Argentina
31. Telegram 8233 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy analyzed the political turmoil in Argentina, concluding that a military takeover of the country was likely.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750440–0355. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Asunción, Brasília, La Paz, Montevideo, Santiago, and DIA. Telegram 6087 from Buenos Aires, September 10, is Document 28. In telegram 7681 from Buenos Aires, November 21, the Embassy reported that while Perón had diverted the momentum against her by abandoning some of her previous intransigence, the government remained paralyzed, with a power vacuum at the top. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750406–0829) In telegram 7691 from Buenos Aires, November 21, the Embassy reported on the increasing involvement of the Armed Forces in fighting subversives, observing that “no security force in the world has had much luck in struggle against terrorists when govt it was defending was corrupt and discredited, as is Mrs. Peron’s. In struggle against terrorists, Armed Forces are put in uncomfortable position of defending an entity they themselves abhor.” (Ibid., D750407–0997) In telegram 8055 from Buenos Aires, December 10, the Embassy reported that the military had apparently decided not to intervene in politics for the time being. (Ibid., D750429–0866)
32. Telegram 660 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State
Summary: In an analysis of Argentine perceptions of the United States, Hill reviewed U.S.-Argentine relations since 1973 and noted that internal turmoil had deprived Argentina of its ability to forge a coherent foreign policy.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760036–0529. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Brasília, La Paz, Montevideo, Santiago, Asunción, and USCINCSO for POLAD. In telegram 10605, January 15, Rogers asked all American Republic diplomatic posts to comment on perceptions of the United States in their host countries. (Ibid., D760016–1144)
33. Telegram 36721 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina
Summary: At a luncheon at the Argentine Embassy, Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Quijano discussed inter-American relations, bilateral relations, the Secretary’s trip to Latin America, and Argentine-U.K. talks concerning the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760056–0788. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Bartch and approved by Rogers.
34. Telegram 1186 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State
Summary: Ambassador Hill told Air Force Commander in Chief Agosti that the Argentines would have to determine their country’s future, adding that the United States would recognize an Argentine Government that effectively discharged its international obligations.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760065–0825. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to DIA. In telegram 984 from Buenos Aires, February 12, the Embassy reported that the military appeared to have given up on the ability of civilians to govern and to be awaiting an appropriate moment to step in. The Embassy concluded that the United States “must now wait for coming developments and hope for a stable, responsible govt.” (Ibid., D760054–0425) In telegram 1042 from Buenos Aires, February 16, Hill reported on a conversation in which a Foreign Ministry official told the Ambassador that he had been asked by “the military planning group” to prepare a study on how best to avoid problems with the United States on the human rights issue. The officers reportedly intended “to carry forward an all-out war on the terrorists” but wished “to minimize any resulting problems with the US.” (Ibid., D760058–0466) In telegram 44004 to Buenos Aires, February 24, the Department commended Hill for his handling of Agosti’s inquiry and of the human rights issue. (Ibid., D760068–1074) In telegram 1292 from Buenos Aires, February 26, the Embassy transmitted a memorandum of conversation of the Hill-Agosti meeting. (Ibid., D760072–0725)
35. Telegram 1373 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported on widespread rumors that a military coup was inevitable, adding that no significant segment of Argentine society accused the United States of being responsible for the anticipated coup. The U.S. Government therefore remained on good terms with both civilian politicians and military leaders.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760076–0478. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Asunción, Brasília, La Paz, Montevideo, Santiago, and DIA. In telegram 1790 from Buenos Aires, March 18, the Embassy stated that while a moderate caretaker administration was likely to emerge initially in the wake of a coup, the magnitude of the country’s problems and the presence of hard-line officers in the Armed Forces could lead to “military rule for an extended duration and of unprecedented severity.” The Embassy added that while U.S. interests were unlikely to be sharply affected by developments in the short term, the failure of any military regime to address the country’s problems could allow leftist extremists to build a broader base, resulting in “a disastrous situation of such magnitude that US interests across the board would be seriously threatened.” (Ibid., D760104–0479)
36. Airgram A–32 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy provided its assessment of the human rights situation in Argentina, concluding that terrorist suspects had been subject to extralegal killings, arrests, and incarceration, but that the extent of official involvement in these abuses was difficult to assess.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760037–0384. Confidential. Drafted by Political Officer Frank Zambito; cleared by Acting DCM Hugh Woodward and Hill; approved by Political Counselor Wayne Smith. In telegram 45319 to all diplomatic posts, February 25, the Department sent instructions for human rights reporting. (Ibid., D760071–0412)
37. Telegram 62045 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina
Summary: The Department reported on a request by the Argentine Military Attaché for information on Argentines in the United States with leftist sympathies. The Department noted that the U.S. Government did not intend to provide the requested information, adding that, as a matter of policy, it did not wish to receive detailed information on plans for unconstitutional changes of government.
Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 16, Buenos Aires. Secret; Immediate; Noforn; Roger Channel. Drafted by Bartch; approved by Emerson Brown in INR/DDC and by Ryan.
38. Telegram 1751 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State
Summary: Hill reported on a conversation with Navy Commander in Chief Massera in which the possibility of a military coup was discussed in hypothetical terms.
Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 16, Buenos Aires. Secret; Immediate; Roger Channel. In telegram 1715 from Buenos Aires, March 15, the Embassy reported that the military leadership was coming under increasing pressure from hardliners to carry out a coup. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760098–0063) In telegram 1916 from Buenos Aires, March 23, the Embassy reported that large-scale troop movements in connection with a coup attempt had begun on the afternoon of March 22. (Ibid., D760109–0938) In telegram 2034 from Buenos Aires, March 26, the Embassy reported that the military junta had met less opposition than expected in overthrowing Perón and that it had named General Jorge Videla as President. (Ibid., D760115–0439)
39. Telegram 72468 From the Department of State to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts and the Commander in Chief of the Southern Command
Summary: In an analysis of the military coup that was developing in Argentina, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research concluded that the new regime would not pose a threat to U.S. interests but that human rights violations could become a serious issue in U.S.-Argentine relations.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760113–0958. Confidential. Drafted by Buchanan; cleared by Louis Misback in INR/RAR, Jack Smith in ARA/APU, and Ryan; approved by Kirk.
40. Transcript of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting
Summary: Kissinger and Rogers discussed the stance that the United States should adopt toward the military junta that had taken power in Argentina.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, Lot 78D443, Box 4, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret.
41. Telegram 2061 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy characterized the coup as moderate and concluded that the U.S. Government should sympathetically consider any Argentine requests for assistance while avoiding over-identification with the junta.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760119–0409. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Asunción, Brasília, Caracas, La Paz, Lima, Mexico City, Montevideo, and Santiago.
42. Telegram 2528 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported on the Argentine Government’s human rights record since the coup, concluding that any abuses and arbitrary behavior did not reflect official policy.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760145–0248. Confidential. In telegram 2288 from Buenos Aires, April 6, the Embassy reported on incidents of right-wing terrorist violence against leftists during the 12 days following the coup, noting that while there was no evidence that the violence was officially inspired, the incidents could damage the new Argentine Government’s reputation for moderation. (Ibid.) In telegram 83929 to Buenos Aires, April 7, the Department noted that it was receiving inquiries about arrests in Argentina since the coup and it asked the Embassy to report on individuals detained by the new regime. (Ibid.)
43. Telegram 2748 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State
Summary: Hill reported that the hard-line attitudes expressed by several Argentine Cabinet members during a luncheon conversation had given him a sense of unease about the direction of the regime.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760161–0110. Secret; Exdis.
44. Telegram 3460 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State
Summary: Ambassador Hill reported on his conversation with Undersecretary General of the Presidency Ricardo Yofre regarding U.S. Government concern over human rights abuses in Argentina. Although Yofre was confident such abuses would be limited, the Embassy concluded that hard-liners posed a threat to the moderate line favored by Videla.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760202–1291. Secret; Priority; Exdis. In telegram 3390 from Buenos Aires, May 21, the Embassy reported on the abduction of Uruguayan refugees Zelmar Michelini and Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz by armed men who invaded their residences. (Ibid., D760205–0965) In telegram 127301 to Buenos Aires, May 23, the Department transmitted a press report that the bodies of Michelini, Gutidrrez Ruiz, and two other Uruguayans had been discovered on May 22. (Ibid., D760200–0798)
45. Telegram 3462 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State
Summary: In view of the worsening human rights situation, Hill requested permission to deliver a démarche to the Foreign Minister to express the concern of the U.S. Government.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760203–0109. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. In telegram 129048 to Buenos Aires, May 25, the Department concurred. (Ibid.) In telegram 3576 from Buenos Aires, May 28, Hill reported on his May 27 démarche to the Foreign Minister, noting that he had advocated “some sort of statement on part of GOA deploring terrorism of any kind, whether from left or right, and reaffirming GOA’s resolve to enforce law and respect human rights.” Hill added that while “Guzzetti indicated his understanding of the problem, I did not have the impression he really got the point.” (Ibid., D760208–0267)
46. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Saunders) to Secretary of State Kissinger
Summary: The Bureau of Intelligence and Research concluded that security forces were probably involved in extrajudicial killings in Argentina, but that there was no evidence to support the contention that the military regimes of the Southern Cone were cooperating in an international assassination program.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760092–1738. Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals. Drafted by Buchanan. An expanded and updated version of this report was sent to all American Republics diplomatic posts, Lisbon, Oslo, Paris, Rome, Stockholm, and USCINCSO in telegram 178852, July 20. Like this memorandum, the updated report noted that the fact that the killings of foreign political figures were happening primarily in Argentina lent “credence to the idea that their origins lie in a uniquely Argentine set of circumstances rather than in an elaborate international conspiracy.” The report also noted that Argentine security personnel were “clearly involved in the anti-exile activities, although it is impossible to assess in what numbers or at what level of command.” (Ibid., D760279–0200)
47. Telegram 3741 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported circumstantial evidence that elements of the Argentine security forces were involved in the killing of foreign political figures in exile in Argentina. The Embassy also called the theory that hard-liners within Southern Cone governments were working together to eliminate Communists and leftists “interesting,” adding that it “would possibly explain developments.”
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760219–0086. Secret; Immediate. Repeated Priority to Asunción, Brasília, La Paz, and Montevideo. In telegram 137156 to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Asunción, Santiago, Brasília, and La Paz, June 4, the Department noted its concern over “the recent sharp increase in the number of assassinations of foreign political figures in exile or political asylum in or from your countries” and asked if “the deaths of political refugees or asylees from your country abroad could have been arranged by your host government through institutional ties to groups, governmental or other, in the country where the deaths took place.” (Ibid., D760214–0807)
48. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Kissinger and Guzzetti discussed bilateral relations, regional and international issues, terrorism, and human rights.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820118–1531. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Einaudi and approved in S on March 7, 1977. Brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s suite in Santiago where he and Guzzetti were attending the OAS General Assembly meeting. The memorandum of conversation is dated June 6, but according to Kissinger’s Calendar of Events, the meeting occurred on June 10. (Secretary’s Calendar of Events; ibid., Executive Secretary Briefing Books, 1958–1976: Lot 76D284, Box 243, Secretary’s Visit to Latin America, 6–13 June 1976, follow-up) A report on Kissinger’s June 18 meeting with Martínez de Hoz is ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, D760238–0062. A report on Simon’s June 16 meeting with Martínez de Hoz is ibid., D760242–0883.
49. Transcript of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting
Summary: Shlaudeman reported that the security forces in Argentina appeared to be out of control and noted that there seemed to be little that the United States could do to influence the situation.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, Entry 5177, Lot 78D443, Box 10, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates. The Chief of the Argentine Federal Police, Brigadier General Cesáreo Angel Cardozo, was killed on June 18 by a bomb placed under his bed. (Washington Post, June 19, p. A–12) In a July 10 memorandum to Kissinger, Shlaudeman described the background of political violence in Argentina and concluded that the situation there was likely to be marked by “continuing instability and little opportunity for constructive U.S. action until more effective governmental leadership emerges.” (National Archives, RG59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760117–0987)
50. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Ford and Musich briefly discussed the guerrilla problem and the Argentine economy. Musich maintained that the guerrillas in Argentina received support from outside the country.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 20, July 19, 1976—Ford, Argentine Ambassador Arnaldo T. Musich. Secret; Nodis. Brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 2:25 to 2:36 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)
51. Telegram 4844 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy commented on a Bureau of Intelligence and Research report on Southern Cone security practices, suggesting that the report might have underestimated the extent of cooperation between regional security forces.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760285–0673. Secret. In telegram 178852 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, July 20, the Department transmitted INR Report No. 526, an updated version of the June 4 report to Kissinger on Southern Cone security practices that is published as Document 46. The report concluded that “the evidence does not conclusively establish the existence of formal, high-level coordination among Southern Cone security forces for the express purpose of eliminating exiles,” though it did suggest “that cooperation does occur on at least a localized and opportunistic basis.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760279–0200)
52. Telegram 5637 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State
Summary: In a full review of the human rights situation in Argentina, the Embassy concluded that security forces were responsible for most abuses but that their actions did not appear to reflect official Argentine Government policy.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760329–0476. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Asunción, Brasília, Montevideo, and Santiago. In telegram 195912 to Buenos Aires, August 6, the Department requested the Embassy’s assessment of the human rights situation, noting that human rights problems in Argentina had “come under rapidly escalating scrutiny in last few weeks.” (Ibid., D760304–0832) In telegram 4852 from Buenos Aires, July 23, the Embassy reviewed the junta’s performance during its first four months in power, noting that human rights abuses were “likely to continue and perhaps even increase in Argentina, thus placing serious strains on US-Argentine bilateral relations.” (Ibid., D760286–0286) In telegram 5521 from Buenos Aires, August 24, the Embassy reported that elements of security forces had been responsible for the murder of 30 people whose bodies were found in a field near Pilar on August 20. (Ibid., D760323–0669)
53. Telegram 227379 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina
Summary: The Department directed Ambassador Hill to inform Argentine officials that if they did not curb human rights abuses, the Harkin Amendment would require the U.S. Government to vote against future IDB loans to Argentina.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760347–0156. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Shlaudeman; cleared by Wilson and Gamble; approved by Robinson. The Harkin Amendment was attached to H.R. 9721, a bill that increased U.S. participation in the Inter-American Development Bank; it required the U.S. Government to vote against IDB loans to countries engaged “in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” President Ford signed it into law on May 31, 1976. (P.L. 94–302) On August 31, Kissinger approved a recommendation for an affirmative vote on the IDB loan and for a notification to the Argentine Government that the Harkin Amendment might have to be applied in the future. (Memorandum from Greenwald and Shlaudeman to Kissinger, August 25; ibid., P760142–2290) Hill responded to his instructions, “I was somewhat disappointed to note from reftel [227379] that apparently my presentation [in Washington] resulted only in a reaffirmation of an affirmative vote on the IDB loan. I still think this is a mistake and could result in misinterpretations here concerning the seriousness with which the USG views this [human rights] problem.” (Telegram 6017 from Buenos Aires, September 15; ibid., D760348–0842)
54. Telegram 6276 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State
Summary: Hill reported on a conversation with Videla, who maintained that lower-level officials in the U.S. Government did not understand the difficulties faced by Argentina. Hill responded that the U.S. Government wanted Argentina to quell terrorism as quickly as possible without damaging its image or relations with other governments.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760361–0450. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. In telegram 6177 from Buenos Aires, September 21, Hill reported on other portions of his September 21 conversation with Videla. (Ibid., D760356–1130) Telegram 227379 to Buenos Aires is Document 53. In telegram 231122 to all diplomatic and consular posts, September 17, the Department provided guidance on the human rights provisions of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760353–0445) In telegram 6130 from Buenos Aires, September 20, Hill reported on his September 17 discussion of the human rights situation with Guzzetti, who said that the Argentine Government was “somewhat surprised” by strong U.S. interest in the issue, since the impression that he had gained from his June 10 conversation with Kissinger was that “USG’s overriding concern was not human rights but rather that GOA ‘get it over quickly’.” Hill replied that the U.S. Government’s hope that the terrorist problem would be resolved quickly “in no way implied an insouciant attitude regarding human rights.” (Ibid., D760355–0430) For the June 10 meeting, see Document 48.
55. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Acting Secretary Robinson and Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman discussed terrorism, the Argentine economic situation, and refugee issues with Foreign Minister Guzzetti.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P830033–1258. Confidential. Drafted by Zimmermann on October 8; cleared by Robinson and in draft by Shlaudeman. The meeting was held in the James Madison Room at the Department of State.
56. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Secretary Kissinger reassured Foreign Minister Guzzetti that he wished the Argentine Government to succeed and expressed understanding for the fact that Argentina was engaged in a civil war. The Secretary added that the increasingly serious human rights problem was complicating bilateral relations, and he encouraged the regime to restore as many civil liberties as possible.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820118–1700. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Fernando Rondon in ARA/ECA on October 8. Approved in S on October 26. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s suite at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. In telegram 251484 to Buenos Aires, October 9, the Department reported to the Embassy on the conversation between Kissinger and Guzzetti. (Ibid., D760381–0046)
57. Telegram 6871 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State
Summary: Hill noted that Guzzetti seemed to have returned from the United States without having been impressed with the gravity with which the U.S. Government viewed the human rights situation in Argentina.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760392–0544. Secret; Priority; Exdis. In an October 20 memorandum sent through Habib and Robinson, Shlaudeman informed Kissinger that Hill had “registered for the record a bitter complaint about our purported failure to impress on Foreign Minister Guzzetti how seriously we view the rightist violence in Argentina,” and he proposed to respond to Hill for the record. (Ibid., P840077–1553)
58. Telegram 262786 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina
Summary: Shlaudeman assured Hill that he and other U.S. officials had shared human rights concerns with Guzzetti during meetings in Washington, and he stated that the Argentine Foreign Minister must have heard only what he wanted to hear on this issue.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Shlaudeman and approved by Kissinger and Robinson. Telegram 6871 is Document 57. In an October 20 draft of this telegram, the concluding paragraph reads: “With respect to your closing admonition about the futility of representations, we doubt that the GOA has all that many illusions. It was obvious here that even Guzzetti knew his country had a problem. In any event, you and we have laid it out as best we could. In the circumstances, I agree that the Argentines will have to make their own decisions and that further exhortations or generalized lectures from us would not be useful at this point.” (Department of State, FOIA Electronic Reading Room, Argentina Declassification Project) In telegram 7062 from Buenos Aires, October 27, Hill told Shlaudeman that it was “reassuring to have chapter and verse on what Guzzetti was told.” Hill added that “we continue to believe many in GOA maintain their illusions GOA has no serious human rights problems” and suggested that a protest by the Department would reinforce the message delivered to Guzzetti. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850108–2013, N760007–0818)