101. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1 2
The following is an “aide memoire” on our talk today.
I strongly agree Richardson should “direct” the Biafra peace initiative. But there are two problems:
1. A Direct White House Role in the Probe.
—Left alone, ER has to turn to AF. Yet the Bureau (a) doesnʼt really want a settlement, (b) is hopelessly soft on the Feds, and (c) will concentrate on trying to trap the Biafrans and expose them in public.
—A State probe, without us along, wonʼt be credible to the Biafrans, who know AF as well as I do.
—We must participate directly in the probe, clear all cables routinely, etc. if weʼre to protect the Presidentʼs interests and goals.
2. Timing
—State, by natural penchant and calculation, will drag their feet.
—Now is the moment to move. Both sides have military and political incentives to respond.
—Other tactical details can be left to ER working with us. Timing should be “immediate” as part of the instruction.
If the President approves your memo, I recommend your instruction to Richardson include:
(i) My direct participation in the probe. (Even if it comes to going into Biafra—and, believe me, I donʼt relish dodging MIGs—we just canʼt trust State to be neutral).
(ii) Immediate approaches to both sides.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Eyes Only.↩
- Morris agreed with Kissinger that Richardson should direct the peace initiative, if approved by the President, but felt that Stateʼs Africa Bureau was hopelessly pro-Federal. Morris recommended that he have direct participation in the probe.↩