Chile
229. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Kissinger and Cardinal Silva discussed the political and human rights situation in Chile.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820118–1245. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Driscoll; cleared by Fimbres; approved by Rogers. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office. On May 29, Rogers recommended Kissinger meet with Silva, given the Cardinal’s prominence as a human rights advocate. Such a meeting would demonstrate Kissinger’s sincere interest in the issue, Rogers said. (Ibid., P840150–0525) At a June 25 meeting of ARA and CIA officials, a CIA official reported that “at the present there is nothing going on with DINA; we are providing no equipment, training or technical support–nothing to abet repression of human rights, but if Cardinal Silva spreads stories of CIA–DINA collaboration, we’re in the soup.” (Memorandum of Conversation, June 29; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA–CIA Weekly Meetings, 1976–1977)
230. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers)
Summary: Rogers and Kissinger discussed comments by Deputy Permanent Representative to the OAS Robert White, who expressed support for an OAS Human Rights Commission report on Chile which concluded that repression and torture continued despite new decrees that supposedly guaranteed the rights of prisoners.
Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts. Unclassified. On June 15, the Washington Post reported that Diez criticized an OAS HRC report on Chile, noting that it did not recognize Chilean Government initiatives to improve human rights, leftist arms importation to Chile, open propaganda campaigns with Chile and abroad, and the constant threat of terrorist violence. The Post reported that White expressed support for a resolution praising the HRC report. (“U.S., Chile Disagree on Rights,” Washington Post, June 15, 1976, p. A23) Rogers began his position as Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs on June 19.
231. Memorandum From Stephen Low of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)
Summary: Low recommended that Scowcroft support a new $15 million contract for spare parts for the Chilean military. Although Congress had banned spare part sales to Chile and the Department of State opposed the deal, Low argued that the contract could be justified as a necessary part of the package of transfers that Congress had allowed to go forward.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Box 3, Chile, 2. Confidential. Sent for action. In the first sentence of the third paragraph, “were talking about” was crossed out and “ruled out” was written in an unknown hand. The last sentence on the bottom of the first page of the memorandum was underlined. Although no record of a Kissinger-Scowcroft meeting has been found, Scowcroft wrote underneath his approval, “Have discussed with HAK [Kissinger]. Go ahead.” In a June 21 memorandum, Ryan informed Acting Secretary of State Robinson of Kissinger’s approval of the non-lethal spare parts sale to Chile, contingent upon prior congressional consultations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840037–1989)
232. Telegram 152569 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chile
Summary: In response to allegations by Rafael Gonzalez Verdugo, a former Chilean intelligence officer, that U.S. officials may have been complicit in the death of Charles Horman, the Department instructed the Embassy to examine his credibility and explore the possibility of arranging for Gonzalez and his family to leave Chile.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Personal Papers of Ambassador David H. Popper, 1968–1979: Lot 82D280, Chrons (May–Aug)—1976, Incoming Telegrams. Confidential; Stadis. On June 10, the Washington Post published an article based on an interview with Gonzalez. (Joanne Omang, “Chilean Charges General Ordered American’s Death,” Washington Post, June 10, 1976, p. A21)
233. Memorandum From Stephen Low of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)
Summary: Low recommended that Scowcroft advise Kissinger to provide the Department of State’s authorization for the Department of Defense to negotiate an agreement on spare parts for Chile, while simultaneously continuing consultations with Congress.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, National Security Council Latin American Affairs Staff Files, 1974–1977, Box 1, Chile, Political, Military, 2. Confidential. Sent for action. Scowcroft wrote “OK” on the memorandum and initialed it. On June 22, Kissinger instructed Eagleburger to inform Scowcroft “how outraged I am that the Chile matter has not yet gone ahead. I want you [Eagleburger] to take the responsibility for getting the Department moving on this since they are obviously dragging their feet despite explicit instructions. I will not repeat not accept any further procrastination or resistance. Rogers has also been instructed.” (Telegram Hakto 4; Ibid., Trip Briefing Books/Cables of Henry A. Kissinger, Box 26, 6/20–28/76, Paris, Munich, London, San Juan, P.R., HAKTO, 20)
234. Telegram 158555/Tosec 170316 From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger
Summary: In order to avoid alienating Senator Humphrey, Robinson recommended that Kissinger approve a $6 million agreement for aircraft spare parts for Chile as opposed to two open-ended $3 million contracts.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760110–0978. Secret; Immediate. Sent for action. Drafted by Robinson, Jenkins, and Shlaudeman; cleared by McCloskey and Jordan; approved by Robinson. Kissinger was in the United Kingdom for meetings with Callaghan and Crosland. Kissinger approved Recommendation A. The first sentences of paragraphs one and three were underlined, as was the phrase, “cancel the letters of authority,” in the first sentence of paragraph nine. A notation on the front of the telegram reads: “SECTO 17079 answers 6/27.” Secto 17079 from Dorado June 28, transmitting the Secretary’s approval of Recommendation A, is ibid., D760249–0371.
235. Telegram 6507 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported that top Chilean officials signaled their displeasure over U.S. Government aid restrictions by not attending a reception in honor of the U.S. bicentennial.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760260–0864. Limited Official Use. On July 1, the Department informed the Embassy of the limitations imposed on Chile by the Security Assistance Act, signed by Ford on June 30. The Act prohibited military assistance, including education, training, credits, and cash sales. In addition, it capped economic assistance at $27.5 million for FY 1977. (Telegram 163805 to Santiago, July 1; ibid., D760255–0646) On July 2, Cauas stated that because the limitation on economic assistance had been expected, and the amounts were small, the limitation would not affect the Chilean economy. (Telegram 6661 from Santiago, July 9; ibid., D760265–0557)
236. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: During a meeting with Scowcroft and Merino on the issue of spare parts for military equipment purchased from the United States, Trucco discussed improvements in Chile’s human rights record.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 20, July 12, 1976, Scowcroft, Chilean Admiral Jose Toribio Merino. Confidential. The meeting took place in Scowcroft’s office at the White House. In a July 9 memorandum, Brownell informed Scowcroft that Merino would want to discuss congressional restrictions on arms sales to Chile; the pipeline of arms sales to Chile; and the Chilean Government’s human rights practices. (Ibid., Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Box 3, Chile, 3)
237. Telegram 184182 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chile
Summary: The Department reported on a conversation with Trucco, in which the Ambassador said that the Chilean Government was examining the desirability of continuing to receive U.S. economic assistance since the amount involved was relatively small and receiving aid subjected Chile to congressional scrutiny.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760286–0236. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Shlaudeman. In telegram 7172 from Santiago, July 22, Popper reported that the Chilean Government appeared to be reviewing its economic relations with the United States in light of the restrictions imposed by the Security Assistance Act. (Ibid., D760283–0096)
238. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger
Summary: Shlaudeman reported to Kissinger that the military regimes of the Southern Cone had coordinated intelligence activities, including finding and killing subversives located in their countries and Europe.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760138–0562. Secret; Noforn; No contract. Drafted by Proper and Luers on August 2. On July 30, CIA officials informed ARA officials that while Operation Condor was originally developed to exchange intelligence information between the Southern Cone nations, it was emerging as an organization that identified, located, and assassinated guerrilla leaders. The CIA characterized this development as “an understandable reaction to the increasingly extra-national, extreme, and effective range of the Junta’s activities,” but noted that such activities were bound to complicate U.S. relations with the security services, adding that it would be necessary to handle requests for information from those services “far more gingerly.” (Memorandum for the Record, August 3; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA–CIA Weekly Meetings, 1976–1977) In telegram 178852 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, July 20, the Department transmitted an INR report on the possibility of an intergovernmental assassination plot involving Southern Cone security forces; the report concluded that “the evidence supporting such speculation is scanty.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760279–0200)
239. Telegram 7720 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: Although the Chilean Government had tried to convey the impression that the rule of law guided the detention of political prisoners, the Embassy reported that the authorities increasingly picked up and held, or disposed of persons perceived to be a threat to the regime.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760306–0874. Confidential; Priority. In telegram 6573 from Santiago, July 7, the Embassy reported on the possible existence of clandestine detention centers. (Ibid., D760262–0206)
240. Evening Report Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency
Summary: The CIA reported that Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile had agreed to suspend initiation of a planned counterterrorist operation in Europe until Brazil decided whether or not to participate.
Source: Ford Library, Project File on Pinochet/Chile, Box 1, Evening Reports, 8/13/1976. Secret.
241. Telegram 209192 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Bolivia
Summary: The Department directed the Embassies in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Bolivia to express deep concern to high-level government officials regarding rumors of assassination plotting.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760139–1959. Secret; Immediate. Roger Channel. Repeated immediate to Brasília and Asunción. Drafted by Zimmerman and Luers on August 18; cleared by Shlaudeman, Kirk, and Habib; approved by the Secretary. In telegram 210906 to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Santiago, La Paz, Brasília, and Asunción, August 24, the Department informed the recipients of telegram 209192 that the reference in paragraph 4 part B to “2.B.” should read “3.B.”, that the reference in paragraph 4 part C to “2.D.” should read “3.D.”, and that the references in paragraph 8 to “2.B.” and “2.C.” should read “3.B.” and “3.C.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760139–2183) In an August 30 memorandum, Shlaudeman informed Kissinger of what he thought was the purpose of the démarches: “what we are trying to head off is a series of international murders that could do serious damage to the international status and reputation of the countries involved.” (Ibid., P860084–1945)
242. Telegram 8210 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: Given Pinochet’s sensitivities regarding pressure by the U.S. Government, Popper suggested approaching DINA Director Contreras, rather than Pinochet, to express the Department’s concerns about Operation Condor and rumors of assassination plotting.
Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 16, Santiago, 1963–1979. Secret; Immediate. Roger Channel. In telegram 3123 from Montevideo, August 24, Ambassador Siracusa suggested that the Department consider making “parallel representations” to the Embassies of the Condor countries in Washington, adding that he would defer action pending further instructions. Given recent indications that Condor operations had been shelved, Siracusa wrote that “time for consultation on this grave matter seems affordable.” (Ibid., Box 16, Montevideo) On August 27, Shlaudeman, in a meeting with CIA officials, stated a démarche of Pinochet would be futile, but that representations to the Chilean Government would be made [text not declassified]. (Memorandum for the Record, August 30; ibid., ARA–CIA Weekly Meetings, 1976–1977) In telegram 8223 from Santiago, August 24, Popper characterized the U.S. Government’s relations with DINA as “formal, correct, and cool,” and described DINA Chief Contreras as “far from a conservative, reliable intelligence operative. His credibility with us . . . is low.” (Ibid., INR/IL Historical Files, Box 16, Santiago, 1963–1979) Telegram 209192 is Document 241.
243. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Bolivian-Chilean Affairs (Fimbres) and the Officer-in-Charge of Chilean Political Affairs (Driscoll) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman)
Summary: Three officers in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs reported their research and findings in Department of State records on the disappearance and death of Charles Horman.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Information Management Services, Job 09–02528R, Box 2, Horman/Teruggi/Weisfeiler [3 of 5]. Secret. Forwarded through Hewson A. Ryan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. The memorandum was also signed by “W.V. Robertson,” possibly referring to William Van Bogaert Robertson, who at the time worked in the Office of Economic Research and Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, but may have been temporarily detailed to the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs to assist on the Horman case. The “Gleanings,” which provided more detail on the memorandum’s findings, is attached but not published. None of the other referenced documents, in particular, the October 30, 1973, memorandum to Colonal Hon, are attached.
244. Telegram 8956 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported that in a speech commemorating the third anniversary of the establishment of the Chilean junta, Pinochet failed to indicate that there would be any imminent liberalization of human rights practices.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760345–0603. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
245. Telegram 4526 From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State
Summary: Noting that there had been no reports in some weeks indicating an activation of Operation Condor, Shlaudeman instructed that no further action be taken.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760355–0146. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Shlaudeman was in Central America September 15–21. (Telegram 226288 to San José, Managua, San Salvador, Guatemala, and Tegucigalpa, September 13; ibid., D760345–0605) In an August 30 memorandum to Kissinger addressing Siracusa’s hesitation to raise Operation Condor with the Uruguayan Government, Shlaudeman recommended that U.S. officials deliver a démarche on Operation Condor to Uruguyan officials in Washington and Montevideo. In telegram Secto 27128 from Lusaka, September 16, Kissinger informed the Department that he had declined to approve the proposed message to Montevideo instructing Siracusa to deliver a démarche on Operation Condor; the telegram also noted that Kissinger had “instructed that no further action be taken on this matter.” (Ibid., D760350–0102) In telegram 231654 to Managua, September 18, Luers informed Shlaudeman of Kissinger’s decision and noted, “I will await your return to discuss how best to clear the boards with the Ambassadors on this matter.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 16, Managua, 1961–1979)
246. Memorandum From Mary Brownell and Dan Mozeleski of the National Security Council Staff to Les Janka of the National Security Council Staff
Summary: NSC staff members reported that a car bomb had killed former Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier and his American assistant, Veronica Moffitt, in Washington. They added that while right-wing Chileans were obvious suspects, it seemed unlikely that they would wish to create a martyr for the Chilean left.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, National Security Council Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 1, Chile, Political, Military, 3. Official Use Only. Sent for information. Attached but not published is a suggested statement on the bombing.
247. Telegram 9212 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: Ambassador Popper speculated on who might have been behind Letelier’s assassination.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760356–0956. Secret; Immediate. No record of the September 21 Luers-Popper telcon has been found. In a September 21 letter to Kissinger, Trucco expressed “the most complete repudiation of such a condemnable action,” and requested a U.S. Government investigation. (Ibid., P900101–0906) On September 25, Shlaudeman informed Habib: “My CIA counterpart tells me that all the reports we have on this subject [Operation Condor] have been disseminated to the FBI. The Agency has also responded to requests from the Bureau for traces on several possible Chilean suspects.” (Memorandum from Shlaudeman to Habib, September 25; ibid., P840037–1089) On October 4, Associate Deputy Attorney General Giuliani sent a summary of the FBI’s investigation of the car-bombing to Edward Schmults, the Deputy Counsel to the President. The summary stated that “the manpower being devoted to this investigation varies depending on the leads, but is estimated to be approximately 75–100 special agents working on the case throughout the United States.” (Ford Library, Edward C. Shmultz Files, Box 17, Letelier Bombing Investigation) On October 5, Schmultz forwarded the summary to Duval.
248. Memorandum for the Record
Summary: In response to continuing controversy surrounding the disappearance and death of Charles Horman, James E. Anderson summarized his involvement in the case.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of General Counsel, Job 12-01548R: Legan Subject Records Files (OGC), Box 1, Chile Special Search Project, CIA Documents Denied in Full Pertaining to Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi—Gonzales/Privacy Issues—[less than 1 line not declassified]. No classification marking. Anderson, who had been a counselor officer in Santiago in September 1973, was a political officer in San Jose in September 1976. None of the documents referenced in the memorandum were attached to this copy.
249. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger
Summary: Shlaudeman reported that, when questioned about Operation Condor, DINA Director Contreras responded that it consisted only of intelligence-sharing operations and that it did not involve the planning of assassinations.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860053–1545. Secret. Attached and published is a memorandum summarizing an October 3 meeting with Contreras in Santiago. In telegram 246107 to Santiago, October 4, drafted on October 2, Shlaudeman informed the Embassy in response to telegram 8210 from Santiago, published as Document 242, that the Department agreed “that our purpose can best be served through [less than 1 line not declassified] approach to Contreras and that the issue should not repeat not be raised with Pinochet. [less than 1 line not declassified] is receiving instructions to consult with you on manner and timing of approach.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 16, Santiago, 1963–1979) In an attached note, Shlaudeman informed McAfee, “I have authority from above for this. Would appreciate no clearances shown and distribution confined to S, P, M, you and me.”
250. Letter From Attorney General Levi to Director of Central Intelligence Bush
Summary: Levi requested that the Central Intelligence Agency collect appropriate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information in support of the Department of Justice’s criminal investigation of the Letelier assassination.
Source: National Security Council, NSC Intelligence Files, INT File. No classification marking. On October 21, Scowcroft sent a memorandum to Levi indicating he endorsed his recommendation. (Ibid.)
251. Telegram 10032 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: Noting that requests for aid prompted congressional and other attacks on the Chilean Government, Carvajal told Popper that Chile would not seek further bilateral assistance from the United States.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760389–0704. Secret; Exdis. In a September 21 meeting with Simon and Parsky, Cauas indicated that the Chilean Government was “planning to tell U.S. not to proceed with aid to Chile”; the Chilean Finance Minister explained that “after much deliberation GOC has decided that given small amount of aid involved and given stress every time aid to Chile is brought up, it was not worth it.” (Telegram 252555 to Santiago, October 12; ibid., D760383–0798) In telegram 252354 to Santiago, October 12, the Department reported on an October 7 meeting between Kissinger and Carvajal, in which the Chilean Foreign Minister stated that “the GOC believes it would be better to eliminate all bilateral economic assistance next year.” (Ibid., D760382–0941)
252. Airgram A–155 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: Popper reported on an October 15 conversation in which he asked Carvajal about the possibility of a gradual relaxation of human rights restrictions in order to improve U.S.-Chilean relations. According to the Ambassador, the Foreign Minister showed rock-hard resistance, claiming that the threat of international communism justified Chile’s measures.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760166–0456. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Popper. In telegram 10130 from Santiago, October 20, the Embassy reported on a statement by Pinochet that the Chilean Government would not accept foreign loans that stipulated that the recipient take particular political action. (Ibid., D760393–1060)
253. Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency
Summary: The CIA reviewed items which could come up in a meeting between Popper and Colby, including deteriorating relations with Chile, the human rights situation, and Operation Condor.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 79M00467A: Subject Files Correspondence, Box 8, Folder 16: B–7.2: Briefings of Ambassadors. Secret. Attached but not published are a covering memorandum [name not declassified] to Colby, November 23; a curriculum vitae for Popper; and a Country Profile for Chile. A record of the conversation between Popper and Colby has not be found.
254. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Acting Secretary of State Robinson
Summary: Shlaudeman reviewed topics that Robinson might wish to discuss with Popper, including human rights in Chile, UNGA and UNESCO resolutions, the junta’s termination of the U.S. assistance program, and the arms imbalance between Peru and Chile.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760185–1435. Secret. Drafted by Levine on November 22; cleared by Fimbres, Hewitt, and Luers. Robinson and Popper discussed the Chilean economy and human rights. Popper thought that the human rights situation was improving, and Robinson and Popper thought that the U.S. Government should encourage such progress. (Telegram 289068/Tosec 310069 to Kissinger, November 25; ibid., D760438–0305)
255. Telegram 11822 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: Popper discussed with two influential Chilean army generals what the junta might do in the field of human rights to improve its image in the United States.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760460–0729. Secret. Airgram A–156 from Santiago was not found. On November 4, the ICRC representative in Santiago informed the Embassy that although serious human rights problems remained, human rights practices in Chile had improved since August. (Telegram 10862 from Santiago, November 11; ibid., D760421–0674) A December 6 CIA report noted that because there had been a “sharp decline in the number of prisoners held by the government,” the human rights situation was substantially improving. (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Chile Collections)
256. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Habib)
Summary: Shlaudeman reviewed the investigation into the disappearance and death of Charles Horman and recommended sending a telegram instructing the Embassy to re-interview Rafael Gonzalez.
Source: Department of State, Virtual Reading Room, Chile Declassification Project. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shlaudeman on January 15, 1977; cleared by McAfee and Aldrich. Tabs 1 and 2 were not attached.