Chile


169. Telegram 4226 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State

Summary: Popper reported that he had explained to Defense Minister Bonilla the factors that made it difficult for the U.S. Government to provide military equipment to Chile.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740192–0983. Confidential. Repeated to Lima. Telegram 150955 to multiple posts, July 12, stated that the Department was “reviewing entire area of Human Rights and authoritarianism in light of seriousness with which problems are viewed by Congress.” (Ibid., D740188–0199) In telegram 4247 from Santiago, July 18, Popper reported on other aspects of his conversation with Bonilla. (Ibid., D740194–0123) In a July 18 telephone conversation with Kubisch, Kissinger referred to Popper’s meeting with Bonilla and asked if “our Amb[assador] to Chile could be taught that he is not to reform the Chilean Government.” Kissinger expressed his preference for the new Chilean Government over that led by Allende, and he told Kubisch, “Let’s see what we can do on military equipment for them.” Kubisch expressed concern that making military equipment available to Chile could prompt Congress to pass legislation restricting the Department’s ability to provide foreign military assistance. Kubisch suggested informing the Chileans privately that military aid would be forthcoming. (Department of State, FOIA Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts)


170. Telegram 4315 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State

Summary: Secretary of the Army Callaway urged Pinochet and Bonilla to allow interested parties to investigate the human rights situation in Chile, noting that openness could counter the perception that the regime was overly repressive.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740199–0012. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated immediate to DOD, the Office of the Secretary of Army, and COMUSCINCSO for General Rosson. In telegram 4294 from Santiago, July 20, the Embassy sent the Department a summary of the human rights situation in Chile, including information on the rights and treatment of detainees. The Embassy reported that although there was cause for concern over human rights problems in Chile, an examination of the human rights situation led “to qualified rather than utterly sweeping conclusions.” (Ibid., D740196–1019)


171. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (Bowdler) and the Acting Legal Advisor (Feldman) to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (Sisco)

Summary: Bowdler and Feldman noted that in recent weeks the Chilean Government had failed to make sufficient progress in eliminating civil rights violations and recommended that the Embassy be instructed to deliver a low-key démarche on the subject.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850148–2670. Confidential. Drafted by Gantz on August 29; cleared by Runyon and Shlaudeman. Tab A, a draft telegram, was sent as telegram 196836 to Santiago, September 7. (Ibid., D740249–0676) The attachments at Tab B have not been found. On September 9, Popper reported that even though the U.S. Government might find the IAHRC’s recommendations “eminently reasonable,” the Chilean Government did not, largely because the regime considered itself “to be engaged in a deadly game, against conspirators both at home and abroad, in which their lives are at stake.” Popper concluded that the U.S. Government should encourage the junta to restore normal legal and procedural practices as soon as possible. (Telegram 5492 from Santiago, September 9; ibid., D740250–1095) In telegram 5689 from Santiago, September 18, Popper reported that he had told Carvajal and Merino that Chile had to improve its human rights record if it wished to secure assistance from the U.S. Government. (Ibid., D740262–0074)


172. Memorandum of Conversation

Summary: Ford, Kissinger, and Rockefeller discussed how to mitigate the problem of leaked information on U.S. covert action in Chile.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 5, September 6, 1974, Ford, Kissinger, Rockefeller. Secret; Sensitive. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the Oval Office and lasted from 9:26 to 10:30 a.m. (Ford Library, President’s Daily Diary). A September 8 article in the New York Times entitled, “CIA Chief Tells House of $8 Million Campaign Against Allende in 70–73,” referred to a letter from Harrington to Morgan which contained confidential information from a closed session of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence. During a September 9 meeting with the President, Kissinger informed Ford that the leak had come from Congress and that it had not had significant repercussions. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 5, September 6, 1974, Ford, Kissinger, Rockefeller)


173. Telegram 5559 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State

Summary: The Embassy reported that although the junta was firmly in power a year after the overthrow of Allende, its weaknesses included the limited capacity of a military-dominated government, the political liabilities created by repressive human rights practices, and the vulnerability of an economy dependent on a single commodity. Despite these challenges, the Embassy concluded that public support for the Chilean Government appeared to remain at a high level.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740253–0688. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Buenos Aires, Lima, La Paz, Brasília, Asunción, Quito, USUN, and the Mission in Geneva.


174. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bowdler) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Summary: Given congressional opposition to U.S. arms sales to Chile, Bowdler suggested to Kissinger that a sale of weaponry be held in abeyance while assuring the Chileans that the U.S. Government was in the process of completing action on the purchase.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, ARA Files, Subject and Country Files: Lot 81D324, DEF 12–5 CHILE Military Sales, 1974–75. Secret. Drafted by Karkashian on September 25; cleared by Jenkins, Vest, and Gantz. Sent through Maw. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum, “Chilean foreign minister inquired about TOWs—where does it stand? HK” Attached at Tab A is a draft cable, not published, instructing the Embassy to assure the Chilean Government that the U.S. Government was doing everything possible to meet the needs of the Chilean armed forces; the cable added that Chilean officials should understand the importance of the human rights issue. The final draft was sent as telegram 220331 to Santiago, October 7. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, D740283–0919) Attached at Tab B is telegram 5805 from Santiago, September 24, not published, which noted Chilean dismay at delays in receiving arms. In an October 8 memorandum, Rogers reminded Kissinger that he had approved ARA’s September 26 recommendation on October 7, and suggested that because the weaponry in question was defensive, its sale to Chile would not arouse significant Congressional criticism. (Ibid., ARA Files, Subject and Country Files: Lot 75D476, Chile 1974)


175. Telegram 6180 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State

Summary: Popper reported that he had informed Defense Minister Bonilla of the U.S. Government’s intention to act soon on Chilean arms requests. Bonilla expressed great satisfaction and responded to Popper’s comments on human rights issues by offering a justification and a plea for understanding of the Chilean Government’s handling of internal security threats.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Box 3, Chile–State Department Telegrams, To SECSTATE–EXDIS. Secret; Exdis. The instruction for this démarche is in telegram 220331 to Santiago, October 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740283–0919) Telegram 5805 from Santiago is discussed in the source note to Document 174. On December 2, Rogers assured Heitmann that the U.S. administration’s intention to sell weapons to Chile remained unchanged, but he noted the serious problem posed by strong congressional opposition to any military assistance. (Telegram 264721 to Santiago, December 3; ibid., D740349–0725)


176. Telegram 242788/Tosec 707 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy

Summary: The Department suggested to Kissinger that congressional leaders be called regarding military assistance to Chile, and that the United States accept some Chilean citizens under detention who would soon be released.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740317–0678. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Karkashian; cleared by Shlaudeman, Jenkins, Aldrich, Vest, and Raphel; approved by Rogers. Kissinger was attending the World Food Conference in Rome. On November 7, Kissinger informed Rogers that he approved the “Chile arms package and inter-related issues as presented in paragraph 3.” Kissinger did not want to decide on the human rights circular until he had a chance to discuss it upon his return to Washington. (Telegram 245395/Secto 525 to Quito, November 7; ibid., D740320–0679) Rogers was in Quito for a meeting of foreign ministers. In an October 1 telephone conversation, Kissinger assured Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D–MA) that the Department of State was concerned about human rights issues and told Kennedy that he believed that the Senator’s proposed amendment to restrict military assistance to Chile would have “unfortunate consequences.” (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts)


177. Transcript of the Secretary of State’s Regional Staff Meeting

Summary: Kissinger, Rogers, and Maw discussed congressional attempts to cut off military assistance to Chile and the potential impact the cut off would have on the military government in Chile.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, Lot 78D443, Box 5, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates. In a meeting with Ford on the same day, Kissinger, in outlining administration strategy to prevent Congress from cutting FMS, stated, “I think our strategic position has to be to go to the people against the Congress. I will go to the people too and talk about the Executive–Legislative relationship. In the name of human rights, they [Congress] will undermine national security.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 6, December 3, 1974, Ford, Kissinger) In a December 4 memorandum to Kissinger, Rogers suggested that he inform Kennedy that terminating military assistance would lessen the U.S. Government’s leverage with the junta, and that Peru might perceive termination of assistance as a “green light” to invade Chile. (National Archives, RG 59, ARA Files, Subject and Country Files: Lot 81D324, DEF 12–5 CHILE, Military Sales 1974–75)


178. Transcript of the Secretary of State’s Principals and Regionals Staff Meeting

Summary: Kissinger, Rogers, and Maw discussed the implications of a ban on U.S. military assistance for Chile.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, Lot 78D443, Box 5, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates. In telegram 7654 from Santiago, December 18, the Embassy reported that the Chilean military would seek to procure weapons from Spain, the Arab nations, and the PRC. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, D740368–0466) In a December 23 staff meeting, Kissinger, Rogers, and Maw discussed the possibility of completing commercial sales of arms to Chile in a manner consistent with the ban on military assistance, and Kissinger expressed his intention to have a public fight with Congress over the role in foreign policy that it was asserting for itself. (National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, Lot 78D443, Box 5, Secretary’s Staff Meetings.)


179. Memorandum of Conversation

Summary: Chilean Chargé Guzmán and Kissinger discussed the implications of a ban on U.S. military assistance to Chile and Kissinger’s prospective trip to Latin America.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820123–0667. Confidential; Nodis. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office at the State Department. Drafted by Isaacs. In a December 20 meeting with the President, Kissinger stated, “The Chilean aid cut is disastrous. I want us to do everything possible to get arms for Chile. They [the Chileans] can buy commercially but Defense says they won’t sell if there is any DOD component.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 7, December 20, 1974, Ford, Kissinger) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, which included a ban on FMS to Chile, was signed into law by Ford on December 30. Upon signing the legislation, Ford stated, “I regret the action of Congress in cutting off the modest program of military assistance to Chile,” adding that he did not consider the measure to be an effective way to promote human rights there. (Statement on Signing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, December 30, 1974, Public Papers: Ford, 1974, p. 780) Rogers informed Kissinger on January 4, 1975, that Maw thought that continued U.S. training of the Chilean military was inconsistent with Congress’s cutoff of military assistance, but Kissinger decided to continue the assistance until he could consult with Congress upon their return. (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Transcripts of Kissinger Telephone Conversations)


180. Telegram 49 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State

Summary: In anticipation of a possible visit to Chile by Secretary Kissinger, Popper and Pinochet discussed key bilateral issues, including human rights and U.S. economic and military assistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750003–0830. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Because of the impending collapse of the South Vietnamese Government and crises in the Middle East, Kissinger’s first trip to Latin America as Secretary of State was postponed until February 16–24, 1976. He did not visit Chile until June 7–9, 1976, when he attended the OAS General Assembly there. On January 6, the Embassy reported that although there had been no major change in the human rights situation, some individuals within the Chilean Government understood that the issue was affecting Chile’s international image. (Telegram 84 from Santiago, January 6; ibid., D750005–0495.) In telegram 131 from Santiago, January 7, the Embassy commented on reports that Pinochet and other Chilean officials had become convinced of the need to curtail human rights abuses. (Ibid., D750006–0976.) In telegram 726 from Santiago, February 3, Popper reported that Chilean military officials were “desperately concerned” by the prospect of a Peruvian attack and by the refusal of the United States to provide even minimal material and moral support. (Ibid., D750038–0954.)


181. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Walters) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Summary: Walters reported on a meeting with the Chief of the Chilean intelligence service, Colonel Juan Contreras. During the meeting, Contreras delivered a memorandum from Pinochet outlining the economic and military assistance desired by the Chilean Government.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 4, Chile. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A copy of the January 3 memorandum from Pinochet that was delivered by Contreras to Walters is attached and published. In a handwritten note attached to the memorandum, Scowcroft suggested to Kissinger that the U.S. Government respond to Pinochet’s message by having Walters indicate that “we want to do what we can,” and that Kissinger “would hope to discuss it if you are able to visit Chile”; Kissinger approved. In a memorandum to Scowcroft, December 31, 1974, Walters noted that he had declined a Chilean invitation to Santiago for private discussions with Pinochet, and that he had suggested, as an alternative, that Contreras travel to the United States to meet with him. He added that Contreras was scheduled to visit Washington during the week of January 6–10 and was expected to deliver an appeal for assistance from Pinochet. (Ibid., Box 3, CIA–Communications 16)


182. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Summary: Rogers briefed Kissinger on Popper’s démarches to Foreign Minister Carvajal and Interior Minister Benavides, in which the Ambassador had stated that legal reform and improved human rights practices would help to improve Chile’s international image and to placate the Chilean Government’s critics.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P830132–0278. Confidential. Drafted by Hechtman and Gantz. Tabs A–D are attached but not published. In Tab A, a February 6 memorandum to Kissinger, Rogers listed the 10 démarches Popper made to Chilean officials on human rights from April 1974 to February 1975; next to the entries for December 13, 1974, and February 3, 1975, Kissinger wrote, “What was this about?” Tab B is telegram 7578 from Santiago, December 13, 1974. In Tab C, telegram 23898 to Santiago, February 1, the Department instructed Popper to communicate to Benavides that legal reform, improved human rights practices, and a Chilean invitation for an IAHRC visit were important for Chile to restore its international credibility. In Tab D, Telegram 789 from Santiago, February 4, Popper relayed to the Department that Benavides thought that Chilean efforts towards legal reform and curbing human rights abuses were adequate. Popper concluded that future dialogue on the human rights problem should not be conducted with Benavides.


183. Memorandum From the Chief of the Latin America Division of the Central Intelligence Agency (Phillips) to Director of Central Intelligence Colby

Summary: Phillips reported that U.S. officials had persuaded the Chilean Government to take steps to curb human rights abuses and to liberalize its policy toward the media.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01542R: Executive Registry Subject Files, Box 2, C–7: Chile. Secret. [drafting information not declassified]. Sent through the DDO. A copy of the memorandum was sent to Walters. In a January 4 memorandum to Walters, [name not declassified] asserted that the U.S. Congressional cutoff of assistance to Chile was not having a significant impact on Chilean policy. (Ibid.) In telegram 1118 from Santiago, February 20, the Embassy reported on Pinochet’s February 18 announcement, and observed that while there had been improvement in the area of human rights, until progress was made “on other fronts (due process, modifying state of siege), Chile will continue to have both a problem and a poor world image.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750061–0357)


184. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers), the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Vest), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (McCloskey) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Summary: Rogers, Vest, and McCloskey outlined options for Kissinger for FMS sales to Chile in light of Congress’s prohibition on military assistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P830133–2615. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Karkashian and Michel on March 3. Sent through Maw. Gantz, Richardson, and Stern concurred. A notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Kissinger “approved 1st recommendation” in telegram Secto 77, March 7. On the first page of the memorandum, the phrase, “as permitting cash sales,” is underlined, and a notation in the margin reads, “DOD does not concur, see Tab A supp[lement].” A notation next to the first recommendation reads, “with respect to new items, consult Congress.” The two tabs are not published. Tab A is a March 4 memorandum from Leigh to Maw providing a legal opinion on the President’s authority to sell defense articles and services to Chile. Tab B is a January 3 memorandum from Foreman to Fish transmitting an undated list of pending FMS actions. Telegram 42/Secto 77 from Aswan, March 7, containing Kissinger’s approval and his instruction that Congress be consulted regarding new items, is ibid., P850014–1285. In a March 8 memorandum, Springsteen informed Rogers, Vest, and McCloskey of Kissinger’s decision. (Ibid., P830113–1174)


185. Memorandum From Ambassador Popper to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers)

Summary: Popper provided Rogers with a briefing on outstanding issues with Chile upon his arrival in Santiago for meetings with Chilean officials.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, ARA Files, Assistant Secretary Files, Subject and Country Files: Lot 78D261, Chile, Secretary Kissinger’s Visit, April 1975. Secret. Rogers was in Chile from March 11 to March 12. (Telegram 1434 from Santiago, March 7; ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, D750081–0002) The papers enclosed with this memorandum have not been found. In telegram 2023 from Lima, March 12, Rogers reported on his meeting with Pinochet, in which Kissinger’s planned visit to Chile was discussed. Pinochet urged that Kissinger be made familiar with Chile’s economic problems, and he referred to his Government’s interest in arms purchases in response to Peru’s military build-up. (Ibid., D750087–0183) Kissinger’s projected visit to Chile was subsequently postponed; he did not travel to Santiago until June 1976. During an April 2 staff meeting, Kissinger indicated that he wanted Chilean debt rescheduled at a meeting of the Paris Club so that the IBRD would find Chile creditworthy, thus allowing the possibility of loans. (Ibid., Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, Lot 78D443, Box 6, Secretary’s Principals’ and Regionals’ Staff Meetings)


186. Telegram 1947 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State

Summary: Ambassador Popper reported that the Chilean reaction to the U.S. Government’s ban on military assistance had initially been restrained but that resentment and anti-U.S. sentiment seemed to be growing within the Chilean Government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750114–0750. Confidential; Exdis. In telegram 282507 to Santiago, December 27, 1974, the Department instructed the Embassy to “reflect on the effect in Chile of the congressional arms ban.” (Ibid., D740376–0267) USDAO Brasília Message No. 146 and DATT–IR0076 have not been found.


187. Telegram 2055 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State

Summary: Minister of Economic Coordination Saez informed Popper that the Chilean Government planned to announce a series of measures that would result in an improvement of Chile’s human rights practices.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Box 3, Chile, State Department Telegrams, SECSTATE–NODIS. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. On April 10, Popper reported that Saez had informed him that the inclusion of more civilians in Pinochet’s Cabinet would help bring about improvements in the human rights area. (Telegram 2160 from Santiago, April 10; ibid.) The Decree Law on National Security, April 30, decreed that detainees would either be charged or released within five days, and that notification of family members would take place within two days. However, the Embassy reported that the measure represented “little substantive change from legal situation concerning national emergency and status of detainees which has existed since Sept 1973 coup.” (Telegram 3084 from Santiago, May 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750155–0617) Although the Minister of Justice assured U.S. officials that the law would change the Chilean Government’s detention practices, the ICRC reported that no such change occurred. (Telegram 4454 from Santiago, June 23; ibid., D750218–0556)


188. Memorandum of Conversation

Summary: During a breakfast meeting, Kissinger, Rogers, Carvajal, and Trucco discussed human rights violations in Chile and the junta’s efforts to obtain weapons from the United States and other countries.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820125–0227. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the James Madison Dining Room in the Department. Drafted by Ryan; cleared by Rogers; approved by Gompert on May 13. A memorandum of Kissinger’s conversation with Ford at 9:30 a.m. on May 9 does not indicate any discussion of military sales to Chile. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 11, May 9, 1975)


189. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01542R: Executive Registry Subject Files, Box 2, C–7: Chile. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]


190. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford

Summary: Kissinger recommended that Ford approve the immediate resumption of limited FMS sales and deliveries to Chile.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Box 3, Chile 2. Secret. Sent for action. Scowcroft initialed for Kissinger. Ford approved the recommendation. Tabs A–D are not published. Tab A is an unsigned and undated memorandum from Kissinger to Schlesinger and Ingersoll informing them of Ford’s decision to resume FMS sales and deliveries. Tab B is a March 4 memorandum from Leigh to Maw giving a legal opinion on the President’s authority to sell defense articles and services to Chile. Tab C is a March 24 memorandum from Forman to Fish outlining the legal position of the Department of Defense on military sales to Chile. Tab D is a May 15 letter from 101 Congressmen to Kissinger indicating their understanding that cash military sales to Chile would be unaffected by the legislative restrictions on military assistance. In a May 20 memorandum to Kissinger under which a draft of the May 26 memorandum was transmitted, Granger asserted that the legal positions of both the Department of State and the Department of Defense were supportable and concluded that “political considerations favor the immediate resumption of limited FMS sales and deliveries.” (Ibid.)


191. Memorandum From Stephen Low of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger

Summary: Noting that proceeding with arms deliveries to Chile might lead Congress to pass more restrictive legislation on military assistance, Low recommended that the resumption of weapon sales to Chile be delayed until at least July 1.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Box 3, Chile 2. Secret. Sent for action. Granger and Janka concurred. Kissinger approved the recommendation. On June 22, McFarlane informed Davis that Ford’s May 26 approval of Kissinger’s memorandum [Document 190] “was overcome by subsequent events and specifically a later paper Steve sent over urging that we hold off in going ahead with arms sales and deliveries until after the beginning of the fiscal year.” (Ibid., Chile, 3) The letter from 101 Congressmen referred to in this memorandum was attached to Document 190 as Tab D.


192. Memorandum From Stephen Low of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Summary: Low summarized a National Intelligence Estimate on Chile, which concluded that even as the economic situation there continued to deteriorate, the military would remain in power for the foreseeable future. The NIE also concluded that the Chilean Government would gradually loosen its authoritarian controls and lessen its repression.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 1, Chile, Political, Military 1. Secret. A notation in an unknown hand at the top of the memorandum reads: “7/29 [July 29]—no comeback rec’d [received]—F.” Attached but not published is NIE 94–1–75, “Prospects for Chile,” June 6. An attached note indicates that Ratliff sent Kissinger’s copy of the estimate to Low on June 13.


193. Memorandum From Stephen Low of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)

Summary: Noting disarray in U.S. policy towards Chile, Low suggested holding an inter-agency Senior Review Group meeting to clarify the U.S. Government position.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Box 3, Chile 2. Confidential. Sent for action. Granger concurred. Neither approve nor disapprove was checked, but a notation in Kissinger’s hand on the first page of the memorandum reads: “1st let me straighten out ARA.” On the second page, Kissinger wrote next to the last three sentences of the second paragraph, “NO—I agree with DOD.” No record of an SRG meeting on Chile has been found, and a July 31 entry on a routing sheet attached to the memorandum indicates that Low’s memorandum was overtaken by events. The CASP for Chile for FY 1976–1977 was transmitted in airgram A–86 from Santiago, May 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P750084–1651) Telegram 4600 from Santiago, June 30, provides an account of the meeting between Popper and Pinochet, in which Pinochet expressed concern about the threat from Peru and complained that the Chilean military mission in Washington was unable to get straight answers from the Department of Defense on the status of FMS transactions. (Ibid., D750227–0136)


194. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Walters) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Summary: At Pinochet’s direction, Contreras met with Walters and discussed Chilean foreign policy concerns, including a proposal for a U.N. Human Rights Commission visit to Chile, possible Peruvian aggression, and the difficulty of acquiring weaponry.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01542R: Executive Registry Subject Files, Box 2, C–7: Chile. Secret. Rogers informed Kissinger of Walters’s meeting with Contreras on July 7. (Minutes of the Secretary’s Principals’ and Regionals’ Staff Meeting; National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, Lot 78D443, Box 7, Secretary’s Analytical Staff Meetings.) According to a July 7 memorandum summarizing the Walters-Contreras conversation, Contreras indicated that “he exchanges intelligence information regularly with the Argentine and Brazilian security services and noted that he has his own representatives in Buenos Aires and Brasília who work directly with these services.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01542R: Executive Registry Subject Files, Box 2, C–7: Chile.) In a meeting of Department and CIA officials, July 11, Rogers characterized Contreras as “the most notorious symbol of repression in Chile.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA Weekly Meetings, 1976–1977) In an August 25 meeting with ARA officials regarding a visit to Washington by Contreras at that time, a CIA official referred to Contreras as one of Pinochet’s “unfortunate advisors.” (Ibid.)


195. Telegram 4824/Tosec 60104 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State

Summary: Pinochet indicated he would be willing to receive a “truly impartial” group to investigate human rights abuses, but not the UNHRC. Although he understood that it would be difficult for the U.S. Government to provide assistance, Pinochet requested it anyway.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–1976, 7/9–12/75, Europe, TOSEC 5. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Kissinger as telegram 163457/Tosec 60104 on July 11. On July 4, Pinochet cancelled the visit of the UNHRC three days before it was scheduled to arrive in Santiago. (Memorandum From Rogers to Ingersoll, July 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810150–1244) A summary of the July 9 conversation between Ingersoll, Rogers, Valdes, and Trucco is in telegram 164813 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, July 12. (Ibid., D750242–0058)


196. Memorandum From Stephen Low of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)

Summary: Low informed Scowcroft of disagreement between Congress and the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government over arms sales to Chile.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Box 3, Chile 2. Confidential. Sent for information. Scowcroft wrote “OK” on the memorandum and initialed it. The Pinochet-Popper conversation mentioned here took place on June 30 and is referenced in the source note to Document 195. The Maw-Popper meeting referred to here took place on July 14 and is described in telegram 174230 to Santiago, July 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750254–1055) In telegram 4698 from Santiago, July 5, the Embassy reported on Pinochet’s July 4 announcement that he had decided not to allow the United Nations Human Rights Commission to visit Chile. (Ibid., D750233–0196)


197. Memorandum of Conversation

Summary: Kissinger, Rogers, and Popper discussed U.S. policy towards Chile, including issues relating to the level of U.S. assistance to be provided to the country, the human rights situation, and the status of weapon sales. Kissinger expressed a desire to strengthen Chile and to deliver military assistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820123–1831. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Karkashian on July 21; cleared by Rogers. The hold on sales of armaments before July 1 is discussed in Document 191. Ingersoll reported to Kissinger on July 15 that he had met the previous day with Popper and representatives from NSC, ARA, H, PM, and L, all of whom agreed that it was politically impossible to initiate any new military assistance for Chile, but that the U.S. Government would inform the Chilean Government that FMS credits from prior years were still available to them. (Telegram 165671/Tosec 70003 to the Secretary, July 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–2305) On July 24, the Department informed the Embassy that FMS sales agreed to prior to July 1, 1974, and a few items contracted in early FY 1975 before the suspension of assistance would be delivered. (Telegram 174230 to Santiago, July 24; ibid., D750254–1055) In telegram 737204 from the Central Intelligence Agency, August 30, the CIA sought information on what steps might be taken to exert positive influence on the Chilean Government. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01542R: Executive Registry Subject Files, Box 2, C–7: Chile)


198. Memorandum of Conversation

Summary: Kissinger and Maw discussed Chilean human rights violations and U.S. military assistance with Fraser and other members of Congress.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820123–1780. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Richardson on August 5.