Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

370. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in El Salvador¹

Washington, February 16, 1979, 0044Z

39568. For Ambassador. Subject: High-Level Dialogue with GOES. Ref: (A) 1978 State 294003;² (B) 1978 San Salvador 6290;³ (C) San Salvador 0195.⁴

1. (S-Entire text)

2. We have concluded that we should pursue the GOES proposal to enter into a high-level bilateral dialogue. Our main purpose would be to promote improvements in human rights conditions and reinforce our capacity to work with El Salvador in the increasingly serious Central American political/security situation. Active exploration of possibilities for genuine progress in human rights is particularly important in view of the likelihood that the alternative to such progress would be a deepening spiral of polarization, violence, repression and terrorism which could have serious consequences for El Salvador and Central America as a whole.

3. In view of the time that has passed since the initial soundings per reftels, and given Assistant Secretary Vaky’s conversation with Reyes February 9 (State 037969)⁵ which raised the format of “private confidential” talks rather than a high-level commission, we think it desirable to reconfirm directly with Romero precisely what he has in mind, what he envisages by way of dialogue and what he intends to achieve. Accordingly, you should seek an early appointment directly with President Romero for this purpose, referring to the earlier approaches and to the Vaky-Reyes conversation. Talking points for this are in para 7 below. (If requests for more information on our views on the human rights situation come up, contingent talking points are contained in para 8.)

4. Depending on what we learn we would then enter a second stage determined largely by the results of this initial exploratory talk. After completing your exploratory conversations, we would like to receive your recommendations as to the worthwhileness of proceeding, topics to be covered, and the modalities. Because the internal dialogue between the GOES and other domestic political sectors is more important to the future of El Salvador than our bilateral dialogue, we would particularly appreciate your analysis of how it should be factored into stage two.

5. FYI: Our overall objectives, which you should bear in mind in all phases of any dialogue, include:

—To get an accurate assessment of the GOES’ perceptions of the situation, the depth of its understanding and its intentions.

—To make clear that we are concerned about deteriorating human rights conditions in the country, that cosmetic changes will not result in improved relations, and that lack of improvement in these conditions will yield a further deterioration in our relations.

—To counter any impression that U.S. acceptance of the dialogue implies approval of the GOES’ poor human rights record to date.

—To make clear that our concerns about Central America include economic development and Central American economic conditions.

—To avoid any commitment, however, to a specific parallel step-by-step U.S. response to GOES’ actions, making clear U.S. response will depend on actual GOES performance, not on mere existence of dialogue or on announcements of intention.

—To avoid involving U.S. in a process of negotiation with the GOES or in any type of mediation between it and other Salvadoran groups. We intend to keep church and political opposition groups generally apprised of what we are doing, but do not view our bilateral dialogue as a substitute for the GOES-opposition dialogue.

6. We are concerned that the bilateral dialogue be conducted in a way that will not prove counterproductive, either within El Salvador itself (where recent steps toward internal dialogue should be encouraged, not delayed), or in the overall Central American situation, by prompting Romero to conclude that the U.S. has done what Somoza has predicted—targeted El Salvador next.

7. Talking points for your meetings with Romero follow:

—We appreciate and welcome your suggestions regarding a high-level dialogue (repeating here the circumstances of the approaches). Last week Minister Reyes also spoke to Assistant Secretary Vaky regarding frank and confidential discussions. We believe this an interesting and opportune idea.

—I have been asked to discuss this with you to be sure that we understand as clearly and precisely as possible what you have in mind, how you envisage the process and what you conceive would be its intent and purpose.

—We assume for example that beside a general dialogue about how we see El Salvador in the context of the evolving geopolitical and socio-economic situation in Central America, we should have a broad discussion of the human rights situation, including individual, socio-economic and political rights and the relationship of those things to our bilateral relations. What are your thoughts on this?

—(After Romero responds): These are important questions. Raising our dialogue to a systematic and high level has risks as well as opportunities. We believe the stakes—improving human rights, controlling terrorism, and strengthening peace and stability in El Salvador and the rest of Central America—warrant accepting your proposal. But we believe the stakes are also high enough to require as much initial clarity as possible.

—I would be less than candid, for example, if I did not make clear at the outset that we believe your human rights situation is serious, that unless it improves, political conditions and stability will deteriorate, and that such deterioration will inevitably create new problems in our relations.

—Like you, we are seriously concerned at the evident political and social deterioration and growing terrorism which we see occurring and believe threatens El Salvador’s future.

—We believe improvements in human rights conditions in El Salvador are necessary to internal peace and stability.

—We look at human rights broadly in three categories, and see serious problems in all three areas in El Salvador:

—Fundamental problems of individual rights such as the practice of torture, arbitrary arrests and disappearances.

—The fundamental problem of improving the distribution of income and living conditions for all the people of El Salvador.

—A political process sufficiently open to prevent the growth of extremism and radicalism.

—We are prepared to discuss specific areas where we believe changes are necessary. Our purpose in identifying specific problems is to be helpful to you as your government makes decisions and also to help you to see the nature and dimension of our concerns. We are prepared to offer some specific suggestions, but you should view them as illustrative only, and not as complete or sufficient blueprints.

—We have been heartened by the indications of renewed political dialogue within El Salvador. We would not wish our own bilateral dialogue to interfere with it or to delay its development.

—As our bilateral dialogue unfolds, we will try to avoid any possible misunderstanding by keeping some private and political groups outside the government generally apprised of our purposes.

—The reason is that the course of our bilateral relations depends more on developments here in El Salvador and on what you achieve, than on the existence of our dialogue. Our ability to cooperate will depend on these developments.

(At the conclusion of Romero meeting): It had been indicated that a dialogue might be in the form of meeting with a high-level group. Is this how you envisage it, or do you have some other format in mind?

—I would, of course, welcome any comments you may wish to make to me directly.

8. The following talking points are for your use, if asked, in responding to questions for greater detail on how we see the human rights situation in El Salvador.

—In our view, the situation as a whole has become too grave for any single act to alter it significantly. We believe your security and that of the region require the development and implementation of a comprehensive approach rather than piecemeal reforms.

—What you decide, however, is up to you. The ideas we offer are suggestions. We do not intend to interfere in your internal politics, mediate between domestic groups, or engage in a negotiation with you over your internal affairs.

—The test of our dialogue, and the basis of our response, will be your success in engaging constructively the basic forces of Salvadoran society—business, labor, and religious groups, and political parties.

(A) Individual Rights

—We appreciate the seriousness of El Salvador’s terrorist problem, but we are convinced terrorists can be combatted in ways that do not violate individual and civil liberties. Indeed, we believe that the best way to combat terrorism in the long term is to preserve these liberties.

—Fundamental problems of individual rights are the practice of torture, arbitrary arrests and disappearances.

—And the sense that these are endorsed as official policy.

Several steps could be taken to address these problems, such as amnesty for prisoners incarcerated under the public order law for non-violent actions, and systematic access to information in cases of missing persons (desaparecidos) and of political prisoners. (In addition to mentioning these two specific steps, you are also authorized, if you believe it would be helpful, to mention the following steps: (1) reform or rescission of the public order law along the lines proposed by the ICJ;⁶ (2) increased discipline in the forces of public order, including provisions for prompt investigation of reports of torture, arbitrary arrests, or disappearances, by a special commission empowered to bring offenders before courts martial or to present cases for criminal prosecution in civil courts; (3) verification of prison conditions and of allegations of unacknowledged prisons by qualified international observers, like the ICRC; (4) non-use of orden for paramilitary or security activities. If you choose not to mention these steps, you should at a minimum indicate that there are deeper problems in the area of rights of the person which we would be prepared to discuss in the course of the dialogue.)

(B) Political Rights

—The fundamental problem is to create conditions in which national priorities and policies can be established through a political process sufficiently open to prevent the growth of extremism and radicalism.

—A successful dialogue with the church and the political parties can only be established by regaining their confidence through concrete initiatives to open the political system.

—Steps we believe might facilitate a more open political system include:

—Amendment of the electoral law to ensure the ability of all legal parties to participate.

—Reconstitution of the Electoral Commission as a clearly non-partisan body.

—Invitation of outside observers for the 1980 legislative and municipal elections.

(C) Economic and Social Rights

—The fundamental problem is the need to improve the distribution of income and to better the living conditions for all the people of El Salvador.

—Steps in this direction might include:

—Adoption of a sound and meaningful agrarian reform law;

—Tax reform.

U.S. response

—The degree of progress you achieve on these concerns will determine the course of our future relations.

—We cannot respond to each and every step you take.

—As you begin to move forward we will consider your actions carefully, keeping in close touch through this group, but concentrating on the actual realization of your proposals.⁷

9. For Bogota, Caracas, Mexico, San Jose: Please inform appropriate officials that President Romero has requested an opportunity to dialogue with the U.S. on human rights issues (broadly defined), and we have consented. You should also seek their ideas on ways to constructively pursue this dialogue. (FYI: We think it is important for you to inform and, if possible, engage the attention of these democracies. While we do not want to become as deeply involved in El Salvador as we are in Nicaragua, the dialogue will involve sensitive political issues. We want to avoid being drawn into such delicate discussions without the support, and to the extent appropriate, involvement of the other democracies.)

Christopher

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790073–0212. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Guatemala City, Managua, Panama City, San José, Tegucigalpa, Bogotá, Caracas, and Mexico City. Drafted by Einaudi; cleared in HA, ARA/CEN, S/P, ARA, and in draft in NSC; approved by Christopher.
2. See footnote 2, Document 367.
3. See Document 367.
4. In telegram 195 from San Salvador, January 10, the Embassy examined the “mood of the moment” in El Salvador. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790015–1263)
5. In telegram 37969 to San Salvador, February 14, Vaky described his February 9 meeting with Reyes and Rojas in New Orleans. During the meeting Reyes conveyed Romero’s interest in improving human rights practices, as well as the social and economic conditions in El Salvador. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790069–0615)
6. In telegram 4493 from San Salvador, August 28, the Embassy reported that a representative of the International Commission of Jurists had visited El Salvador and written a report endorsing the reform of the law of defense and guarantee of public order. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780351–1029)
7. For Devine’s first meeting with Romero, see Document 371.