemies in the ultraleft terrorists bent on provoking security forces into mindless reprisals against the masses leading to popular insurrection and the ultraright terrorists who are carrying out inhuman reprisals against center-left aimed at total polarization, ouster of moderates from JRG and civil war to implant repressive dictatorship. I cannot emphasize too strongly that immediate threat is from ultraright; it must be defeated before JRG can begin to detach accessible left from foreign trained leftist terrorists.

3. It is clear to me that enactment of the agrarian and other reforms has strengthened the JRG significantly. Even Minister of Defense Garcia publicly pledged support to the Junta and to reform program in an effective TV broadcast the evening of March 11. The limited state of siege⁴ has calmed the country by removing from the newspapers, radio and TV the inflammatory calls to insurrection from the extreme left [garble—and extreme] right.

4. This sudden burst of effectiveness has caused the revolutionary left to break stride and falter. There has not been a major incident from the left in over two weeks, apart from a disastrous attack on guardia barracks that left 15 attackers dead and one guardia wounded. These same two weeks have seen a quantum leap in violence from the right. Each day the toll mounts with the brunt of the violence falling on the left wing Christian Democrats, on the Socialists (MNR), Orthodox Nonviolent Communists (UDN), and on the more moderate leaders of the popular blocs. The strategy of the right is clear: (1) destroy the accessible left, those who might be open to an appeal to reason from the JRG and could potentially be persuaded either to support or at least not violently oppose the Junta’s reform program; (2) demonstrate the impotence of the Junta and the tolerance of the armed forces for savage reprisals by the ultraright, thereby radicalizing the moderates and insuring denunciations of the government from the archbishop and other popular leaders; and (3) convince the armed forces that its only hope of survival as an institution is to return to its traditional alliance with the oligarchy, especially those who are bankrolling the rightwing violence.

5. The Human Rights Commission of El Salvador published a statistical table yesterday showing the January and February figures for deaths caused by the left at 73 and by the right at 330. The source may be biased and its figures somewhat suspect but they are all we have and most people believe them. It is instructive to note that this Mission has never kept such a tally and when I requested one yesterday at our staff meeting there were strenuous objections from some quarters. This introduces a separate but related problem.

6. This is unquestionably the most disciplined diplomatic Mission I have ever seen and a good share of our problems in El Salvador arise directly out of the mixed signals we have been sending to the various political actors here, especially to the armed forces. I am morally certain that if Jim Cheek had not taken charge when he did and if he and Mark Dion had not engaged in a marathon effort to untangle the mass of miscues and misreadings about our position, notwithstanding the Department’s firm and public rejection of a rightwing coup,⁵ we would now have an intractable rightwing Junta in place and good prospects for a civil war. Over the next several weeks we will speak here with one voice or see some of our speakers depart. I will be meeting over the next few days with each member of the Junta individually and with MinDef and commanders of each of the security forces. One of my main themes will be the need to rein in the rightwing terrorism hard. It would help if Washington agencies, specifically CIA and DIA, gave clearest and most forceful instructions to their representatives that U.S. policy does not countenance a rightwing solution and that every opportunity must be sought to denounce rightwing violence that threatens to radicalize the country irretrievably.

7. To return to the overall analysis, let me say that I perceive a substantial group within the armed forces, especially in the High Command, that will never accept civilian leadership and who will attempt to undermine all movement towards democracy. This group wields important power and several of its members not only tolerate assassinations and bombings but probably actively encourage the rightist terrorist squads.

8. The rationale for us to provide this government with Military Training Teams (MTTs) is not as many opponents claim, a military solution to a political problem. The policy is designed to buy time for the government to broaden its appeal all across the political spectrum to the point that it will have sufficient strength to reform the military and then turn to the real task, the elimination of the threat from the extreme left. There are, however, several problems with that rationale.

9. First, it will do nothing to eliminate or discourage the threat of another coup attempt—an attempt which I believe will certainly come sooner or later. In fact, I believe the arrival of the MTTs will be interpreted by the rightist officers as USG support for the armed forces as presently constituted. The rightwing terrorists will not be disciplined because we will have committed our support already without demanding action to end the assassinations and bombings. With the USG “in the bag”, the rightwing officers will begin to press again for the ouster of Col. Majano and the PDC. In fact, we could easily find ourselves with a coup in progress while the MTTs are here.

10. [garble], the extreme right is desperate and it may well be pushing sympathetic elements in the military to move against the progressive members of the Junta right now. This may well be the wrong time for the right to do so. It is only human to try to postpone a crisis but I believe it is perfectly logical to argue that an attempted rightwing coup in the near future would have an odds-on chance of failure. A failed coup could increase the support for the government from the moderate left and moderate right, meanwhile providing the military an opportunity and a strong rationale for cleaning house. At least one senior officer, Col. Carranza, has got to go and the sooner the better.

11. It might be possible to stave off a showdown but it is a fact that a total incompatibility exists between this reform government and the outlook and tactics of the Salvadoran military forces as presently consituted. If we back this government we must accept that eventually the “institutionalists” in the armed forces will move to destroy the influence of the progressive younger officers like Majano. The result could easily be internal upheaval, beginning with the armed forces and spreading to the society at large. In my judgement, to permit a rightwing coup or even a veiled ouster of Col. Majano “in the interest of efficiency” could well provoke a split in the armed forces, a bloody civil war ending in defeat for the right, and, ultimately, another country gone the way of Nicaragua.

12. What should we do to avoid this? The first thing is to be very careful about who we strengthen in the military and what signals we send to the right, which at the moment is angry and confused from the bomb squads of Major D’Aubisson through the bankers and brokers and landowners to the shopkeepers and secretaries and housewives. We cannot afford to suggest to these people, most of whom can be recruited into a moderate solution once the terror squads are crushed, that we just might be up for a rightwing alternative.

13. Another argument is that everyone to the left of Pinochet will begin shouting about U.S. intervention and lump our MTTs with the rightwing murder incorporated that is operating so freely in Salvador. We could take that sort of smear a lot better when the reforms are well underway and the ultraright has begun to phase out under JRG pressure and erosion of its financial base among the former bankers and landowners. That is another argument for holding off.

14. But don’t we owe the armed forces delivery on our MTTs because they were promised to the institution in order to head off the coup? I am not persuaded that we owe a debt to anyone for not overthrowing a duly constituted government to which he has sworn allegiance. However, I do believe we need to show willingness to identify ourselves with the JRG and the armed forces here to the extent that the assessment teams need to be brought in fast, the helicopters should be offered immediately and the FMS/IMET must begin to be available. But the MTT instructors are a different matter. We have got to get the rightwing terrorism, the excess use of force and the brutal indiscipline of the security forces under control, in my view, before we commit our prestige so frontally as to send in armed U.S. training teams.

15. As for economic aid, I would hope we would establish where Central America and El Salvador stand on our order of priorities and then get the programs funded and moving accordingly. We have to have ESF money and people to support the agrarian reform or it could end in chaos as peasants slaughter the farm animals to keep their families alive. We have got to be able to get guarantees for raw [garble—materials?] shipments here or the factories will close and put many more thousands of unemployed at the disposition of the FPL, ERP and FALN. Let’s stop filling the terrorist recruitment pool and get ExIm to start the insurance coverage up again. We should be thinking seriously of an employment program on the WPA/CCC model. It will cost money. However, in this way we may be able to head off a disastrous leftist takeover here. But the symbol of U.S. assistance, I would argue, at least at the outset, has got to be the loan signing ceremony, not the green berets arriving on a C–130. We can perhaps bring the MTTs in quietly when the current heat is off but not in an atmosphere of rightwing mayhem to which the military fails to respond.⁶

16. Lastly, this Mission needs urgently the personnel approved by the last SCC meeting.⁷ If we are to get our message out and our programs in, we must have prompt action.

White

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880137–1701. Secret; Flash; Nodis.
2. No record of the telephone conversation between Brown and Dion has been found. See Document 427.
3. In telegram 1857 from San Salvador, March 12, White reported that he had presented his credentials to the JRG on March 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800126–0310) Brzezinski’s March 12 memorandum to Vance reported that Carter had read White’s telegram and “commented that within a few days he would like Ambassador White’s personal assessment of the situation.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 20, El Salvador: 3/80)
4. In telegram 1719 from San Salvador, March 7, the Embassy reported that the JRG had suspended certain individual rights on March 6 after announcing its agrarian reform decree. The Embassy noted: “It is not a declaration of martial law but it is locally being called a ‛state of siege’ because of any suspension of constitutional guarantees is commonly referred to by that term in this country. A more precise characterization, however, would be a ‛limited state of siege.’” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800117–0207)
5. See footnote 3, Document 417.
6. In a March 13 memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, Pastor noted that White had spoken to him that afternoon while he was drafting the cable. Pastor commented that White told Pastor that he “regretted sending” the telegram “since he was not there long enough to have sufficient meetings to make the judgments we requested.” Pastor added: “I think he underestimates the degree to which his predecessor (Cheek) committed the U.S. to sending these guys in, and he underestimates the fact that the MTT’s can also be a positive instrument.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 20, El Salvador: 3/80)
7. See Document 419.