58. Telegram 262786 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina1
262786. For Amb. only from Asst. Sec. Shlaudeman. Subject: Guzzetti’s Visit to the U.S. Ref: Buenos Aires 6871.
1. As in other circumstances you have undoubtedly encountered in your diplomatic career, Guzzetti heard only what he wanted to hear. He was told in detail how strongly opinion in this country has reacted against reports of abuses by the security forces in Argentina and the nature of the threat this poses to Argentine interests. An example of the filter he employed (or perhaps a reflection of his poor grasp of English) is the quotation ascribed to Ambassador Martin on “being careful” about the Catholic church. What Ed said was that if priests [Page 175] were guilty of crimes, they should be arrested and tried—but if they simply disappeared or were shot that could never be accepted in this country.
2. As for the “consensus of the meeting,” on our side it was that Guzzetti’s assurances that a tranquil and violence-free Argentina is coming soon must prove a reality if we are to avoid serious problems between us. Guzzetti’s interpretation is strictly his own. With respect to “understanding” Argentina’s problems, we did indeed take cognizance of the violent assault on Argentine society from the other side and expressed the hope that we could continue to be helpful in the task of restoring Argentina’s economy.
3. On the Harkin problem, the Secretary warned Guzzetti that we would be forced to vote against Argentine loans absent an improvement in conditions. We have told the Argentines that we would not vote negatively at the moment in light of our understanding of the current situation in the country, but might be forced to abstain. (If our impression that counter-terrorism has declined recently is ill-founded, please correct it.) The GOA has postponed a $30 million industrial-credits loan, but not as Guzzetti indicated for several months. The loan should come up again within a few weeks.
4. Finally, with respect to Guzzetti’s “jubilation” and its effect, we doubt that the GOA has such illusions. It was obvious in our contacts that Guzzetti knew his country has a problem—one that requires a speedy solution. And we will continue to impress on Argentine representatives here, as we expect you to do there, that the USG regards most seriously Argentina’s international commitments to protect and promote fundamental human rights. There should be no mistake on that score. I recommend that you read and bring to the attention of the GOA the Secretary’s speech of October 19 before the Synagogue Council of America as a basic statement of our policy of practical efforts to enhance respect for human rights—in Argentina or elsewhere.
-
Summary: Shlaudeman assured Hill that he and other U.S. officials had shared human rights concerns with Guzzetti during meetings in Washington, and he stated that the Argentine Foreign Minister must have heard only what he wanted to hear on this issue.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Shlaudeman and approved by Kissinger and Robinson. Telegram 6871 is Document 57. In an October 20 draft of this telegram, the concluding paragraph reads: “With respect to your closing admonition about the futility of representations, we doubt that the GOA has all that many illusions. It was obvious here that even Guzzetti knew his country had a problem. In any event, you and we have laid it out as best we could. In the circumstances, I agree that the Argentines will have to make their own decisions and that further exhortations or generalized lectures from us would not be useful at this point.” (Department of State, FOIA Electronic Reading Room, Argentina Declassification Project) In telegram 7062 from Buenos Aires, October 27, Hill told Shlaudeman that it was “reassuring to have chapter and verse on what Guzzetti was told.” Hill added that “we continue to believe many in GOA maintain their illusions GOA has no serious human rights problems” and suggested that a protest by the Department would reinforce the message delivered to Guzzetti. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850108–2013, N760007–0818)
↩