371. Telegram From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State1
1040. For delivery to action offices by opening of business Monday February 26. Subj: (S) High-level Dialogue with Government of El Salvador. Ref: State 039568.2
[Page 923]1. (S-Entire text)
2. Pursuant to the instructions contained in reftel, I met with President Romero on February 23 to pursue with him the GOES proposal for a high-level bilateral dialogue. After a most careful and specially tailed introduction, I explained to him our basic interests and motivation along the lines set forth in para 2 reftel.
3. I then reviewed for President Romero the background to our present discussion, reminding him of Minister Reyes’ late November breakfast meeting in Miami which first surfaced the concept of a high level dialogue,3 then the Vice President’s December 1 identification to me of a five-person “permanent commission” named to engage us in such a dialogue, my own having been called to Washington in the light of these developments, the fact that I returned to await instructions which would govern my approach to the GOES, and the last-minute uncertainty introduced by Minister Reyes’ reference to “private confidential talks” rather than a high-level commission when he spoke with Assistant Secretary Vaky in New Orleans on February 9.
4. Following this, I said that I had now received my basic instructions and wished to make a rather comprehensive presentation of our position. I then presented the complete set of talking points provided me in para 7 reftel and concluded with a statement along the general lines of the section entitled “U.S. response” at the end of para 8 reftel. In view of the way our conversation developed, it was not necessary nor appropriate for me to enter into the more detailed talking points set forth in the rest of para 8 reftel.
5. President Romero heard me out and took some notes as I talked. In our ensuing conversation, he made inter alia the following points:
A. The five-person high-level commission identified to us by the Vice President on December 1 had been ready to meet with us from that point forward.4
B. When two months elapsed without any substantive response from us, they had concluded that perhaps such a vehicle for dialogue was not congenial to us, and for this reason Minister Reyes raised with Ambassador Vaky, as an alternative, “private confidential talks”.
C. Reyes had specifically requested a private meeting with Assistant Secretary Vaky in order to avoid the presence on our side of a notetaker, a practice which they find inhibitory to frank discussion.
D. As an additional alternative, Reyes had suggested to Vaky the idea of his meeting privately with President Romero. Either in Miami, [Page 924] New Orleans, or San Salvador.5 GOES understood that no immediate answer had been possible.
E. As matters now stand, the GOES is at our disposition for whatever dialogue we would prefer: meetings with the high-level commission; private confidential talks; or a meeting between President Romero and Assistant Secretary Vaky.
F. US participants are left to our choosing. Salvadoran participants are prepared to meet with US Ambassador alone, with a group from US Embassy, or with any visiting group from US.
G. My requests for an audience with the President had come just as he was preparing to call me in for a similar conversation in course of which he planned to inform me of GOES thinking on human rights and similar related problems, of steps being planned, and of timetable contemplated.
H. Final touches were lacking on this presentation but in course of following week (week of February 26) President would in fact invite me to his office and acquaint me with GOES action plan.
I. President Romero sees no conflict or interference between our dialogue and those others underway locally. All are pointed in same direction. USG is asking same things as other interested sectors on local scene.
J. At this point, President observed somewhat whimsically that things we are asking are same as those being asked by political opposition, Archbishop Romero, subversive organizations, terrorist groups, et al.
K. GOES definitely plans take some steps along lines we desire but asks for patience and understanding that all cannot be done at once. Too fast movement could bring the whole structure down. Remedial action must be phased over time.
L. As to purpose of dialogue, GOES sees it as to achieve understanding between USG and GOES, to acquaint us with movement which GOES is willing to take, and to seek our understanding and concurrence with timetable envisaged.
M. In closing this part of conversation, President Romero reiterated that he would be calling me in during following week for meaningful talk on steps planned and timetable envisaged by GOES for action along lines which are obviously of interest to USG. Meanwhile, I could inform Department that GOES is at our disposition for dialogue using any vehicle of our choosing.
[Page 925]6. Inasmuch as moment seemed both appropriate and propitious, I then volunteered a few observations to President Romero on the deteriorating state of political, economic and social order in El Salvador. We discussed recent terrorist acts and increasing level of affluence, cooperation and confidence on part of terrorist groups. I urged necessity for a more open and participatory political system in which the nation’s youth and other dissatisfied elements might find a way to express their dissent and work for change through the vehicle of political parties rather than finding this avenue closed and feeling themselves forced into the ranks of the terrorists. He said that he and some close associates shared this analysis.
7. Taking advantage of this opening, I went on to assure the President that those of his advisors who think and tell him that the American Embassy is supporting and sponsoring the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) are mistaken. We support no party. But we do support the concept of an open democratic system in which the PDC and other parties can operate. We feel that the restoration of such a system would do much to counter the present trend toward terrorist violence. Parenthetically, I told the President of my recent conversation with a member of the wealthy elite who had lamented the fact that “Christian Democrats here are not like those in Italy or Germany. Here they are all Communists. When they had a chance to nominate a presidential candidate (Napoleon Duarte) they nominated a Communist!” I told the President of my dismay at hearing such an analysis. President Romero immediately replied that what had been told me was “stupid”, that he himself had met and talked with Napoleon Duarte on many occasions and knows that the latter is no Communist.
8. I reminded the President of our talk last year in which we had agreed upon the desirability of participation by the established political parties in the next election but in which I had warned him that the time to start constructing an electoral climate (which would make this possible) was “not 1980, not 1979, but right now in 1978”. I observed that nothing seemed to have happened, and we were by now in 1979. He agreed but said that steps would very soon be taken to start creating the proper kind of electoral climate.
9. As long as we were this deeply into the subject, I mentioned to the President the kudos and goodwill which some Latin American military have achieved by biting the bullet and announcing that they will turn the reins of government back over to the civilian political leaders. I cited Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru in this regard. I suggested that an immediate turnover is not usually contemplated but at least a statement in principle and some semblance of a timetable. The President smiled and acknowledged that the military had controlled power for some forty years in El Salvador. He seemed to take no umbrage at my raising this subject and discussed it with me in dispassionate terms.
[Page 926]10. One aspect of our conversation deserves mention. When I suggested to the President that failure to take some steps in the right direction might cause us to review our bilateral relationship with an eye toward relative disassociation, he drew an immediate parallel to present US policy with respect to Nicaragua. He was appalled at the thought that we might view El Salvador in the same light as Nicaragua or measure it with the same yardstick. I had the feeling that this touched upon a sensitive underlying Central American nerve, and it may presumably be a useful point for us to remember and utilize in future negotiations.
11. In light of all the foregoing, I recommend that we approve in principle the idea of moving ahead with high-level dialogue but withhold further action until the President has called me in and informed me as to the action plan and timetable of which the GOES wishes us to be aware. I tend to share President Romero’s view that there is no basic conflict between such a dialogue on our part and those others currently trying to get off the ground, but believe we should continue making the point to all concerned that ours is no substitute for the others. Finally, and subject to whatever views the Department may have, my own inclination would be that if and when we move forward with the contemplated dialogue, we lead off by having this Embassy make to the five-member commission a comprehensive presentation of the type authorized by reftel (to bring the commission abreast of President Romero’s own understanding of our position), that we stand ready in the light of ensuing developments to continue the dialogue through this Embassy and/or an appropriate visiting group from Washington, and that we leave ourselves room for tactical escalation if necessary or appropriate in the form of an eventual visit by Assistant Secretary Vaky for a meeting with President Romero accompanied by members of his high-level commission.
- Source: Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, unlabeled folder. Secret; Niact Immediate. Sent for information to Bogotá, Caracas, Guatemala City, Managua, Mexico City, Panama City, San José, and Tegucigalpa. Feinberg sent this copy of the telegram to Vaky under a February 26 memorandum, indicating that Devine’s discussion with Romero “went extremely well. Frank must have been very persuasive for Romero to have been so agreeable.”↩
- See Document 370.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 367.↩
- See Document 367.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 370.↩