Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nicaragua¹

Washington, November 1, 1978, 1527Z

277722. Eyes Only for Ambassador Bowdler. Subject: Nicaraguan Mediation: Talking Points for Somoza.

1. You are authorized to approach Somoza as soon as possible, preferably November 1, and make the presentation outlined below. This is intended as a first step in making clear to Somoza that he should take the FAO proposal seriously; that he should not repeat not paint himself in a corner by rejecting the FAO plan or any important element in that plan in his public statement Friday;² and in testing his real reaction to the idea of his leaving early.

2. You should seek the support of the other mediators so that you can speak on their behalf generally, but we believe you should make this demarche privately one-on-one.

3. Please report Somoza’s reaction soonest so that we may consider both the timing and modalities of a possible second step along the lines you had earlier suggested.

4. Talking points, begin text:

A. My colleagues and I want (or I have been instructed by my government) to give you our very candid appraisal of the current situation in Nicaragua and to seek your cooperation in achieving a peaceful, enduring solution to your country’s internal crisis.

B. We believe we still share with you the common objectives of avoiding further suffering for the Nicaraguan people and of preventing a radical takeover of this country and the destabilizing effect this would have in Central America. These objectives prompted our initiatives in seeking a peaceful solution and now bring us (me) to seek your cooperation in making such a solution possible.

C. During the weeks that our three-nation group has been in Nicaragua we have met with a broad cross-section of Nicaraguans, including some from your own government and party. The picture of the crisis facing Nicaragua which has emerged is most disturbing:

—Since the murder of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro³ and the violence of September your country has become dangerously polarized and radicalized. There is a widening gulf—not just the obvious conflict between the government and the FSLN but, far more importantly and more seriously, between the people of this country, on the one hand, and the Somoza government.

—There is great concern, uncertainty and fear throughout the country.

—The danger of renewed violence on an ever more destructive scale than in September is imminent.

—The situation is on a downward spiral. You cannot continue to ignore the demands of your opposition except at the price of draconian repression; but that in turn will simply breed further violence. I repeat: the situation is on a downward spiral.

D. Faced with these hard realities and mindful of our common objectives, I and my colleagues have tried over the past month to find a basis for a peaceful solution. We believe that the package solution now offered you in the FAO plan provides the basic elements for reconciliation and peace. The fundamental elements of this plan permit constitutional procedures to be followed and provide for the careful preservation of such institutions as the Guardia Nacional. We believe that it is essential to the preservation of your nation and to the hope of a peaceful future for your country that you accept the fundamental elements of this plan and negotiate its details with the opposition.

E. I should point out to you that the depth of international concern over the situation in Nicaragua is illustrated by the extraordinary step taken today by the nations of the world in voting to postpone action on Nicaragua’s request for the IMF compensatory drawing. This is a measure of international opinion, of all our nations’ hope for the mediation process and of their consequent unwillingness to take any action that would prejudice that process or be misinterpreted as partiality.

F. Similarly, it was in recognition of the extraordinary situation in Nicaragua that the United States has, as you know, decided to withhold discretionary economic and military assistance, and temporarily to delay disbursements pending development of a political solution in your internal crisis.

Until such a solution is found, such bilateral instance would be interpreted as support for one party or another and it would be improbable that the purposes for which such assistance is extended could be attained.⁴

G. (In the event a postponement is not achieved in the IMF,⁵ the following talking point should be substituted for the above two points: I should point out to you that the depth of our concern over Nicaragua’s situation is illustrated by the statement we felt it essential to make today when acting on Nicaragua’s request for a drawing from IMF compensatory facility, a copy of which I have here. As you will note, we felt it necessary to make clear that our action should not be misinterpreted, and to make public our actions in suspending discretionary bilateral assistance, which we have, as you know, already done.)

H. I mention these things to illustrate the depth of our concern and of our earnest hope that Nicaragua’s internal agony can be assuaged.

I. We must say that we have been perplexed and deeply disappointed that the representatives you have named to negotiate for the Liberal Party have so far been unwilling to deal with this proposal, and have not shown any positions or views which have any hope of resulting in an enduring solution.

J. Consequently, we want to urge you most earnestly to instruct your negotiators to act without delay in negotiating with the opposition sectors promptly and in good faith an agreement within the parameters of this plan.

K. We hope that in your public statements this week, which you have announced you will make, you will not close off your options by rejecting the plan or any of its important elements but rather show your willingness to work out an enduring solution embodying the fundamental elements contained in this plan which the U.S. in general endorses.

L. If you wish, we are prepared to review and explain these proposals to you in detail. If you wish to suggest specific changes or amendments we will take them up with the FAO.

M. What we ask in short is your realistic understanding of the situation and of your country’s tragedy and the exercise of the highest form of statesmanship. End text.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Flash; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Drafted by Vaky; cleared in S/S–O and in draft by Pastor; approved by Christopher.
2. November 2.
3. See footnote 3, Document 64.
4. In telegram 279876 to Managua, November 3, the Department wrote: “Department and AID have determined that, in light of the unsettled economic and political situation in Nicaragua and in order to give the mediation efforts currently under way a reasonable chance to succeed, it will be necessary for the United States to suspend our bilateral assistance activities in Nicaragua.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780453–0516)
5. In telegram 278301 to multiple posts, November 2, the Department reported that the United States had successfully supported a postponement, on November 1, by the IMF Executive Board of consideration of Nicaragua’s compensatory financing request. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780451–0484)