Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

423. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 12, 1980

SUBJECT

• El Salvador (U)

This afternoon I learned from DOD that Secretary Brown and General Jones will support your recommendation to ask the President to reconsider his decision not to send in the MTT’s. I have been pressing Bowdler and Tarnoff all day to get the Secretary on board, and finally Bill met with the Secretary late this afternoon, but found him just as non-committal as ever. (S)

Sensing that Vance would not commit himself, Bill tried to persuade him to accept a compromise 3-step plan: (1) To send in two 2-man teams for two weeks to survey what the Salvadorean military can use in terms of communication and transport equipment. (Despite DOD’s pledge that they could send FMS equipment immediately, State was informed today that it would be necessary to send these two teams first for a 2-week period.) (2) After that, the equipment ($5–$7 million) should be sent in over a two to three month period. (3) Go in with the MTT’s to train the military to use the equipment. Vance accepted the idea, and asked Bowdler to draft a memo from him to the President, asking the President to approve the 2-man teams. (S)

Bowdler clearly does not like this 3-step plan, but is constrained from arguing otherwise. I think it is a crazy idea, myself. It means that we won’t even consider MTT’s for three months. A recent intelligence report suggests great concern about a rumor that we will not follow through with our MTT’s. I predict this will spread like wildfire if the news gets out, and our credibility and resolve will be seriously questioned. Given the President’s concerns, I think the central question we should be asking is how can we get the junta to reduce military and right-wing repression, which has increased dramatically in the last couple of weeks. I believe that we could probably use the MTT’s to do that, and we can strengthen our hand even more if we instructed Ambassador White to seek a confidential meeting with the junta and indicate our reluctance to allow the MTT’s to go in unless we could be assured that the junta intends to crack down on right-wing repression.² (S)

I don’t think we have a lot of time; I am sure we don’t have three months, but I recognize why you must go to the President with the combined recommendation. Jim Cheek will be returning Wednesday evening³ from El Salvador. Let me recommend that we schedule an SCC meeting for Thursday to get an up-date and briefing from Cheek and to discuss ways we could use the MTT’s to minimize the repression from the right. If you could hammer out a combined recommendation at that meeting, then we could send in a memo after it. If you cannot get Vance to come around, at least you could use the opportunity to bring you and Harold Brown up to speed on the issue, and perhaps you can have Brown raise it at the Friday breakfast again. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That we schedule an SCC meeting on El Salvador to get an up-date briefing from Cheek. (If you approve, I will ask DOD to begin work on a strategy for the MTT’s to reduce the repression in El Salvador.)⁴ (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 21, El Salvador: 3/1–15/80. Secret. Sent for action.
2. Aaron wrote in the margin next to this sentence: “[unclear] Way to do it. We ought to get White’s recommendation.”
3. March 12.
4. Aaron wrote at the bottom of the page: “Seems reasonable but we should get White’s suggestion too.” Brzezinski indicated his approval. He also drew an arrow from Aaron’s comment pointing to his own handwritten note: “Get White’s input.” For White’s report, see Document 424.