Nigerian Civil War

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53. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers

INRʼs analysis of USSR-Nigeria relations concluded that the USSR had exploited the situation as far as possible and would prefer a negotiated end to the war rather than continued fighting.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 4, Presidentʼs Daily Briefs. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.


54. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Kissinger told Nixon that the war continued to be a stalemate; British Prime Minister Harold Wilsonʼs visit to Nigeria had produced no changes, as anticipated; diplomatic initiatives by Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had been unsuccessful; and Special Coordinator Clyde Fergusonʼs efforts had yielded no results but had satisfied Congressional critics and public lobbies at home.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. Nixon wrote the following note on page one: “Sunday, I have decided that our policy supporting the Feds is wrong. They canʼt make it. Letʼs begin to get State off this kick.”


55. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

[7 pages not declassified in time for publication.]

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 763, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, United Kingdom: Prime Minister Wilson Correspondence #10. Confidential. Sent for information. Another copy of the attached message is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27—Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; Exdis.


56. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson)

Kissinger forwarded a memorandum of David Rockefellerʼs conversation with Ivory Coast Ambassador Ahoua, who met with Rockefeller to present President Houphouet-Boignyʼs views on Nigeria. Those views concerned Soviet influence in Nigeria, South African Government financial aid for Biafra, and criticism of Secretary Palmerʼs commitment to the Nigerian Government.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. This unsigned copy of the memorandum indicates that Kissinger signed the original.


57. Telegram 58725 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Liberia

The Department reported on Special Coordinator Clyde Fergusonʼs visit to Nigeria, including his meeting with Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria then Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, and again with Gowon between March 15 and March 25. Until a surface corridor into Biafra could be opened, a plan to use both Uli and Obilago air fields for daylight relief flights was proposed. Both men were favorable to the corridor concept but stuck to known positions on daylight flights and use of Obilago airstrip.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by S.C. Schott (U/CF); cleared in AF/W and by Melbourne; and approved in U/CF.


58. Memorandum From the Country Director for West Africa (Melbourne) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer)

The memorandum outlined the lobbying activities in Washington of Biafrans Dr. Pius Okigbo, Dr. Eni Njoku, and Dr. Kenneth Dike.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969–June 1970, Box 514, Lot 70 D 336, Political. Limited Official Use. Copies were sent to Moore, Ferguson, and Ruser.


59. Memorandum of Conversation

During a four-hour dinner conversation with U.S. officials, three Biafrans representatives proposed that the United States call for an arms embargo and an end to the war against Biafran independence.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential. Drafted by George Sherry (AF/W).


60. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Kissinger warned the President that the Congressional chorus on Nigeria might be rising again, in particular due to a new organization, “Americans for Biafran Relief,” with Senator Kennedy taking the lead. Tabs to attachment are included with Kissingerʼs January 28 memorandum, Document 25.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria. Confidential. Sent for information.


61. Telegram 3636 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State

The Embassy suggested that “Americans for Biafran Relief” might present an opportunity to put pressure on Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, to facilitate relief efforts. The Embassy wanted the onus for blocking relief put on Ojukwu.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9, Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential.


62. Situation Report Prepared by Nigerian Task Force

French officials estimated 20–40 tons of arms per day had gone into Biafra since March 31.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria. Secret. Drafted by D.F. Smith (AF/W) and approved by Melbourne.


63. Memorandum of Conversation

In a meeting with Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson, Ambassador Iyalla stated that the Cross River surface corridor was all right in principle. However, the Federal Military Government opposed two more C–97s for church groups involved in relief, and airdrops would be acceptable only if inspected first in Lagos.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret. Drafted by S.C. Schott (U/CF).


64. Telegram 3911 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State

The Embassy assumed the Federal Military Government (FMG) would win the war, then devise a multi-state structure to provide stability, and there would not be a pattern of recurring coups.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2 Nigeria. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Ibadan, Kaduna, CINCSTRIKE, and DIA


65. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

In a status report on the war, Kissinger told the President that the fighting and diplomacy were stalemated. Biafra could win only through political exhaustion on the Federal side. U.S. policy was being carried out, i.e., political non-involvement and basic neutrality.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. The document is stamped, “The President Has Seen.” Nixon wrote on page one, “HK—I hope the Biafrans survive!”


66. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

According to Walshʼs report, Bishop Swanstrom had requested that the U.S. Government sell two additional C–97s to Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) despite FMG opposition. The FMG was linking surface corridor negotiations to sale of additional aircraft. The U.S. Government decided it would replace one JCA C–97 that crashed and was a total loss. Attachments 1 and 2, Incoming Correspondence and Suggested reply, are not published.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential.


67. Aide Memoire From the Special Coordinator (Ferguson)

Ferguson stated in a message to Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, that the crashed JCA C–97 plane would be replaced but the two additional C–97s were in abeyance during surface corridor discussions.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Unclassified. A handwritten note states that the aide-mimoire was handed to the Nigerian ambassador on May 16.


68. Briefing Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Morris briefed Kissinger for his meeting that afternoon with Pius Okigbo. He advised Kissinger to stress relief, U.S. neutrality, and the U.S. hope that the two sides would try negotiations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Attached was Document 65.


69. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Morris advised Kissinger that Federal feelings had reached a flash point over the recent appearance of a Biafran “air force” piloted by Swedish mercenaries and armed with French rockets. In response, it was possible that Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, would bar all relief flights. This would cause tough decisions for the United States.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Kissinger underlined “all but foredoomed” in paragraph 3 on page one and wrote “Why?” and “Roger, What is it that keeps Feds from winning?” In response to the penultimate paragraph on page two, Kissinger wrote: “When are we going to see paper?” In an attached memorandum dated June 11, Bob Houdek asked Morris to answer the questions Kissinger had posed, referring to the “paper” as “the State contingency paper on relief efforts should the Feds decide to outlaw or stop relief flights.” Written at the top of page one of Morrisʼ memorandum is, “Action completed orally per RMorris, 7/22.”


70. Telegram 5026 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State

The Embassy reported that Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson had asked major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, if there was any change in policy toward relief flights. Gowon stated that the policy had not changed—all night flights were “illegal” and those flying did so at their own risk.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Geneva, London, Addis Ababa, Cotonou, Lisbon, Kaduna, and Ibadan.


71. Situation Report Prepared by the Nigerian Task Force

On June 5, an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) plane was shot down by a Nigerian MIG while en-route to Biafra with relief supplies.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential.


72. Department of State Press Statement

In this statement, which was handed out to the press on June 6, the Department expressed U.S. regret for the attack by the Nigerian Air Force and reiterated the U.S. position of avoiding political or military involvement in the Nigerian civil war. The attached briefing paper, which was read but not distributed, acknowledged that relief and arms night flights were intermingled, and urged expanded relief through daylight flights and a land corridor.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil war, February 1969–June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517, ICRC, Records. Unclassified. At the top of page one of the statement, Schott wrote, “Clyde—Here is last Fridayʼs statement. The top page was handed out and the second one only read out. SCS.”


73. Telegram 5164 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State

The Embassy transmitted a Federal Military Government (FMG) statement in which that government stated that the press releases of the U.S. and Swedish Governments were hypocritical. The FMG charged that Swedish nationals had bombed and strafed civil installations as mercenaries of Biafra, and the United States did not condemn it.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Unclassified; Immediate. Repeated priority to Lome. Also repeated to Cotonou, Geneva, The Hague, Stockholm, Libreville, Yaounde, and London.


74. Telegram 1835 From the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations to the Department of State

Ambassador Roger Tubby reported on a meeting with James Freymond, Acting President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), who expressed grave concern regarding problems dealing with both the Federal Military Government (FMG) and Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria. Tubby also noted profound changes in the attitude of some governments and public groups who had been strong supporters of the ICRC.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; Immediate. Repated immediate to Lagos. Also repeated to London.


75. Telegram 93759 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria

The Department expressed its concern that the Federal Military Government (FMG) statement transmitted in telegram 5164 (Document 73) indicated its policy toward relief flights had changed after the ICRC plane was shot down. The Department was aware of the intermingling of arms and relief flights but believed interdiction of relief planes would do damage to the FMG in the long run.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Cotonou, Lisbon, London, and Geneva. Drafted by Smith (AF/W); cleared by Moore and Ferguson; and approved by Palmer.


76. Telegram 5314 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State

Ambassador Mathews reported on his meeting with Federal Commissioner for External Affairs Arikpo, during which he presented U.S. views on Federal Military Government (FMG) policy toward relief flights, the FMG statement in response to a U.S. press release (see Documents 72 and 73), and FMG assurances that the Nigerian Air Force could be controlled. Arikpo stated that the FMG must control its air space. Regarding the FMG statement, Arikpo said it had come from the Ministry of Information and was not an expression of FMG policy.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated priority to Addis Ababa. Also repeated to Cotonou, Lisbon, London, Geneva, CINCSTRIKE.


77. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Morris advised Kissinger that now that the Federal Military Government (FMG) was moving to interdict arms flights, this would embargo or cause serious danger to relief flights. He admitted that he was not enchanted with the Federal cause, but this could end the war with a Federal victory, which the President reluctantly has concluded to be in the United Stateʼs long-term interests.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret.


78. Telegram 5401 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State

Ambassador Mathews reported on his meeting with Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, and Arikpo, Nigerian Federal Commissioner for External Affairs. Gowon stated that the Federal Military Government (FMG) would do all possible to prevent shooting down genuine relief flights. Aircraft that did not comply with Nigerian Air Force instructions would be subject to attack. The FMG wanted to terminate or reduce the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) role in Nigeria.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Immediate. Repeated priority to Addis Ababa. Also repeated to Cotonou, Geneva, Lisbon, and London. The Department replied in telegram 97185, June 13, that it agreed that Gowonʼs assurances were the most they could hope for at this stage and under the circumstances it was urgent that both the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) carefully screen cargo on all future flights to ensure there was nothing aboard which the FMG might consider non-relief items. Ibid.


79. Telegram 99708 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria

The Department transmitted Fergusonʼs June 18 press release in which he stated that there was agreement by the FMG and Biafran authorities to a surface corridor up the Cross River and that the ICRC had undertaken to manage the new relief arrangement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Unclassified; Immediate. Repeated priority to Addis Ababa. Also repeated to Cotonou, The Hague, Lome, London, Paris, USUN, Ibadan and Kaduna. Drafted by Raymond L. Perkins (AF/P), cleared in P/ON, and approved by Perkins.


80. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Morris told Kissinger that the Federal Military Government (FMG) had all but kicked out the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and imposed a de facto embargo on relief flights into Biafra. Airlifts into Biafra could operate only in daylight following inspection in Federal territory. Those from Sao Tome were illegal and subject to interdiction. Morris was apprehensive of negative reaction by Senator Kennedy and the Biafra lobby.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret.


81. Telegram 109879 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria

The Department transmitted a statement by Secretary Rogers issued on July 2 about the Nigerian situation. Rogers deplored the curtailment of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) role in Nigeria, stated that the United States financed the charter of two shallow draft vessels for ICRC use on the Cross River, and supported controlled daytime relief flights.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Unclassified. The telegrams was also addressed to Addis Ababa, Cotonou, Lagos, London, Niamey, Paris, Stockholm, Yaounde, Geneva, USUN, Douala, Ibadan, and Kaduna. Drafted by Powell (AF/P), cleared in P/ON, and approved by Powell.


82. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Kissinger summarized where the United States Government stood in the wake of the recent Federal Military Government (FMG) decision to take over the relief operation and presented three broad approaches: contest the Federal relief embargo; guarantee relief corridors against military violation; and separate relief from any appearance of pro-Federal bias.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum is stamped, “The President Has Seen.” Nixon marked suggested actions in the margin as “OK,” “Good,” and “NO.” He initialed his approval of the three approaches proposed by Kissinger.