Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

417. Telegram From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State¹

Guatemala City, February 25, 1980, 2359Z

1272. Department please pass to Panama, Caracas and San Salvador from Bowdler/Pastor/Cheek. Subject: (S) Assessment of Where We Stand in El Salvador Situation.

1. (S-Entire text)

2. We believe developments of the past week have had a salutary effect on both the military and civilian components of the JRG. The military, influenced to a considerable degree by our strong stand against a coup, have temporarily put aside plans to replace the JRG and are making a last effort to work with the PDC in reaching JRG decisions on agrarian and banking reforms and ancillary security measures by the end of this week. The assassination of Mario Zamora² seems to have brought the PDC more closely together and given them a heretofore missing sense of urgency to reach JRG decisions on reform and security measures. Thus, under the pressure of events, the JRG may at long last be moving to the decisive stage toward which we have been urging it for the past month.

3. Last night (February 24) the PDC leadership outlined to Jim Cheek the following plan, saying they are determined to carry it out by the end of this week at the very latest: (a) Final JRG approval of the banking reform which has been under active consideration by the Junta for the past month; (b) Final JRG approval of the agrarian reform decree which has been staffed out in detail by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Agrarian Reform Agency (ISTA); (c) JRG approval and implementation of a number of social order measures (e.g., temporary suspension of guarantees of free speech and assembly to permit a ban on demonstrations and on the massive propaganda campaign being waged by both left and right in the media, a public commitment from the security forces to more effectively deal with violence of the extreme left and right, and the mobilization of reserve forces to protect implementation of the agrarian reform from extremist attacks).

4. Although the PDC and the military seem determined to act quickly and decisively this week, some major issues remain to be negotiated between them. The PDC has publicly committed itself to a “nationalization” of the banks but the military, uncomfortable with this, would like to limit the reform to majority state ownership of bank stock rather than full ownership. The complex agrarian reform contains a number of questions on which the military and the PDC are at odds agreeing. There are also significant differences between the two parties on the social order measures, with the military seeking more than the PDC wishes to give. Whether the PDC’s and the military’s new determination, backed by their realization that time is running out, will prove sufficient to overcome these obstacles remains to be seen. Embassy San Salvador believes the odds that they will are about even. In any event the components of the JRG are closer to moving ahead with key reforms and necessary security measures than they have been since the October 15 coup and both parties seem to realize that they confront a now-or-never opportunity.

5. If the JRG successfully carries out the PDC game plan this week, we will pass to a new phase of the October 15 revolution. A number of major new problems will confront the JRG as it attempts to implement the agrarian and banking reforms and security measures:

—The agrarian and banking reforms should remove grave uncertainties relative to the economy and clarify to the majority of the business, industrial and agricultural sectors that are not seriously threatened by these reforms. However, the reforms will hit hard at the oligarchy and large land owners who can be expected to go all out violently to attack the reform program.

—The reform program will steal thunder from the left and its successful implementation could dash the left’s hopes to gain control of the government through failure of the JRG. The extreme left will therefore try to step up its campaign of disruptive tactics, including greater violence, which, if backed by the united “popular forces,” could prevent implementation of the agrarian reform. The JRG’s security measures, however, will give the left cause for concern. Opportunities for dividing the left and negotiating with its less extreme elements will exist and the JRG will have to take advantage of them.

—Sizeable external assistance will be needed to finance implementation of the reforms and to overcome the economic crisis through which the nation will pass. The JRG will have to effectively mobilize these resources.

6. In the first phase of the emerging process (i.e., the delicate negotiations between PDC and military that will take place over the next few days on the reform-social order packages), it is hard for outsiders to play an influential role unless they have close knowledge of the process and the confidence of the players. We have excellent communications and considerable influence with both parties. Our forthright public stand of the past week³ and our assistance in blocking the rightist coup have further enhanced our position. Both sides of the JRG view us as a close and trusted friend. We foresee that they will readily call upon us to help them resolve sticking points that emerge in their negotiations and that we can effectively do so. The only other country which might help is Venezuela which knows the situation better than any other Latin country. If a Mission under a person like Ambassador Cardozo, who has demonstrated a capacity to collaborate with us, could arrive in San Salvador in the next day or two, this would be helpful. (Jim Cheeck strongly counsels against attempting an approach such as the truce-dialogue proposal discussed with the Panamanians over the weekend because it would torpedo the present effort and could result in the breakup of the JRG. Bowdler and Pastor accept this assessment.)⁴

7. The second phase of the process (i.e., implementation of the reform packages) will in all likelihood stimulate the two extremes to step up efforts to defeat the programs. Various steps might be taken to reduce this danger both by the JRG and by outside parties.

8. Dealing with the right: With respect to the right the JRG will want to resolve pending issues in the agrarian and banking reform packages which will split the extreme elements from the moderates. It will also be necessary for the JRG to insist that the military make clear to the leadership of the far right that further acts of terrorism and sabotage will not be tolerated. Charge Cheek will pursue these points with the Junta. In addition the USG should be ready to take the following steps.

—Soon after promulgation, issue a statement endorsing the reforms and warning the right and left against opposing them.

—Privately, but at a high and credible level, warn the right in even stronger terms not to interfere with the reform process.

—Suggest to OAS/SYG Orfila that he visit El Salvador to demonstrate support and look for ways in which the OAS might assist in the reform programs or otherwise help the JRG.

—Identify and try to pre-empt potential sources of support for the extreme right in the US, particularly in congress and among business interests.

9. Dealing with the left: Efforts to neutralize the opposition from the left could take a variety of forms. The JRG might ask the Archbishop to use the church’s contacts with the left to attenuate efforts to disrupt reform. It might go a step further and also ask the Archbishop to broker direct consultations between the JRG and the extreme left organizations. Charge Cheek will pursue these courses with the JRG and directly with the archbishop as appropriate. We might also from Washington take these steps:

—Accept Torrijos’ offer to host a meeting at which US officials could talk to leaders of the far left. Prior understanding would have to be reached with Torrijos for both of us to urge the leaders to collaborate with the reform effort and halt violent tactics. (We would only do this if we get a credible explanation of the ACAN–EFE story from Torrijos.)⁵

—Failing this, we should seek to establish contact with the left through alternative channels, such as having Ambassador Pezzullo urge the Sandinistas to use their influence with the Salvadoran extreme left to the same end, or contacting Fidel Castro for the same purpose.

10. The assumption throughout this process is that we would work closely with the Venezuelans and other potentially supportive governments and the international financial institutions to provide economic and security assistance to reinforce the three elements of the reform package and deal with the economic crisis.

11. For Caracas: We recommend that Ambassador Luers continue his efforts with President Herrera to have the Cardozo Mission go to San Salvador as rapidly as possible. Arrival during the phase one talks would be best but even during phase two it would be helpful. AD and COPEI statements of support for the JRG reform package soon after it is announced would also be especially helpful. Gov may also want to consider sending teams to help in implementing the reforms and in developing a good public relations presentation of the reform program.

12. For Panama: We do not see any prospect of collaborating with Torrijos or Salamin unless they provide a very credible explanation of the ACAN–EFE story. In the absence of such an explanation, we believe Ambassador should limit himself to correcting the record and describing our continuing efforts to block a rightist coup and support a peaceful but fundamental reform program, leaving the door open to a Panama-arranged meeting with leftist leaders if in the future this seemed desirable.

Ortiz

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870148–1918. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Also sent from the Department as telegram 50823 to Panama City, Caracas, and San Salvador, February 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800004–0030) On another copy of the telegram, Brzezinski wrote the following to Pastor: “RP I agree with the general approach. What do we now do to implement?” An unknown hand dated Brzezinski’s comments February 26. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 21, El Salvador: 2/25–29/80)
2. In telegram 1357 from San Salvador, February 23, the Embassy reported that PDC leader Mario Zamora Rivas had been killed that day by masked assassins. The Embassy commented: “Murder of Zamora appears coldly calculated to exacerbate as greatly as possible present extremely delicate situation in PDC and in country.” The PDC national convention was scheduled to take place on February 24 in order to elect leaders to party vacancies. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800095–0611) Telegram 6181 from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, February 24, reported that “the extreme right-wing White Warriors Union” had claimed credit for Zamora’s assassination. (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, unlabeled folder)
3. Graham Hovey reported on February 23: “For the second time in two days, the State Department took the unusual step today of publicly warning El Salvador’s armed forces and their right-wing supporters against any attempt to overthrow the existing Government.” (Graham Hovey, “U.S. Warns Against Rightist Coup in El Salvador,” Washington Post, February 24, 1980, p. 3) Telegram 47653 to multiple posts, February 22, included the February 22 statement to the press. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800093–0609)
4. In telegram 1719 from Panama City, February 24, Bowdler and Pastor wrote to Vance, Brzezinski, Cheek, and Luers: “In five hours of conversations Saturday [February 23] night, Bowdler, Pastor, and Moss agreed ad ref with Torrijos and his aides on the need to strengthen the Junta in El Salvador and to promote a dialogue which would include all groups from the extreme left to the armed forces and the private sector. The dialogue would be aimed at getting a moratorium on violence, an agreement on a program of reforms, and an agreement on a structure which would allow broader political participation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870108–0453)
5. See footnote 7, Document 414.