239. Telegram 7720 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State1
7720. Subject: Illegal Detentions and Disappearances: Chile. Ref: Santiago 7212 and Previous.
1. Summary: In recent months the GOC has tried to convey the impression that the detention of political prisoners takes place in accordance with pertinent laws and decrees under its state of siege authority. It has also sought to convince observers that the number of persons held on internal security grounds has declined. In fact, relatively few cases of such detention have recently been publicized. Reports of mistreatment of detainees have also decreased. But we have evidence—which is growing in quantity and detail—that the Government is resorting increasingly to an alternative procedure: picking up and holding, or otherwise disposing of persons who are then said to have “disappeared.” This evidence cannot be made public for security reasons; nevertheless, the GOC is widely known to be acting in disregard of its own laws. A prime example of the current tactics is afforded by the case of the Budnik brothers, who we now know are in DINA’s hands. End summary.
2. Official, publicized detentions: beginning in September 1974 with President Pinochet’s “challenge” to the USSR and Cuba to release political prisoners, the GOC has first frequently and then irregularly made public statistics on the number of people detained under state of siege authority and thus to be held indefinitely without judicial proceedings; those in process of being tried; and those already tried and serving sentences (our categories I, II and III respectively). All were considered internal security cases, although many category II and III cases were prosecuted under regular arms control legislation.
3. From February 1976 on, the GOC apparently began making a determined effort to reduce state of siege detention cases (category I) to a minimum—first, by taking in few new detainees, and since May, by releasing a considerable number of detainees in country or into exile. They can thus claim, as they do, that the GOC is now holding [Page 651] only a few more than 400 “political prisoners.” At the same time, the 3,000 plus persons undergoing trial or already convicted (categories II and III) have simply dropped out of Government public statistics, although statistical information can be acquired by interested parties.
4. Disappearances: as the Department is aware, “disappearances” continue. The number of persons who disappear may or may not be greater now than earlier, but the proportion of disappeared to those formally detained seems to us definitely higher. In some cases, unidentified persons are seen to pick up a man; in others, he simply drops out of sight. The family may or may not receive a cryptic telephone call or other indication that the detainee is still alive.
5. When it addresses this subject at all, the Government is likely to suggest that the “disappeared” voluntarily went underground, changed names, or ran away with girlfriends. We have even gotten a hint that one of the charges against Hernan Montealegre (Vicariate of Solidarity Defense lawyer accused of communist membership) may be that he fabricated and gave publicity to bogus disappearances under orders from the Chilean Communist Party, in order to discredit the GOC. So far there has been no way definitely to tax the Government with responsibility for disappearances, in the absence of specific information. But Chileans who work in this area are convinced of government—usually DINA—complicity in many cases. As far as we know the police never seriously investigate them. Their antennae obviously are as good as the vicariate’s, and they want no run-ins with the Directorate of National Security (DINA). GOC Human Rights Spokesman Sergio Diez, who is well aware of the GOC’s image problem, for example told the Ambassador—perhaps disingenuously—that he could not understand why the government had not launched a major investigation when it heard that the Budnik brothers (reftel) had disappeared.
6. Number of disappeared: hard information is lacking. The vicariate of solidarity has a running account of over 1,000 since the coup, but the evidence on many of these is poor. The ICRC in late 1975 spoke of about 600. The vicariate is now in the process of distributing (we are promised a copy) a multi-volume work reproducing documentary evidence on some 340 “disappearances.”
7. More recently, we know [less than 1 line not declassified] that the GOC detained illegally 60–80 Communists in the Santiago area in the period just before the June OAS General Assembly. The ICRC (protect) had a hard list of 29 disappearances for June (para 10, Santiago 6573), and another 16 up to July 30. Our latest, preliminary June figures for Santiago from the vicariate of solidarity showed 23 arrests, of whom 14 had not subsequently surfaced. When an ICRC representative visited Cuatro Alamos July 29, it was empty, although he knew that a dozen [Page 652] or more people had been there during the month. Supreme Court President Eyzaguirre visited an empty Cuatro Alamos the same week, and he told the Ambassador August 2 that he also had heard of people who had disappeared.
8. We still do not know how “disappeared” detainees are treated. We think it possible that some of the communists who have been detained for many months may have been killed or tortured by DINA. This may have happened in the recent case of the dual citizen (Spanish and Chilean) ex-communist and UN functionary, Carmelo Soria Espinoza (Santiago 7581), who seems clearly to have been murdered.
9. Places of clandestine detention: [less than 1 line not declassified] information from a reliable source that the detained communists who disappeared are rotated among army camps in Peldehue (30 miles north of Santiago) and Penalolen (in Santiago’s southeast suburbs), and navy installations in Valparaiso and Talcahuano. The ICRC has long had its eye on the two navy posts. (See also para 10, Santiago 6573.)
10. The Budnik brothers: The most notable case of current interest is that of Julio and Eduardo Budnik, whose July 22 disappearance and subsequent fate has been bizarre. Since our last detained report (Santiago 7358), EmbOffs have talked to Rabbi Kreiman and the family’s lawyer, and other information has been developed. President Pinochet twice fended Kreiman off on the telephone. Then, in an August 4 meeting he repeated that the brothers were not in GOC hands and insinuated that they had either fled to avoid penalties for passing bad checks by going to Argentina, or had been kidnapped by extremist bandits. Kreiman picked up the last point to as why, then, the police had not taken aggressive action to find them. Pinochet undertook to give the police appropriate orders. We have what we consider quite reliable reports that the Budniks in fact are in DINA’s hands.
11. Comment: As indicated above, all the foregoing leads us to conclude that while the GOC is trying on the one hand to improve its image by claiming that the number of Chilean political prisoners is decreasing, on the other hand it is resorting with perhaps growing frequency to extra-legal methods of disposing of presumed dissidents. Since the beginning of 1976, the primary targets of the DINA have shifted: formerly they were MIR terrorists; now that the MIR has been neutralized, they seem to be the Chilean Communist leadership.
12. We will do our best to determine how wide-ranging the new DINA tactics may be. Taken in conjunction with the expulsion of anti-Marxist lawyers Jaime Castillo and Eugenio Velasco, these “disappearances” tend to give Chilean internal security operations rather more [Page 653] of a cast of terror. In this connection, it will be interesting to observe what happens to the ten labor leaders known as the “dinamicos” (Santiago 7617). They are the most prominent publicly vocal opponents of the regime at this time.
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Summary: Although the Chilean Government had tried to convey the impression that the rule of law guided the detention of political prisoners, the Embassy reported that the authorities increasingly picked up and held, or disposed of persons perceived to be a threat to the regime.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760306–0874. Confidential; Priority. In telegram 6573 from Santiago, July 7, the Embassy reported on the possible existence of clandestine detention centers. (Ibid., D760262–0206)
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