Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

427. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in El Salvador¹

Washington, March 16, 1980, 2034Z

70429. Subject: Strategy in Coming Weeks for El Salvador. Reference: San Salvador 1886.²

1. (S-Entire text).

2. We have considered reftel which outlines your views on a number of subjects. With regard to the policy issues raised we believe it useful to give you a statement of our current policy goals which you should be pursuing as well as suggested strategy and tactics for achieving these objectives.

3. To review—Since October 15, 1979, our policy has been to urge the Revolutionary Governing Junta (JRG) to take effective action to deal with the immediate political and security threats to its existence posed by the extreme left and right, and, having contained these, move on to restoration of constitutional government as rapidly as possible.

To meet the political threat we have pressed the JRG to enact and implement the agrarian and other basic reforms and to meet the security threat we have supported its taking measured emergency security measures and improving the professional capability of the armed forces. These original goals of our policy have now been largely realized: The reform process is now successfully underway and reasonable emergency security measures adopted, and plans made to enhance the professionalism of the armed forces. We have contributed significantly, possibly crucially, to achieving these goals by giving the JRG strong and consistent political and moral support; by defending the Junta against its enemies, including from a threatened rightist coup; by helping to maintain the unity of the JRG’s civilian (PDC) and military components and serving as an effective broker between them; and by committing ourselves to furnish significant economic and security assistance.

4. We are now moving to a new phase in which our priority policy goals will be:

—Successful implementation of existing reforms and promulgation of the remaining reforms.

—Effective curtailment of violence from both extremes, but particularly from the right which currently is of most immediate concern.

—Elimination of repression emanating from the armed forces, particularly from the security forces which are the greatest offenders.

—Broadening of the JRG’s base of popular support to include participation in the reform process by the private sector and more moderate elements of the left.

—Neutralizing of the extreme left by continued successful implementation of reforms which deprive the guerrillas of popular support and by judicious use of military force which will defeat the extreme left as a credible military threat to the JRG.

5. Our strategy to achieve these policy goals calls for the USG to:

—Continue to provide strong political and moral support to the JRG, including inviting representatives of the JRG to visit the United States soon to meet with high officials of the USG and international organizations and possibly including a meeting with President Carter.

—Maintain our very high level of influence with both the armed forces and the PDC;

—Use this influence to play our ongoing and essential broker role with a view to strengthening the civilians vis-a-vis the military and strengthening the more progressive army vis-a-vis the less reliable security forces;

—Fulfill our commitments to furnish economic and security assistance, with the clear understanding that these programs continue to be conditioned upon meaningful efforts by the PDC and the military to achieve the above goals;

—Support JRG efforts to obtain needed economic resources from the International Financial Institutions (IMF, IBRD and IADB) and from friendly donor countries;

—Support JRG efforts to obtain military assistance from potential donor countries, particularly from Venezuela and Peru which currently offer the best prospects.

—Encourage the JRG to request international political and moral support for its program and recognition from the OAS, the Andean Pact, Mexico, Central American Countries, the U.N. and U.S., non-governmental groups.

6. The tactics which the Mission in San Salvador employs in carrying out this strategy and in pursuing our policy goals will be left largely to you to determine. However, the following are some specific initiatives which we recommend the Mission undertake immediately, if it has not already done so:

A. You should press the JRG to begin at once its simultaneous approaches to elements of the left and right to seek their support and participation in the reform process. The current attacks on the moderate left demand that the JRG authorize the PDC to initiate contacts with the left before they react to this violence by becoming more radical, and more remote from the JRG. The PDC was reportedly arranging for the Archbishop to broker contacts with the popular organizations; we hope they are pursuing this and that Majano and Gutierrez firmly support these efforts. If some outside broker would be useful, please recommend. The JRG should also be moving to garner popular support from elements on the right since this is now facilitated by promulgation of the reforms. Earlier PDC contacts with ANEP and other private sector organizations should be vigorously pursued, and the Mission should support these efforts in its own contacts with these organizations. The PDC should also explore whether some of the middle-class-supported political groups such as the FAN could now be turned around. And you should ask how we could be helpful to these efforts. You should ensure that the military fully accepts PDC approaches to the left and that they assist its approaches to the right. The military will have to play the major role in reducing the repression, and you should concentrate your efforts on persuading them to do this.

B. In connection with the foregoing there are two steps which in our judgement the JRG might initiate now which should assist in the consolidation of its position. These are: (1) initiation of a political process which could involve all groups wishing to work toward a peaceful solution of the crisis and (2) reform of the security structure in ways which will achieve separation of police functions from the military without decreasing their effectiveness. With regard to the political process it is probably too early to think in terms of a constituent assembly to review the constitution and launch a return to constitutional government. But the JRG could begin now to revise the electoral code through a mechanism that would be open to all major groups, including those on the far left, and which could draw international support in the form of electoral experts from acceptable countries like Venezuela, Peru and the Dominican Republic, possibly under international auspices.

C. All elements of the Mission should use their influence with the JRG, the PDC and the military to get them to deal effectively with repression emanating from the security forces and violence of the extreme left and right, which threaten the reform process and damage the international standing of the JRG. The military must be made to sever their remaining relationships with the extreme right and to move vigorously to halt violence from this quarter. You should impress on the military that their generally perceived tolerance of rightist violence has a particularly damaging effect on our ability to furnish them military assistance.

D. With regard to military assistance, you should inform the JRG and the armed force High Command that:

—We expect to proceed with implementation of our $5.7 million FMS credit program as soon as reprogramming consultations with the Congress are completed, hopefully next week. We anticipate being able to expedite delivery of many items purchased under the program.

—Per septel, we will shortly be sending special military survey teams of 2 to 4 persons to augment on a TDY basis the military group’s capability to assess the requirements of the Armed Forces for transportation and communications assistance.³

—Per septel, we are also authorizing you to begin immediately to execute LOA’s for purchases of high priority equipment using the $428,000 remaining from the FY 77 FMS credit.⁴

—In view of the current uncontrolled high level of violence and the absence of any significant presence in El Salvador of military advisors and/or trainers from some other country or countries we are withholding implementation of the planned MTT program for the time being. Meanwhile, out-of-country training under our IMET program can proceed.

E. The Mission should continue closely to monitor implementation of the agrarian and other reforms, identifying problem areas and suggesting ways in which we might assist. The AID Mission should continue to place top priority on efforts to channel assistance to the agrarian reform.

7. Given the high level interest in your Mission, and the importance we attached to your recommendation that we re-consider all the elements of our military package until repression is better controlled, we ask that you rapidly extend your contacts and discuss individually with members of the Junta how we could be helpful to them in dealing with the extreme left and right. In addition, we would appreciate your evaluation of whether, and if so, how the MTT’s could serve as a positive instrument in the pursuit of the objectives described above. We recognize that some will continue to criticize our military assistance—both equipment and men—no matter what, but we would like from you at an appropriate time your evaluation whether the benefits of the MTT’s could out-weigh the costs of the criticism.

Vance

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 21, El Salvador: 3/16–31/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. See Document 424.
3. Telegram 68628 to San Salvador, March 15, noted the approval of equipment survey teams. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800132–0273)
4. Telegram 72290 to San Salvador, March 19, instructed the Embassy to inquire whether the Salvadoran Government wished to make immediate use of an unused FY 1977 foreign military sales credit of $428,000. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800139–0381)