133. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
5688. For Deputy Secretary Christopher and Assistant Secretary Vaky Only from Bowdler. Subject: Nicaragua Mediation No. 112: NG Conversation with Somoza.
1. The three principals called on President Somoza at the “bunker” at 12 noon. The only other person present was FonMin Julio Quintana.
2. Somoza opened the conversation by asking us how we had spent the weekend. Jimenez answered first by describing his trip to the “Isletas” on Sunday. Obiols said that he had visited with friends. Turning to me the President said “Mr. Ambassador, and how did you spend your time?” I replied that I stayed at home to listen to his speech.2 A wry smile crossed his face and he jabbed back with a comment about the unwarranted IMF action.
3. Jimenez then began to present the points in our aide memoire (Managua 5671).3 As he read, one sensed a dramatic rise in tension. About half way through the presentation Jimenez’ voice began to falter and he turned to Obiols and asked him to finish making the presentation.
4. When Obiols finished the presentation, there followed about two minutes of total silence while Somoza, chin in hand, stared at the floor. His first words were “I knew from the beginning that sooner or later you were going to pose this question.” Somoza then lapsed into another long silence. His next comment was, “the question that you have asked me has been posed by many newspapermen but you are an international commission made up of important countries which represent [Page 353] ‛el andamiaje de las Americas’ (the structure of the Americas) and which must operate with justice.”
5. At this juncture he picked up the aide memoire which Jimenez had given him and read sections of it. Another long pause followed. This interlude was broken by his statement that some of the language of the aide memoire was not felicitous. Jimenez asked him what he referred to. Somoza answered that it amounted to an “ultimatum”. Obiols responded that it posed a question which was basic to our work and not an ultimatum. Somoza said that by setting a 24-hour period by which he had to reply we are forcing him to respond within a given time frame. Obiols explained that by suggesting that he might wish to take until tomorrow to think over our presentation we were saying that we knew that he did not want to make a quick decision and would want some time to think it over. If tomorrow was too short a period, I added we would, of course, wait the time he required.
6. Quintana entered the conversation during the foregoing to echo Somoza’s ultimatum remark. He went on to comment that our question amounted to a request for the President’s resignation which the Congress probably would not accept. In any event the President would want to consult the PLN leadership on so important an issue. Somoza seemed to agree, paused, and then asked rhetorically “well, in the final analysis the decision is mine, isn’t it?” This remark led me to point out that the language in the last sentence in paragraph 4 speaks of separation but leaves open the route to be followed. Obiols explained that there is more than one constitutional route and this could well be the subject of negotiation. Somoza nodded.
7. There followed another long pause which Somoza again broke by saying “Encima de mi cabeza estan todos esos cadaveres” (“All those cadavers will be my responsibility”.). He was clearly referring to the fact that if his reply to our question was in the negative the responsibility for what was to follow would be his.
8. Toward the end of the meeting, and after another long pause, Somoza turned to us and said “If you see me calm and non-polemic, it is not because I have changed my convictions; it is because I have to examine my conscience.” On that note the half hour meeting came to an end with Somoza saying that he would get in touch with us sometime tomorrow afternoon.
9. Comment: Somoza seemed to be caught off guard by the fact that all three members of the commission were putting the critical question so directly and explicitly to him. He seemed to be at a loss on how to respond and gave no hint on which way he would go. After the meeting Obiols commented that he thought that we had gotten him half way down the coconut tree. I would like to think that this is the case. He is a smart and resourceful man, and we will have to wait [Page 354] for his response tomorrow. Yesterday’s PLN document in effect put the monkey on the FAO’s back. Through our initiative this morning we returned the monkey to Somoza’s shoulders. Tomorrow we will see whether he gives us a straight yes or no answer or resorts to another maneuver to evade the issue.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Lot 81D113, Box 22, Human Rights—Nicaragua VII. Secret; Niact Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis.↩
- Telegram 5621 from Managua, November 6, reported on Somoza’s November 5 speech, which was broadcast nation-wide. The Embassy noted that Somoza spoke from a bulletproof booth. He “equated current outside pressures allegedly orchestrated by the opposition to past foreign interventions (especially U.S.) in Nicaragua” and “vowed to resist these pressures and to fulfill his oath to uphold the Constitution even at the risk of his life.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 39, Nicaragua Cables: 11/4–10/78)↩
- In telegram 5671 from Managua, November 7, Bowdler included the Spanish-language text of the NG’s aide-mémoire to be presented to Somoza and remarked that “my Guatemalan colleague agreed with Jimenez and me to very candidly lay it on the line asking Somoza directly whether he will consider resignation or early departure to resolve current acute national crisis.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2535)↩