49. Transcript of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting1
[Omitted here are a list of participants and discussion unrelated to Argentina.]
Secretary Kissinger:
Go ahead, Harry.
Mr. Shlaudeman: Well, let me just say that it looks very much that this group for Videla in Argentina—the security forces are totally out of control. We have these daily waves of murders.
[Page 144]Secretary Kissinger: Whom are the security forces working for though?
Mr. Shlaudeman: They’re working for themselves pretty much now.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but in what direction?
Mr. Shlaudeman: It’s what’s turned into a very large-scale Mafia warfare between the security forces and the leftist urban guerrillas. We get our human rights constituents—who, it sometimes seems to me, are the only ones we have—clamoring after us all the time about Argentina, because they think it is another Chile—but it isn’t.
Secretary Kissinger: It’s worse.
Mr. Shlaudeman: It’s totally different. The Chileans eliminated their opposition, really, in the first 24 hours; but nobody in Argentina is in control of anything. And this thing is a bad situation.
Secretary Kissinger: But what could be done if we wanted to do something—
Mr. Shlaudeman: I don’t think there’s anything we can do, frankly.
Secretary Kissinger: —if they’re out of control?
Mr. Shlaudeman: I think we have to wait until somebody surfaces to get a handle on this.
Secretary Kissinger: Do the security forces work according to some theory? I mean do they have specific targets?
Mr. Shlaudeman: Yes. I think their theory is that they can use the Chilean method—that is, to terrorize the opposition—even by killing priests and nuns and others.
The problem is that they’re up against a much tougher situation with the Chileans where the guerrillas are very well organized, very well armed.
Secretary Kissinger: But whom do the guerrillas get their support from?
Mr. Shlaudeman: They’re getting most of their support internally. They have a lot of middle-class supporters.
Secretary Kissinger: But where do they get their arms from?
Mr. Shlaudeman: They get their arms from killing people and building a very large war chest.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but what is their basic orientation?
Mr. Shlaudeman: There are two groups—the ERP and the Montoneros. The ERP are Trotskyites—
Secretary Kissinger: That’s a great choice we have.
Mr. Shlaudeman: —really.
Secretary Kissinger: But if these guerrillas are so powerful that even something doesn’t put them down, what are they screaming about—that they can terrorize and kidnap?
[Page 145]Mr. Shlaudeman: That’s exactly right.
Secretary Kissinger: I mean what is it that should be done?—because, clearly, these movements aren’t going to stop their kidnapping; are they?
Mr. Shlaudeman: No, not at all.
I think the difference between the two countries has to be explained—the difference between these situations—and the fact is that we can really do nothing at the moment about this situation, I think.
Secretary Kissinger: But even if we could, what would we do? Wouldn’t the operational consequence of telling the government to lay off be that the terrorists take over—if the situation is as you’ve described it?
Mr. Shlaudeman: Yes; and I also think that telling them to lay off is fruitless, because the people who are doing it—they have no real control of it.
Secretary Kissinger: That’s the position. But it isn’t just mindless terror either, is it?
Mr. Shlaudeman: No—although it descends to that level at times.
Secretary Kissinger: But on both sides.
Mr. Shlaudeman: Very much so. The terrorists—the guerrillas are using these bombs increasingly, if you say the story about the police chief’s daughter’s best friend who put the bomb under his bed and blew him up.
Secretary Kissinger: What was she doing in his bedroom? (Laughter.)
Mr. Habib: She had gone to study. (Laughter.)
Secretary Kissinger: Do you want to do a memo for me—
Mr. Habib: I will.
Secretary Kissinger: —giving me the breakdown of the various groups so that I understand what I am reading?
Mr. Habib: I will.
Secretary Kissinger: O.K.
[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina.]
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Summary: Shlaudeman reported that the security forces in Argentina appeared to be out of control and noted that there seemed to be little that the United States could do to influence the situation.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, Entry 5177, Lot 78D443, Box 10, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates. The Chief of the Argentine Federal Police, Brigadier General Cesáreo Angel Cardozo, was killed on June 18 by a bomb placed under his bed. (Washington Post, June 19, p. A–12) In a July 10 memorandum to Kissinger, Shlaudeman described the background of political violence in Argentina and concluded that the situation there was likely to be marked by “continuing instability and little opportunity for constructive U.S. action until more effective governmental leadership emerges.” (National Archives, RG59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760117–0987)
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