83. Telegram 6116 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State

Ambassador Mathews stated that a new, even more serious crisis in U.S.-Nigerian relations was possible arising from the fact that the United States and the Federal Military Government (FMG) faced a similar problem—how to strike a balance between internal pressures and external political realities. In the FMGʼs case, restrictions on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and relief organizations were necessary to alleviate internal dissent. According to Mathews, the United States balance had for some time been titled toward internal pressure. Thus domestic sympathy for Ibos had led the United States to waver from its usual post-World War II stance of giving firm political support to friendly governments against internal dissidents.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Exdis; Immediate.

84. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) to Under Secretary of State (Richardson)

In this briefing memorandum on the situation in Nigeria, Palmer discussed U.S. policy and possible initiatives following Federal Military Government (FMG) withdrawal of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from a relief role in Federal areas and the restrictions placed on relief shipments into Biafra. He was pessimistic about a favorable solution. Tabs A–H are not published.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 89–0028R/4/41. Confidential.

85. Telegram 114395 From the Department of State to the Embassy in New Zealand

The Department provided the text of a classified report on the Biafran food situation. A survey of Biafraʼs food needs indicated the supply should be adequate in terms of caloric content, even without relief shipments, at least through the end of the summer but the shortage of protein foods would become acute.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential. Drafted by Fitzcharles (U/CF), cleared in AF/W, and approved in U/CF.

86. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant to the President (Butterfield) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Butterfield reported that the President, after reading in his daily news summary an advertisement placed in the New York Times by “Americans for Biafran Relief,” stated that he agreed with it and that he (not State) should do something about Biafra.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. No classification marking. An attached, but unpublished, memorandum from the Staff Secretary to Kissinger, July 15, asked that a plan of Presidential actions be submitted. A handwritten note on the memorandum states, “Roger Morris is preparing plan for HAKʼs approval, Aug 5.”

87. Telegram 116458 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria

Under Secretary of State Richardson instructed Ambassador Mathews to inform Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, when delivering the letter transmitted in telegram 116460, that the United States Government was disturbed at his incitement of public opinion against the United States. Further, if the relief impasse continued much longer, the question of possible new U.S. approaches to the problem would undoubtedly arise.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Drafted by Sherry (AF/W) and Melbourne; cleared in the White House, U, S/S, and by Ferguson and Moore AF; and approved by Richardson.

88. Telegram 116460 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria

In a letter to Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, President Nixon urged the Federal Military Government (FMG) leader to permit an immediate resumption of relief flights by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and religious voluntary agencies and implementation of the Cross River relief corridor.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Drafted by Faville (AF/W); cleared in S/S, the White House, U, U/CF and by Moore; and approved by Richardson.

89. Telegram 116456 From the Department of State to the Embassy in France and the U.S. Mission in Geneva

The Department transmitted a letter in which President Nixon urged Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny to encourage Biafran authorities to agree to a prompt resumption of relief flights and realization of the Cross River corridor.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Drafted by Sherry (AF/W); cleared in S/S, AF, the White House, AF/CW, EUR/FBX, U/CF and U; and approved by Richardson.

90. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

In a conversation with his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, President Nixon indicated a shift in control of Nigerian policy from the Department of State to the National Security Council. Nixon said that the United States had to use everything it had to end the war; support for the Nigerian Government should stop, British Prime Minister Wilson should cease his assistance, and French President Pompidou should increase Biafran support.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

91. Telegram 2581 From the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations to the Department of State

The Mission transmitted the Biafran Governmentʼs open letter to Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson suggesting acceptance of Secretary of State Rogersʼ statement on relief. Biafra accepted day and night relief flights, day flights to commence immediately, and the Cross River proposal. The letter went on, however, to impose conditions that negated acceptance of the proposals.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Also sent to Paris and USUN. Repeated priority to Lagos. Also repeated to London and The Hague.

92. Memorandum of Conversation

During a long conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Newsom and the Country Director for West Africa, Roy Melbourne, Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins reported on his trip to Nigeria and Biafra. He met Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, then Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, and believed it might be possible to begin negotiations if the sides could be pinned down.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War February 1969–June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517, Memcons (other). Confidential. Drafted by Stokes (AF/W).

93. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Morris provided background information for Kissinger in case Biafra was raised by the French in Paris meetings. According to Morris there were no major military changes, no serious talks were underway, relief flights had been blocked by failure to agree on daytime flights. Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson had the two sides meeting secretly in Geneva, but chances of an agreement were slim.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. “Dispatched” is written at the top of page one.

94. Telegram 2740 From the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations to the Department of State

The Mission transmitted the final text of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) note to the Federal Military Government (FMG) dated August 1. The ICRC note stated that daylight relief flights from Cotonou and Santa Isabel could be inspected and observers could board and accompany flights.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Also sent to Lagos. Repeated to Addis Ababa, London, Paris, The Hague, and USUN.

95. Telegram 129202 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria

The Department believed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) daytime flight proposal merited careful Federal Military Government (FMG) consideration. The assistance of the United Kingdom High Commissioner should be sought to persuade the FMG to consider the proposal.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; Limdis; Immediate. Repeated to Addis Ababa, London, Paris, The Hague, Geneva, and USUN. Drafted by Melbourne and Sherry (AF/W); cleared in U/CF, Gleysteen S/S, and U; and approved by Moore.

96. Telegram 6969 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State

The Embassy reported that the United Kingdom High Commissioner had said that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) proposal was worse than expected. It offered the Federal Military Government (FMG) no concessions, and might end chances for a reasonable compromise.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; Limdis; Immediate. Repeated priority to Addis Ababa. Also repeated to London, Paris, The Hague, Geneva, and USUN.

97. Telegram 129331 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Nigeria and the United Kingdom

The Department expressed its disappointment that United Kingdom High Commissioner considered the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) note so negative from the standpoint of Federal Military Government (FMG) interests. The embassies were urged to press the proposal to the FMG as a neutral.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; Limdis; Immediate. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Paris, The Hague, Geneva, and USUN. Drafted by Melbourne and Spigler (AF/W); cleared in U/CF and approved by Moore.

98. Telegram 2773 From the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations to the Department of State

The Mission reported on Special Coordinator Clyde Fergusonʼs meeting with International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) officials, who expected the Federal Military Government (FMG) to reject its plan. They also anticipated attacks on Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) flights when night fighter planes were acquired. There was severe division within the committee but all agreed the ICRC would leave Nigeria between August 15 and September 3. There was considerable support for the ICRCʼs becoming “revolutionary humanitarians” if it was to survive.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Limdis; Immediate. Repeated priority to Lagos. Also repeated to Libreville, Addis Ababa, The Hague, London, Paris, and USUN.

99. Telegram 7068 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State

The Embassy expected the negative Federal Military Government (FMG) response as the ICRC failed to consider the sovereignty issue, but the message should not be taken as absolute rejection. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) should consider a new personal mission to Lagos. The Embassy did not believe the FMG was pursuing a policy of genocide nor did Marcel Naville, ICRC president, despite the belief by ICRC Vice President James Freymond and others.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; Limdis; Priority. Also sent to Geneva, Addis Ababa, London, Paris, and USUN. The text of Gowonʼs August 4 message to Naville was transmitted in telegram 7029 from Lagos, August 5. Gowon stated in part: “You have not informed me of any aspects my governmentʼs policy which in your opinion contravene any articles Geneva Convention pertinent to situation civil war. My governmentʼs policy can only be regarded as defective or unrealistic if can be shown contravene international conventions. Any judgment other than that cannot but be political and this is no function your organization.” (Ibid.)

100. Memorandum Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

The memorandum analyzed Federal Military Government (FMG) war aims with specific regard to the Ibos. According to the memorandum, there was no intent to commit genocide, and Gowon and his senior officers probably would take great pains to prevent the massacre of Ibos if federal forces did overrun the Biafran enclave.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. The memorandum was prepared at Morrisʼ request, concurred in by the Clandestine Service, and forwarded to Kissinger by Thomas Karamessines under cover of an August 6 memorandum.

101. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Morris agreed with Kissinger that Richardson should direct the peace initiative, if approved by the President, but felt that Stateʼs Africa Bureau was hopelessly pro-Federal. Morris recommended that he have direct participation in the probe.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Eyes Only.

102. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Responding to Nixonʼs instruction to consider a Presidential initiative to conciliate Nigeria and Biafra, Kissinger provided a summary on the major elements to be dealt with in peace negotiations and on the Presidentʼs options, with a recommended plan of action that Nixon approved.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon initialed his approval of Kissingerʼs recommendation.

103. Special National Intelligence Estimate

The SNIE concluded that an effective embargo on arms shipments to both parties was highly unlikely. If there were an effective embargo, the level of hostilities would soon diminish but neither party would be any more willing to compromise.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, NIC Files, Job 79R–01012A, Box 372, Folders 1 and 2. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.

104. Special Annex to Special National Intelligence Estimate 64.2–69

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files. Top Secret; Umbra.

105. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom)

Morris recommended several steps to be taken if a full-scale initiative began to work.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969–June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 519, Geneva. Secret. Copies were sent to Ferguson, Witman, Melbourne, and Brubeck.

106. Letter From Norman Cousins to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Norman Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review, expressed his reservations about the possibility of an early Federal victory and his belief that President Nixon could play an effective role in ending the war. He suggested that the food situation might be serious but was not decisive in Biafraʼs ability to persevere.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential.

107. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

In anticipation of the Presidentʼs meeting with Secretary of State Rogers on August 22, Morris provided Kissinger with a copy of Newsomʼs briefing memorandum for Rogers for the meeting, in which Newsom recommended immediately launching a full-fledged peace probe that Morris considered heavily weighted toward the Federal side. Morris recommended that Kissinger advise the President to pursue a serious peace probe but on a more even-handed basis and with White House participation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, U.S.-Domestic-Agency Files, State/White House Relationship, Vol. I January 28–October 31, 1969. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The attached memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State Newsom to Rogers, was classified Secret. The Presidentʼs Daily Diary indicates that a meeting between the President, who was at the Western White House, and Rogers did not take place on August 22 nor did they meet before the end of the month. The President and Rogers talked by phone on the evening of August 28.

108. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to Anthony Lake of the National Security Council Staff

Morris informed Lake of his confusion over Secretary of State Rogersʼ intentions in the Nigerian problem.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, U.S.-Domestic-Agency Files, State/White House Relationship, Vol. I January 28–October 31, 1969. Secret; Sensitive. Tab A of the attachment was attached but not published. Tab B of the attachment is Document 101.

109. Editorial Note

110. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Morris informed Kissinger that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had offered the Federal Military Government (FMG) the right to call down random flights for inspection on Nigerian territory. They had requested a response to be given by September 1. If the response were anything less than an unequivocal yes, the ICRC would end its operation. That would leave the Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) agencies and their “illegal” flights as the only relief operation and force the United States to choose either to support their airlift or bow out of the relief business altogether.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. This copy of the memorandum is not initialed.

111. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Attorney General Mitchell

Kissinger discussed Nigeria/Biafra as one of a series of incidents in which the bureaucracy was either unresponsive to President Nixonʼs desires or displayed an extraordinary inability to coordinate internal matters.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, U.S.-Domestic-Agency Files, State/White House Relationship, Vol. I, January 18–October 31, 1969. Secret; Exclusively Eyes Only.

112. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

The Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, and Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins discussed Cousinsʼ upcoming trip to Nigeria. The trip would be unofficial. President Nixon did not want to put anything in writing—official involvement would come when there were potential areas of agreement.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 52, Country Files, Africa, “Cousins, Norman” Biafra. No classification marking.