99. Telegram 7068 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State1 2
Subject:
- FMG Response Naville Plan
1. FMG response much as expected and reflects again umbrage which FMG has taken at what it considers—with some good reason—ICRC failure give consideration their sovereignty and concern in matter relief to rebels. We regard it fortunate tone Gowon letter relatively mild given circumstances and believe our and UKHC intervention did have some effect.
2. Believe it would be highly useful if Ambassadors Ferguson and Tubby could make clear to Naville and Freymond our hope that ICRC continue seek solution to present relief impasse in keeping with its humanitarian mission. We hope they will choose to regard Gowonʼs relatively restrained reaction to ICRC note as evidence that FMG has not written off possibility ICRC finding solution permitting daylight flights, and that ICRC consider desirability new personal mission to Lagos. Believe it would be helpful to stress that despite brickbats from both sides, ICRC has and continue to perform invaluable relief role as only neutral organization mandated with this function. If ICRC withdraws, we know of no other organization more [Page 2] politically acceptable to both sides to perform vital relief role in enclave and cannot envision acceptance by FMG of JCA or French Red Cross relief flights, either explicit or tacit. We think Naville could well be asked consider who would benefit by ICRC abrupt departure from scene?
3. Letter, in short, should not repeat not be taken as absolute rejection. It raises logical questions with Naville. Did you take up FMG plan with Ojukwu and what were results? How does FMG policy contravene Geneva Convention? What new factors have arisen since last meeting which caused change in attitude toward FMG policy? FMG resting its case in effect on Geneva Convention which they clearly interpret—as did Naville in conversation with us—as according most rights to blocking power.
4. Believe best approach ICRC if they desire stay in Nigerian relief business—which seem in doubt (Geneva 2773)—is to send Naville back to Lagos to explain situation, hopefully with Biafran explanation rejection FMG plan and with facts and figures demonstrate why ICRC could not repeat not bear increase in costs incurred by Lagos touchdowns. Failing this, prompt instructions along above lines to Bignami might help, although his prospects seeing Gowon—which important in this situation—is questionable.
5. Department may also wish consider effect ICRC attitude and Freymond talk of “revolutionary concept” on future usefulness ICRC, e.g. in Africa and Asia. We also fail understand conviction Freymond and others that FMG pursuing policy genocide. We do not repeat not believe this case and on his departure Lagos, neither did Naville.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; Limdis; Priority. Also sent to Geneva, Addis Ababa, London, Paris, and USUN. The text of Gowonʼs August 4 message to Naville was transmitted in telegram 7029 from Lagos, August 5. Gowon stated in part: “You have not informed me of any aspects my governmentʼs policy which in your opinion contravene any articles Geneva Convention pertinent to situation civil war. My governmentʼs policy can only be regarded as defective or unrealistic if can be shown contravene international conventions. Any judgment other than that cannot but be political and this is no function your organization.” (Ibid.)↩
- The Embassy expected the negative Federal Military Government (FMG) response as the ICRC failed to consider the sovereignty issue, but the message should not be taken as absolute rejection. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) should consider a new personal mission to Lagos. The Embassy did not believe the FMG was pursuing a policy of genocide nor did Marcel Naville, ICRC president, despite the belief by ICRC Vice President James Freymond and others.↩