135. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1
SUBJECT
- Nicaraguan Update
Whenever I can, I will try to submit a one-page summary of cables and intelligence on Nicaragua so as to keep you up-to-date.
This morning, we received the report of Somoza’s meeting with the negotiating group yesterday.2 It was a melodramatic meeting, and the Dominican’s voice cracked when he posed the “ultimate question” of Somoza’s resignation. Somoza said that the question was one he had heard from reporters before, but from the mediation team, it was very different, and he appeared shaken. He balked at having to respond in 24 hours, but agreed to. Bowdler went in this afternoon to give a private demarche.3
I worked with Vaky this afternoon to get out a cable asking several Latin American governments whether they will support us in our efforts. Pete is not excited about the cable, but has agreed to send it.
The FSLN have indicated publicly a deadline of November 20, which Perez had agreed to. Perez had also apparently told them that he would cut off Nicaragua’s oil imports.
A member of Somoza’s Liberal Party gave our embassy an interesting insight into the divisions within the Liberal Party and the perception of political events. He said that if there had been elections after the September FSLN attack, he believed that the FSLN could have won free elections at that point.
Bowdler informs us today that the opposition is very clear in its desire to have a prior commitment from Somoza to leave before it authorizes its political committee to negotiate an agreement on transition.
Intelligence reports indicate that FSLN forces are positioning themselves in Costa Rica along the Nicaraguan border. Many are said to be [Page 358] armed with M–16 rifles and may possess some heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles.
The Commission of Jurists appointed last July by Somoza to analyze the status of the Chomorro assassination investigation finally made public its recommendations on November 7. They were obvious suggestions to the investigating judge to examine the gun cartridges found at the scene of the murder, inspect the car, etc., all of which the opposition have been demanding since last July.
We have made a demarche to the Cubans to urge them to cease their unhelpful attacks on the mediation effort.
November 9, 1978
I just returned from a meeting between Secretary Vance and the Foreign Minister of Guatemala.4 The Guatemalan Foreign Minister’s perception of the situation in Nicaragua leads me to believe that he is getting his information from Somoza rather than from his mediator. He strongly solicited U.S. concern for the situation there, and he interpreted the cause of the problem as being outside intervention. He fears—and in this, he was conveying the concern of his President—that the Communists will take Nicaragua and Guatemala will be next.
The Foreign Minister did not appear to be aware of the demarche made by the three-member mediation team, nor is it clear to me that he understood our position, or even the position that his mediator is taking. When one of his assistants asked Vaky directly whether the U.S. wished for Somoza to depart as part of the plan, Vaky’s answer was very general, and it is not at all clear to me that the Guatemalans understood it. Secretary Vance repeated with great vigor our hope that the mediation team will remain unified.
In sum, Guatemala’s position is equivocal and they could go either way. Although the conversation served to reinforce Vaky’s feeling that we have to be very clear not only in requesting Somoza’s departure, but also in bringing that about unilaterally if necessary, I left with a different impression. I believe that we must be more certain of international support before more definitive action is taken, and we should seek that support.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Nicaragua: 1/77–11/78. Secret. Inderfurth initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner of the first page.↩
- See Document 133.↩
- For the Department’s instructions to Bowdler, see Document 134.↩
- No record of the conversation has been found.↩