Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

367. Telegram From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State¹

San Salvador, December 2, 1978, 2230Z

6290. Deliver to action offices by start of business, Monday, December 4. Subj: Proposed USG–GOES High Level Dialogue on Human Rights. Ref (A) State 294003.² (B) San Salvador 6124³ (C) State 303826.⁴

1. At request of President Romero, Vice President Astacio and I met on December 1 and discussed the concept of high-level dialogue on human rights matters.

2. GOES has now constituted a permanent commission to carry on such dialogue. It consists of:

A. Vice President Astacio, who will head it and keep President Romero advised of its activities;

B. Supreme Court President Rogelio Chavez;

C. Minister of Planning Jose Eduardo Reyes;

D. Foreign Minister Antonio Rodriguez Porth;

E. Minister of Defense General Castillo Yanes.

3. Vice President specifically requested that no publicity be given to this permanent commission. In fact, he requested that we avoid impressive labels or letterheads for it and instead consider it simply a high-level dialogue group. He explained such requests on two grounds: (1) In order to avoid complications and facilitate the effective work of the group; and (2) To avoid personal difficulties and/or even dangers for its members.

4. With respect to contact and dialogue with the USG, Vice President said it was contemplated that the new group would deal directly with me here and through Ambassador Quinonez with the Department of State. Prior to that, however, constructive discussions were envisaged with local opposition parties such as the Christian Democrats, and a meeting was now being planned with leaders of the Jesuit community here to see if they were amenable to any semblance of “detente”.

5. Vice President said that it is hoped such a commission will contribute to better and more effective communication between our two nations, that it will be in a position to focus effectively upon the findings of the IAHRC, and that it will provide a mechanism for review of specific complaints.

6. In commenting upon the foregoing, I expressed particular interest in the inclusion of the Minister of National Defense. I said that a recent briefing by the nation’s military leaders had brought home to me as never before the diametrically different views which are held by the GOES and important figures in the USG with respect to the role and functions of the military in El Salvador. Identifying these differences for the Vice President, I said that it seemed increasingly essential for someone to explain these facts to the top military leaders of El Salvador. I wondered aloud who should do this, whether I should do it, whether the military would accept it, and whether the new commission might offer an avenue of approach to this process. The Vice President said quietly “do it.”

7. Picking up the conversational ball, the Vice President explained to me his own concept of the problem. He said that there is a great big world out there but an “island mentality” in Central America. Within the latter, there is an even smaller “island mentality” in El Salvador, suffered by practically all sectors of society. They think they are surrounded by a wide ocean and can and must solve their problems without regard to the rest of the world. But now that the rest of the world is interesting itself in how things are done in El Salvador, it is difficult or impossible for people here to adjust to that fact. Proceeding with the analogy, the Vice President said that from time to time someone tries to lay a plank across that “ocean” and to start toward meaningful contact and understanding with the other side. But each time this happens, overly-enthusiastic or clumsy parties at one end or the other dislodge the plank and we are back where we started from.

8. I told the Vice President that I would report his words to Washington and that I knew there would be interest in what he had told me. At the same time, I took the liberty of cautioning him that dialogue for the sake of dialogue can be meaningless unless there is also a willingness to take some decisions and make some changes. He took this with good grace and even expressed agreement.

Devine

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780497–0521. Confidential; Niact Immediate.
2. In telegram 294003 to San Salvador, November 20, the Department described a meeting between Reyes and Jerry Jacobson, who had communicated the substance of the conversation to the Department. Reyes was frustrated by a lack of effective communication with the U.S. Government and indicated that “the GOES is tentatively prepared to set up a high level task force to conduct a dialogue with the USG to work out a program to improve relations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780478–0074)
3. In telegram 6124 from San Salvador, November 24, the Embassy discussed the possibility of a high-level dialogue with the Salvadoran Government and cautioned: “Past dialogue with high-level GOES officials tends to prosper in terms of generalities—everyone is in favor of human rights—but to founder rather quickly on specifics.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780487–0658)
4. In telegram 303826 to San Salvador, December 1, the Department instructed Devine to approach Reyes to obtain more information about the “substantive and technical aspects” of the proposed dialogue with the Salvadoran Government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780495–0639)