Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

369. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky)¹

Washington, January 8, 1979

SUBJECT

• El Salvador Dialogue (S)

I apologize for taking so long in responding to the excellent set of instructions which ARA has prepared with S/P and HA. I have made a number of specific suggestions on the margins of the cable itself (which I attach), but let me use this opportunity to elaborate on several points.² (S)

First of all, your suggestion with regard to the draft PRM on Central America which NSC forwarded to State for comments last month seem more appropriate to this set of instructions than to the PRM.³ You noted the difficulty of doing a policy analysis of the region while the outcome of events in Nicaragua was still uncertain. I believe that one can (and should) begin a policy review during this period, but one should be cautious about the cross-country-implications of implementing a specific policy at this time, as the Salvador cable envisages. (S)

Somoza has repeatedly looked to Romero for support during these last four months, and I’m sure he has tried to persuade Romero that the U.S. has “targeted” him next. In our briefings to Romero on the mediation, we have tried to encourage him to see the Nicaraguan problem as we see it (broad opposition against Somoza) rather than the way Somoza sees it (Communists against Somoza, with the U.S. unwittingly lending support to the Communists). Doubtlessly, Romero is inclined to see things as Somoza does, but I would guess that he has been reluctant to throw his full support to Somoza because he fears it might mean increasingly antagonizing the U.S., and he doesn’t need that now. However, if we go to Romero with this kind of message at this time, we may unintentionally confirm Somoza’s prediction that the U.S. is targeting Romero next, and thus cement an alliance between Romero and Somoza just when we’re trying to put distance between them. (S)

My first recommendation, therefore, is to either postpone any demarche until the situation in Nicaragua is clarified, or alternatively break the demarche into two or three parts. If we choose the latter, then we should point the first demarche in a very different direction. Instead of pushing Romero into the arms of Somoza, as the current message could do, we should try to lure him away. Instead of trying to force Romero to see the full dimensions of his predicament and to make clear that we are prepared to be really tough with him, we should be much more solicitous, but also more direct. We should inform him in general terms of our interest in a dialogue and of our interest in helping him find ways to avoid the problem which is ripping apart his neighbor. The full set of instructions which have been drafted would not be delivered until we can be more certain that El Salvador is on our side of the Nicaraguan problem. I think you will agree that while the problem of El Salvador is an acute one, which we need to deal with soon, the problem of Nicaragua is an urgent one, which we need to have resolved first. (S)

While awaiting the outcome of events in Nicaragua, we should use the time to address some of the very important questions which serve as the premises of the message. The draft message is a significant document; it represents nothing less than a philosophical statement on the nature of political and socio-economic development and on the causes of terrorism. I am in general quite sympathetic with the approach, but I think that in places (particularly, page 4) it is too facile, implying a degree of certainty with regard to answers to fundamental questions, which we just don’t have. Although there are many theories on the origin of terrorism, no one can claim with any certainty which of these theories is correct. If, as this message suggests, terrorism is the result of a system in which “peaceful means of expression” are increasingly denied, then why is there so little terrorism in Cuba or other communist countries, which have fewer openings for political expression than El Salvador, and why is there terrorism in Germany and Italy? Can you argue, as the instructions suggest, that terrorism will stop if Romero’s police stop torturing people and start opening the political system? There are few examples of a nation which has successfully stopped such terrorism, and unfortunately, those countries which have “succeeded” have done so by tightening police controls and by increasing the repression, rather than the other way around. The last thing I would recommend is that we should encourage or even tolerate such abuses; all I am suggesting is that we should not pretend that we have all the answers. Moreover, there are practical reasons for trying to be a little more balanced in our approach. If we are to be credible with a military government, we should show less certainty, more balance, and try to see things from their perspective as well as from ours. Some of my comments on that page (4) reflect this point. Let me, however, suggest below a line of argument which may have more success with someone like Romero: (S)

—We are as concerned as you are over the increasing kidnappings and instances of terrorism. We believe that this stems from two sources, and that these two sources are related to each other: (S)

First, much of the violence is done by revolutionaries, who are convinced that peaceful change is impossible. These people are dedicated to violent revolution, and will not be deterred or diverted by political openings or any changes that you could make. (S)

Second, there are objective conditions in a country which can be exploited by these revolutionaries. If the people of a country can see for themselves that the arguments which the revolutionaries make—that the system excludes them and cannot be changed peacefully—then the power of the revolutionaries increases tremendously. (S)

—We believe that the best way to suppress the revolutionaries is to isolate them, and the best way to do that is to permit legitimate groups to express their views and to participate in finding ways to fundamentally change the political and economic system in order to make it freer, more equitable, and more just. This may not eliminate all terrorism, but by giving more people a stake in the system, it will discredit and isolate the terrorism, making the government’s job of fighting them easier. (S)

I hope these comments are useful to you. Let me make several other points. (U)

First, as you know, the problem of El Salvador is also the problem of Guatemala and Honduras, though to a lesser extent. Therefore, I would send such cables on an “info” basis to our other Ambassadors and encourage them to convey their ideas to us on ways to deal with the El Salvador problem as well as the problems in the rest of Central America. Also, they should begin thinking of ways to apply this line of policy to their countries. (S)

Secondly, we know that the problem of El Salvador cannot be handled in El Salvador alone, because its economy is so tied to the rest of Central America. We need to be ready to find ways to promote a re-vitalization of Central American economic integration when the political circumstances permit that to happen. Therefore, I hope we will task ROCAP as well as our Embassies to begin thinking of ways to handle this broader Central American issue when the time is right. (S)

Thirdly, if we are able to generate interest in a re-vitalization of Central American cooperation, and even if we aren’t, we should try to encourage neighboring democracies—particularly Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela, but also Mexico, Barbados, and Trinidad—to help in the democraticizing of El Salvador and other countries in the region and in promoting economic cooperation. This can mean anything from briefing their Foreign Ministers that we have begun such a dialogue to seeking their ideas to enlisting their support. I know you have reservations about involving third countries at this time, but I hope you also have some reservations about getting the U.S. pulled into another situation like that of Nicaragua where we are, in effect, negotiating a political future for a country between internal groups. I think touching base with these democracies would serve two purposes: (1) being much closer to the socio-political and economic conditions in Central America, these countries probably have experiences and advice which would be very helpful; and (2) if we do find ourselves pulled into a greater role, I for one would prefer that the U.S. share it with other countries rather than doing it alone, finding ourselves vulnerable to charges of paternalism and big-brotherism. We both agree that the U.S. should and can be a leader without being paternalistic. A real leader can find ways to engage more than one country at a time, particularly when getting involved in the delicate affairs of discussing a country’s future economic, societal, and political system. We are not just talking about a demarche on a particular abuse of human rights; in this message we are talking about how El Salvador organizes itself in the future to be more humane. I would hope that the U.S. begins to go down this path with some friends on both sides.⁴ (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 20, El Salvador: 1–9/79. Secret. Copies were sent to Einauidi, Kreisberg, Feinberg, Oxman, and Schneider.
2. Attached but not printed. For the final version of the telegram containing the talking points for the high-level dialogue, see Document 370.
3. See Document 465.
4. Pastor added the following handwritten notation at the bottom of the page: “Pete—After you’ve had time to digest this, let’s talk.”