Nigerian Civil War
[Page 1]143. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State (Richardson) to President Nixon
Richardson outlined four basic courses of action on relief and indicated that the Department of State planned to proceed with the fourth one: increase U.S. support for humanitarian organizations that had existing airlift programs capable of ensuring a more adequate flow of supplies.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. In a December 23 note to Morris regarding Richardsonʼs memorandum, Jeanne Davis, Director of the NSC Secretariat, stated, “I agree, of course, that this was OBE as of the week following its receipt. However, since we received it on December 5, several days before it became OBE, we are in the embarrassing position of having interdicted a memo from the Acting Secretary of State to the President on an important item. If there was any follow-up action, or if there are mitigating circumstances, could you please do a small memo for the record as a fig leaf to cover our nakedness.” Morris responded in an undated, handwritten note, “This was OBE as a matter of policy substance in State before it arrived, let alone events in Africa being anticipated here. Those who know the substance of the problem, therefore, are quite clothed.”
144. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Haig, at National Security Council staffer Roger Morrisʼs suggestion, proposed to Kissinger placing before the President the choice of appealing for a Christmas Humanitarian Truce in Biafra. He expected the African Bureau at the Department of State to drag its feet on the idea. Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson, however, approved of the idea, which would strengthen the Presidentʼs position for the coming tragedy.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Henry A. Kissinger/Richardson Meetings, 11/12-69. Top Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger indicated on the memorandum that he had discussed the concept with Richardson and wrote “appealing idea—will make proposal.”
145. Information Memorandum Prepared for the Under Secretary of State (Richardson)
The memorandum concluded that the population of Biafra was 3.2 million, considerably lower than figures used by relief agencies; the nutritional condition had deteriorated since June, 1969; and 160 tons of relief supplies per night would meet minimum needs.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NCS Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential. The memorandum was forwarded to Kissinger by Theodore Eliot, Department of State Executive Secretary, under cover of a December 10 memorandum stating: “Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum prepared for the Under Secretary.” Written in hand on the cover memorandum is, “No action necessary per R. Morris 12/16/69.”
146. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger wrote the memorandum in reaction to an article in the Washington Post on December 10 stating that the Agency for International Development (AID) was building a road which was of potential military value to the Federal forces surrounding Biafra. Kissinger told the President that the road was good for relief, but had no military value to the Federals; he thought there was reason to suspend construction and was reviewing the matter further with State and AID.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. There are three handwritten notes on page one: Nixon wrote, “K—I think we need another review of our policy here—We are satisfying no one—& accomplishing nothing”; Kissinger wrote, “Roger—crank up another review after talking to me. K”; and a third note states “OBE” per MR 1/16/70.” The article at Tab A and the map at Tab B are not published.
147. Telegram 208132 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria
The Department transmitted a message for Nigerian Federal Commissioner for External Affairs Arikpo from under Secretary of Sate Richardson. The prospect of Addis talks under the supervision of His Imperial Majesty was encouraging, but while Biafran representatives were en-route, Federal Military Government (FMG) participation was in doubt. Richardson sought to convince Arikpo that FMG attendance was essential, if only for positive public relations.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–14 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Addis Ababa, London, Paris, and USUN. Drafted by Brubeck (AF/SN); cleared by Moore AF, Newsom, and Eliot; and approved by Richardson.
148. Telegram 10757 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State
Ambassador Trueheart reported on Nigerian Federal Commissioner for External Affairs Arikpoʼs reaction to receiving Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardsonʼs message. Arikpo appreciated the points made, but believed it was time to end the “propaganda exercises.”
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–14 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Exdis; Immediate.
149. Telegram 5483 From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State
The Embasssy transmitted the statement to the press issued by the leader of the Biafran delegation to the Addis Ababa peace talks, explaining why the delegation was departing.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 15, Presidentʼs Daily Briefs. Unclassified; Immediate. Repeated immediate to Lagos. Also repeated to London and Paris.
150. Transcript of Telephone Conversation
Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger discussed National Security Council staff member Roger Morrisʼs proposal for a Christmas truce. Richardson indicated that the Department of State had sought to determine if there was any basis for joining other countries in an appeal and had received little support. He noted that the Federal Military Government (FMG) was engaged in a broad offensive and would believe that unilateral action on the part of the United States would suggest involvement.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.
151. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon
Rogers provided the President with a status report from the Department of Stateʼs perspective on the military situation, relief problems, future contingencies, diplomatic initiatives, and mediation efforts of the Biafra problem.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret.
152. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
The memorandum illustrates the division between the White House and State over Nigeria/Biafra, with Eagleburger meeting privately with Biafran representatives in Brussels and not informing any Department of State official. Haig advised Kissinger to inform Richardson about the meeting, claiming that the Biafrans refused to deal with State and this was only a feeler.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Top Secret; Umbra; Eyes Only.
153. Memorandum from Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Morris expressed his concern over the possibility of genocide by the Federal army and his desire for an armistice that recognized Biafra.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS SCI 17, Memoranda to the President, Jan–April 1970. Secret.
154. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger informed the President that, according to the French, Biafran forces were collapsing. The French desired U.S. common action in these grave circumstances. The map at Tab A is not published.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS SCI 17, Memoranda to the President, Jan–April 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword.
155. Briefing Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger provided the President with talking points on Biafra for his telephone call with Prime Minister Wilson.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS SCI 17, Memoranda to the President, Jan–April 1970. Secret.
156. Telegram 233 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State
The embassy reported that the Federal Military Government (FMG) had made no victory claims, and no information was available that would suggest Biafran defenses had disintegrated. Hard evidence indicated that Biafrans who had recently come under FMG control were being well cared for.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated priority to London. Also repeated to Paris, Geneva, USUN, Libreville, Addis Ababa, CINCSTRIKE, DIA.
157. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon
Rogers provided an updated status report from the Departmentʼs viewpoint. An early Biafran capitulation or disintegration was likely, presenting problems of relief and security. Rogers noted the Federal Military Governmentʼs (FMG) sensitivity to external meddling and the need for a low-key approach. It was also important for the United States to have a clear record demonstrating its support of an expanded relief effort.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 281, Agency Files, Department of State, 12/01/69–02/21/70, Vol. V. Confidential.
158. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger recommended announcement of a $10 million emergency donation to Biafra relief and approval of a message to Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, offering assistance and recognizing his conciliatory policy.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. A check mark next to “Approve” and an adjacent handwritten note, “per HAK 1/12,” indicate that the President approved Kissingerʼs recommendations. A January 12 memorandum from Eliot to Rogers indicates that Rogers approved a telegram containing the letter to Gowon as revised by the White House. Eliot noted that the wording of the proposed letter, as drafted by State, had been changed considerably by the White House but there were few substantive changes. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria)
159. Transcript of Telephone Conversation
In a conversation with Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger, President Nixon approved Secretary of State Rogersʼ proposed trip to Lagos but believed he had to be strong with Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria. The President emphasized that Rogers should stress U.S. interest in humanitarian concerns.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 3–14 Jan 1970. No classification marking.
160. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the White House Situation Room
Director of Central Intelligence Helms forwarded an intelligence report that he believed showed “such cynicism on the part of the French” that Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger might want to bring it to the attention of the President. The report stated that there were no plans at present for French support to Biafran guerrilla resistance. The rationale, it was reported, was that the French supported Biafra because of oil, not the Ibo revolution.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Noforn Dissem; Controlled Dissem. The telegram was forwarded to Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Haig by his secretary under cover of a January 14 memorandum which stated that DCI Helms had called and left the following message for Haig: “It seems to me that this item, although raw intelligence, shows such cynicism on the part of the French, Dr. Kissinger might want to bring it to the attention of the President.”
161. Memorandum for the Record
Morris reported to the NSC Staff that many relief operations in Nigeria had been blacklisted. Kissinger wanted to maintain a moral stance and stress our concern. The United States could not accept the concept that whatever Lagos did was right.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 314, NSC 14, Meetings Staff Meetings 1969–1971. Secret.
162. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson)
In this memorandum on “Next Steps in Nigerian Relief,” Morris outlined numerous relief effort possibilities while expressing concern about possible domestic criticism. He stressed the Western Report as the basis for determining food needs in Biafra while doubting the capabilities of the Federal Military Government (FMG). Tab A is not published.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central files 1970–73, POL 27–9, Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Eyes Only.
163. Telegram 6676 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ivory Coast
The telegram provided a situation report on Nigeria. Hostilities had ended despite assertions to the contrary by Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria. No evidence of atrocities by either side had turned up. The Federal Military Government (FMG) had blacklisted four governments and five relief agencies. Foreign relief workers who operated illegally in the Biafran enclave had been declared persona non grata.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 Nigeria. Confidential. Drafted by J.O. Westmoreland, and approved by Brubeck and the Nigeria Working Group. Also sent for action to Addis Ababa, Bonn, Lagos, Libreville, London, Lome, Niamey, Oslo, Paris, Rome, The Hague, Geneva, USUN, CINCSTRIKE, and MAC CP Scott AFB.
164. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Morris recommended that Kissinger see Princess de Bourbon who flew out of Biafra with Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, and had a message for the President. Kissinger deferred to Richardson, who objected because it could ruffle feelings in Lagos, and arranged for her to meet Deputy Assistant Secretary Moore.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. No classification marking. Kissinger initialed “HK” next to “Approve” but wrote, “(But give Richardson opportunity to object.)” A handwritten note on the attachment, “HAK will call,” indicated Kissinger would explain the situation to Galbraith.
165. Transcript of Telephone Conversation
Norman Cousins urged Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger to organize a large-scale “post-war reparations” program for Biafra.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological Files. No classification marking.
166. Transcript of Telephone Conversation
Kissinger told Nixon that Cousins felt the President could gain prestige with groups not usually accessible to him by stressing humanitarian relief to Biafra. Nixon indicated he wanted to be sure that the USG took a leadership role on humanitarian problems.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.
167. Telegram 432 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State
The telegram reported on conditions in the former Biafran enclave. There was no misbehavior of Federal troops, no evidence of guerrilla activity by Biafrans, and no pockets of serious malnutrition. There was a fragmentary report that food and drugs were needed at Orlu, but there was puzzlement over the failure to find areas of serious malnutrition.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 Nigeria. Secret; Immediate. Repeated priority to London. Also repeated to Paris, Geneva, and USUN.
168. Transcript of Telephone Conversation
Rogers stated that Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, was the key to Africa, but that he resented intrusion. As a practical matter, the United States could not do anything that Gowon did not approve.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.
169. Memorandum of Conversation
Four pro-Biafran individuals meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Newsom complained that the United States was doing nothing to prevent starvation while endorsing Federal Military Government (FMG) propaganda. Newsom countered by stressing FMG sovereignty and the need for hard facts.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969–June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517. Confidential. The meeting took place in Newsomʼs office.
170. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger provided the President with a status report on relief, comparing the findings of Dr. Karl Western, CDC, based on a survey of Biafra in October/November 1969, with those presented in an attached memorandum from Rogers. Western stressed that there would be a completely unacceptable magnitude of starvation and suffering. Rogers disagreed, noting that FMG claimed to have the situation under control.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive. Tab B is not published.
171. Briefing Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger presented talking points for the Presidentʼs meeting with Secretary of State Rogers, Special Coordinator on Relief Ferguson, and Assistant Secretary of State Newsom the next day. He stated that the purpose was to impress State with the urgency of the relief situation and the need for action by Nigeria.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 3, Chronological Files, 1969–1975. Secret; Sensitive. At Tab A presumably was Document 170.
172. Transcript of Telephone Conversation
President Nixon told his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Kissinger, that he believed Special Coordinator on Relief Ferguson and others were convinced that it was necessary to deal with Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria. They discussed the starvation crisis, and Nixon expressed his belief that neither the Department of State nor Ferguson cared.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.