134. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nicaragua1
283900. For Ambassador Bowdler. Subject: Nicaraguan Mediation: Talking Points. Ref: A) Managua 56502 and B) State 2777223
1. You are authorized to make private demarche November 8. However, we ask that you use the talking points contained reftel B (see adjustments in para 2 below), rather than those in reftel A. The purpose of this demarche is to urge Somoza to accept all the fundamental elements of the FAO plan (which of course includes the central opposition concern of departure). It stops short of the “ultimatum” cast of the stronger talking points.
2. Repeat of reftel B’s talking points adjusted to update them are as follows: Begin text.
A. I have been instructed by my government to give you our very candid appraisal of the current situation in Nicaragua and to seek your cooperation in achieving a peaceful, enduring solution to your country’s internal crisis.
B. We believe we still share with you the common objectives of avoiding further suffering for the Nicaraguan people and of preventing a radical takeover of this country and the destabilizing effect this would have in Central America. These objectives prompted our initiatives in [Page 355] seeking a peaceful solution and now bring me to seek your cooperation in making such a solution possible.
C. During the weeks that our three-nation group has been in Nicaragua we have met with a broad cross-section of Nicaraguans, including some from your own government and party. The picture of the crisis facing Nicaragua which has emerged is most disturbing:
—Since the murder of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro and the violence of September your country has become dangerously polarized and radicalized. There is a widening gulf—not just the obvious conflict between the government and the FSLN but, far more importantly and more seriously, between the people of this country, on the one hand, and the Somoza government.
—There is great concern, uncertainty and fear throughout the country.
—The danger of renewed violence on an ever more destructive scale than in September is imminent.
—The situation is on a downward spiral. You cannot continue to ignore the demands of your opposition except at the price of Draconian repression; but that in turn will simply breed further violence. I repeat: the situation is on a downward spiral.
D. Faced with these hard realities and mindful of our common objectives, I and my colleagues have tried over the past month to find a basis for a peaceful solution. We believe that the package solution now offered you in the FAO plan provides the basic elements for reconciliation and peace. The fundamental elements permit constitutional procedures to be followed and provide for the careful preservation of such institutions as the Guardia Nacional. Indeed, it shares many of the points contained in the document submitted to us by the PLN, diverging in the one major respect we noted yesterday. We believe that it is essential to the preservation of your nation and to the hope of a peaceful future for your country that you accept the fundamental elements of the opposition proposals and negotiate their details with them.
E. The depth of international concern over the situation in Nicaragua and its impact on the economy was illustrated by the extraordinary step taken last week in the IMF to postpone the IMF compensatory drawing. Similarly, it was in recognition of the extraordinary situation in Nicaragua that the United States has, as you know, decided to withhold discretionary economic and military assistance, and temporarily to delay disbursements pending development of a political solution in your internal crisis.4 Until such a solution is found, such bilateral [Page 356] assistance would be interpreted as support for one party or another and it would be improbable that the purposes for which such assistance is extended could be attained. (Please note that you may drop this point if you think it better to do so.)
F. I mention these things to illustrate the depth of our concern and of our earnest hope that Nicaragua’s internal agony can be assuaged.
G. We welcome your willingess to discuss the sixteen points advanced by the FAO in their proposals. I note, however, that the PLN document presented to us on Monday5 does not express a willingness to discuss the issue which is critical to achieving national reconciliation. Unless the question is addressed by the negotiators promptly and in good faith an agreement to resolve the Nicaraguan crisis peacefully will not be possible.
H. Consequently, we want to urge you most earnestly to instruct your negotiators to act without delay in negotiating with the opposition sectors promptly and in good faith an agreement within the parameters of this plan. Failure to do so will endanger the mediation and lead to repercussions inside and outside Nicaragua which are in everyone’s interest to avoid.
I. We hope you will show your willingness to work out an enduring solution embodying the fundamental elements contained in this plan which the U.S. in general endorses. If you wish, we are prepared to review and explain these proposals to you in detail. If you wish to suggest specific changes or amendments we will take them up with the FAO.
J. What we ask in short is your realistic understanding of the situation and of your country’s tragedy and the exercise of the highest form of statesmanship. End text.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 39, Nicaragua Cables: 11/4–10/78. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Vaky; cleared in substance by Pastor; approved by Christopher. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2446)↩
- See footnote 7, Document 132.↩
- See Document 128.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 128.↩
- November 6; see Document 132.↩