Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

132. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State¹

Managua, November 7, 1978, 0340Z

5649. For Deputy Secretary Christopher and Assistant Secretary Vaky only from Bowdler. Subject: Nicaragua Mediation No. 110: Scenario for Dealing with PLN Proposal.

1. This afternoon (November 6) PLN negotiators gave NG a carefully crafted document (Managua 5648)² stating their party’s official position which is designed to make the PLN appear forthcoming without Somoza giving up his control of the country. The document is positive in stating the PLN’s willingness to dialogue and compromise and requesting immediate establishment of a negotiating mechanism to rapidly solve the country’s political problem. The document also expresses a readiness to negotiate the FAO’s 16 points³ as well as a number of issues (electoral Supreme Court and GN reforms) which are important but nevertheless secondary to the issue of Somoza’s departure. On this primary issue, the PLN, professing adherence to constitutional order, proclaims that it is the unavoidable duty of the President to “remain exercising his office until the legal termination of his mandate.” In other words, in the PLN’s view, its ostensibly forthcoming offer to negotiate cannot extend to discussion of the President’s tenure in office.

2. The PLN proposal leaves the NG with a difficult problem. In the normal course of a mediation we would promptly present the PLN document to the FAO and seek its response. The FAO would no doubt welcome negotiation of the issues raised in the PLN document, adding a few of its own which are omitted. However, a sine qua non of the FAO entering such negotiations is its provision that Somoza first leaves or announces that he will leave. Thus, presenting the PLN document to the FAO as it stands will produce a flat no that will leave the mediation at a dead end.

3. Searching for room to maneuver, the NG has found a tactical opening through which we intend to proceed. The document’s statement that the President must serve until the legal termination of his term is merely the PLN’s position, not Somoza’s personal position. Moreover, by referring to “legal termination” the PLN itself allows for Somoza’s resignation which would meet this standard since it is specifically provided for in the constitution. Taking advantage of this, the NG will proceed as follows:

A) We will call on Somoza at noon tomorrow (Nov. 7). Noting that we have the PLN’s view on the issue of his departure which appears to leave the matter up to him we will ask him for his position. This puts the issue squarely up to him instead of putting the monkey on the FAO’s back by forcing it to reject the unacceptable PLN offer.

B) If Somoza’s response is positive, our problem will be to convince the FAO to negotiate without having⁴ a firm prior commitment that Somoza will leave, however, [garble], as we anticipate, he will not concede his departure,⁵ he will try to persuade him to do so. If this fails, we will try to stop him short of a definitive no that would⁶ put us at an impasse. We will insist that he think the matter over carefully and meet with us again twenty-four hours later.

C) Following our noon meeting with Somoza the NG will meet with Alfonso Robelo at 3:30 tomorrow to brief him on developments and seek his advice on how to handle the FAO–PC. Depending of what Alfonso says we will meet with the FAO–PC and tailor our presentation accoring to his advice.

D) Hopefully having kept Somoza from setting himself in concrete and held the lid on the FAO, I will call on Somoza Wednesday morning (November 8) to make my demarche (Managua 5650).⁷

4. This scenario is certainly not as solid as I would like but with a bit of luck it may work. In any event it will give us a chance to first try to corner the cat through a multilateral approach and if this fails to sell him with our bilateral demarche.

Solaun

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 39, Nicaragua Cables: 11/4–10/78. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. Telegram 5648 from Managua, November 7, included the Spanish-language text of the PLN proposal. (Ibid.)
3. See Document 117.
4. Pastor wrote “a,” and drew a circle around it, next to the word “having.” He also drew an arrow to the right-hand margin and wrote: “Not clear. Together or not. 1) Obiols. 2) Int. support. 3) GN contacts.”
5. Pastor wrote “b,” and drew a circle around it, next to the word “departure.”
6. Pastor wrote “c,” and drew a circle around it, next to the word “would.”
7. In telegram 5650 from Managua, November 7, Bowdler asked for approval of revisions to the talking points meant to make them “tough.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) See Document 134.