97. Telegram 129331 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Nigeria and the United Kingdom1 2
FOR EARLY A.M. DELIVERY
SUBJ:
- Nigeria: ICRC Flights
REF:
- a) State 129202, b) State 129212, c) Lagos 6969
1. While we disappointed that UKHicomer considers ICRC note so negative from standpoint FMG interests, we still believe, as stated in opening paragraphs of refs a and b, that it could provide framework to which addition of details could serve interests of both sides.
Accordingly,Embassy Lagos is requested to arrange appointment with Arikpo at earliest opportunity, even though text of ICRC note may not have reached Lagos. In course of discussion with Arikpo, you should not take position as advocate of ICRC proposal and should specifically state that US had no hand in its formulation. However, it is consonant with our policy, of which FMG should be well aware, to be friendly counselor [Page 2] against hasty negative action before cool and searching FMG study of possibilities inherent in ICRC note.
2. In addition to your earlier instructions (ref a) you should point out to Arikpo aspects of ICRC note which in our view represent concessions to FMG views. These include:
a) Daylight flights.
b) Flights under certain FMG controls, such as prescribed routes, prior
notification, and monitoring.
c) Right to request observers to
accompany flights.
d) Undoubtedly some form of FMG participation in inspection.
3. If questioned, you can state that text of note does not appear exclude touchdown on FMG territory. However, we know touchdown of fully loaded plane presents serious problem of maintenance of aircraft. Perhaps some other form of symbolic touchdown could be elaborated with ICRC.
4. FYI: We understand FMG proposals were discussed by Freymond with Cookey and Obi in Geneva and that they rejected them, indicating they acting officially and with authorization (would appreciate Geneva confirming, and expanding if possible). END FYI
[Page 3]5. a. As stated para 5, ref b, Dept. does not repeat not consider that note ignores article 23. Term “technical arrangements” is itself uncertain in meaning. It does not necessarily apply all aspects any given relief operation, but might be interpreted mean technical aspects actual operation, e.g., identification codes, air corridor (height, latitude, longitude), hours of operation. Inspection is not necessarily a “technical arrangement.” In absence interpretation based on convention documentation, convention appears unclear and subject varying interpretations.
b. Article 22 offers little help in present situation since it refers only to classic medical relief role of ICRC:
“Aircraft exclusively employed for the removal of wounded and sick civilians, the infirm and maternity cases, or for the transport of medical personnel and equipment, shall not be attacked, but shall be respected while flying at heights, times and on routes specifically agreed upon between all the parties to the conflict concerned.”
[Page 4]6. FOR LONDON: In light UKHicomer Lagos strongly negative report, it
unlikely UKG would issue instructions to
him along lines State 129202, Para 3. However, Embassy should discuss
foregoing with FonOff and emphasize
need for statesmanlike FMG response to
ICRC note. Report results such
discussion.
END
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; Limdis; Immediate. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Paris, The Hague, Geneva, and USUN. Drafted by Melbourne and Spigler (AF/W); cleared in U/CF and approved by Moore.↩
- The Department expressed its disappointment that United Kingdom High Commissioner considered the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) note so negative from the standpoint of Federal Military Government (FMG) interests. The embassies were urged to press the proposal to the FMG as a neutral.↩