425. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting1

1. Cheek’s Report. Jim Cheek, our Charge in El Salvador for the last two weeks, reported that the main reason the U.S. had been able to prevent a military coup and persuade the military to accept the agrarian and banking reforms has been their expectation that the U.S. would only provide military training teams (MTT’s) after reforms. The Christian Democrats (PDC) had initially balked when we suggested MTT’s in January, but now they view them as essential for demonstrating U.S. support for the reforms and also for them. In the process of negotiating the reforms, both the PDC and the military have come to rely on us for mediating differences, and the PDC see the MTT’s as a way to increase their own influence (through us). Moreover, the 36-man team will train the army, which is more supportive of reforms and opposed to the repression, than the Treasury police or the security forces and so the MTT’s will help us to strengthen the hands of those who are more willing to curb the repression. Cheek said that it will be very difficult to maintain our credibility with the Junta if we backed away from our pledge to send in the MTT’s after they fulfilled their pledge on reforms.

2. Sending in MTT’s. Cheek believes that the most serious debate over the MTT’s occurred last month, before the reforms. The Archbishop and the left will, of course, criticize us if and when the MTT’s [Page 1077] go in, but he does not think it will be that controversial. We discussed whether we should adopt a high or low profile when they arrive, and Cheek said that one of the purposes of sending them is to let the extreme right and left know we’re there and to send a clear message that we support reforms and oppose terrorism of all kinds. To get this message out, we might want to consider sending the leaders of the MTT’s to one of the large farms that has been divided and given to compesinos. We should not react, but rather openly explain that the purpose of the MTT’s is to train the army to deal with the extremists of left and right by using the minimum lethal force. It is also very important that we make clear to the Junta and the military that we will not be prepared to continue giving military aid unless there is a clear sign that rightist violence would be reduced soon.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 183, SCM 116, El Salvador, 3/13/80. Secret. An undated and unsigned note indicates that Brzezinski hand-carried the summary of conclusions to Carter on March 14. (Ibid.) In a March 13 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor forwarded the summary of conclusions and a memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter requesting that Brzezinski sign the memorandum and forward both to Carter in advance of Carter’s February 14 foreign policy breakfast meeting. (See footnote 2, Document 426) Pastor also wrote: “You may want to mention to the President several points I made in my memo to you of today; we are talking about 36 military trainers in El Salvador, which is greater than the Cuban contingent in Grenada. The Cuban military contingent in Nicaragua is 200—twice as much as all our military advisers in Latin America. You may also want to clarify at the breakfast that we will still provide helicopters to El Salvador.” (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 183, SCM 116, El Salvador, 3/13/80) Reference is to a March 13 memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, in which Pastor recommended that the mini-SCC should re-affirm the decisions to “send in MTTs to El Salvador; provide helicopters on a no-cost lease basis and FMS to El Salvador; and make sure the program to Honduras is progressing well.” (Ibid.) In a March 14 memorandum to Turner and Carlucci, Davis briefly summarized the March 13 mini-SCC and noted that Aaron chaired the meeting which was attended by Pastor, Christopher, Bushnell, Cheek, Jayne, Pustay, Kramer, Davis, Carlucci, and other CIA officials. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 18: (SCC) El Salvador)