Iran 1972
217. Telegram 4789 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Ambassador Farland reported that despite a government crack-down, the pace of terrorist activities in Iran had quickened, and that the government was unlikely to halt such activities without first addressing the basic question of political, social, and administrative reforms.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 IRAN. Confidential.
218. Telegram 5055 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Ambassador Farland expressed skepticism regarding the efficacy of the Iranian anti-terrorist campaign.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 IRAN. Confidential.
219. Telegram 161337 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran
The Department forwarded the section dealing with Iran of a Washington Post article based on CIA narcotics reports.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11–5 IRAN. Unclassified; Priority.
220. Airgram 151 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The Embassy conveyed the remarks of an Associated Press correspondent in Iran that SAVAK’s abuses of power were fueling opposition to the Shah.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Andrew I. Killgore, and approved by Heck.
221. Memorandum From the Vice Admiral of the Navy (Peet) to Secretary of Defense Laird
Peet updated Laird on the status of the items promised to the Shah, including F–14/15s, laser-guided bombs, and uniformed technicians.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD Files, (C) (A), FRC 330–77–0094, Iran 1972. Secret. The enclosures are not published.
222. Telegram 6127 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Ambassador Farland observed that although rumors abounded that narcotics were being smuggled from Iran, the evidence needed to approach the Iranian Government was lacking.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11–5 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to Kabul, Islamabad, Manama, Kuwait, Jidda, Karachi, Dhahran, and BNDD.
223. Telegram 6166 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The Embassy relayed the Iranian Government’s decision to reduce authorized 1973 poppy cultivation to ten per cent of the 1972 level.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11–5 IRAN. Confidential. Also sent to BNDD. Repeated to Kabul, Islamabad, and Ankara. One Department official, identified only as “MAGM”, wrote to “JCM” on October 12: “I have reservations on this one. The Iranians are making no sacrifice and are taking no risk comparable to that taken by the Turks. This cutback is only for one year; there is nothing to suggest that Iran will not resume full cultivation once the surplus is used up. It could be useful to pat them on the back to remind them of our interest and encourage any inclination to hold down poppy cultivation in the future, but this cutback isn’t worth a public announcement at the high levels of the USG comparable to the President’s statement on the Turkish ban.” (NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D410, Box 8, SOC 11–5, Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Iran 1972)
224. Telegram 192358 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran
The Department instructed the Ambassador, on the President’s behalf, to request that Iran turn over its entire force of 90 F–5As for immediate delivery to Vietnam.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Flash. Sent Immediate to Saigon.
225. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff for the Files
Saunders recommended no reply to the most recent letter sent to the President by Nasser Afshar, editor of the Iran Free Press.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1282, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran 10/1/72–12/31/72. The attached copy of the August/September Edition of the Iran Free Press is not published. Afshar sent copies of the Iran Free Press to the American Embassy in Tehran, which on October 12, 1971 sought unsuccessfully to get off the distribution list, fearing that Afshar hoped to get the publication into local circulation. (Douglas Heck to Jack Miklos, NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D351, Box 6, PS 7 Iran 1969–71, Assistance to Americans, Nasser Afshar 1971.) On July 18, 1972, Douglas Heck of the Embassy argued against official replies to Afshar’s publication, since “such letters give the publication recognition it does not deserve as well as a peg for further attacks on us and Iran. In addition [they] might be misinterpreted here as suggesting that arguments in this rag are worthy of official response even though what you are trying to do is correct some of the outrageous statements about Iran.” (Heck to Miklos, NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D365, Box 7, POL 23, Internal Security, Counter-Insurgency, Iran 1972). Miklos agreed.
226. Telegram 6317 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The Shah responded to the US plea for F–5As by agreeing to relinquish 32 aircraft for delivery to Vietnam, subject to early replacement.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. Passed Immediate to Saigon.
227. Telegram 6346 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The Shah set out his demands for the replacement of his aircraft, including accelerated delivery of equipment orders previously placed in the US.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Nodis; Cherokee. Passed to Saigon.
228. Telegram 6417 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The Ambassador sent suggestions for another approach to the Shah should more of his F–5As be needed in Vietnam.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Nodis; Flash; Cherokee. Passed to Saigon.
229. Telegram 196855 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran
The Department urgently requested an additional 16 F–5A aircraft from Iran, offering concessions on other equipment in return.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Nodis; Cherokee. Drafted by Thomas R. Pickering (PM) and approved by Johnson, Defense, and Harry G. Barnes, Jr (S/S). Repeated to the Ambassador in Saigon.
230. Letter From the Embassy in Iran to the Country Director for Iran (Miklos)
Political officer Andrew Killgore discussed the likely future of Iranian politics, including the possibility that the Shah might introduce a one-party system.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D365, Box 7, POL 14, Elections. Confidential; Official—Informal. The referenced A-166 was not found. Adl was Yahya Adl, the leader of the opposition Mardom party. In a handwritten postscript, Killgore added, “Jack, your letter was particularly welcome because of the strong criticism of the Iranian regime implied in it. The Shah is a great man whose accomplishments are also great. But this gives no occasion for a worshipful attitude on our part. The Shah’s interests and ours will be better served in the long run by our looking dispassionately at the failures as well as the success of the regime. That’s what we are going to be doing. Cheers! Andy K.” Miklos’s letter was also not found. On October 13, as expected, the ruling Iran Novin party had won a sweeping victory over the Mardom party in local elections, taking 80% of the vote. In Telegram 6210, October 14, the Embassy had written that the importance of the election “lies not so much in Iran Novin victory, which observers already knew would be the result, but in their significance as a training vehicle in democratic forms.” (Ibid., Central Files, POL 18–1 IRAN.)
231. Telegram 6520 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The Ambassador attempted to assuage the Shah’s security concerns over the U.S. request for additional F–5A aircraft.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. Passed to Saigon.
232. Telegram 6611 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The Ambassador expressed the chagrin of both the Iranian Government and the Embassy that Iran’s role in the mission to send F–5As to Vietnam had been divulged in a Department of Defense briefing.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. In Telegram 201483 to Tehran, November 5, the Department explained with regret that since the story had been leaked to the New York Times, the Defense spokesman had been forced to address it. (Ibid.)
233. Telegram 6687 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The Ambassador recommended a package of benefits that the Shah should receive as reward for his cooperation regarding the F–5As.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.
234. Telegram 210666 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran
Under Secretary Johnson advised the Ambassador of the compensation the U.S. Government would provide to Iran, including deeply discounted title to previously leased aircraft.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only. Drafted by Pickering and approved by Defense; Miklos, George S. Newman (U), Eliot, Davies, Lowell B. Laingen (NEA/PAB), Curtis F. Jones (INR/ARR/RNA).
235. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Iran (Farland)
Kissinger inquired whether the compensation package described for the Shah was sufficient or whether more was required.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1282, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran 10/1/72–12/31/72. Top Secret. The source text is the White House approved draft as sent for transmission.
236. Telegram 7008 From the Ambassador in Iran (Farland) to the Under Secretary of State (Johnson)
In strong terms, the Ambassador emphasized that the United States must abide by the condition to replace the Shah’s aircraft rapidly.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Nodis.
237. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Saunders submitted to Kissinger the revised compensation package for the Shah.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Box 602, Vol. IV, 9/1/71–4/73. Secret. Tabs A and B are not published. Haig approved the memorandum on Kissinger’s behalf.
238. Telegram 219119 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran
The Department sent Farland an expanded copy of the proposed compensation package for the Shah.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only.
239. Intelligence Note RECN–36 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
The report on “Iranian Oil Negotiations” observed that the recent Saudi Arabian agreement on oil participation had inspired Iran to demand a revision of its Spring 1972 deal.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Robert L. Dowell, Jr. (NEA); and approved by John F. Ghiardi (INR/Economic). Released by Leonard Weiss (INR).
240. Telegram 7389 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
With some suggested revisions, the Shah approved of the U.S. compensation package for his F–5As.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. This information was included in the material submitted to Kissinger on December 12 for the President’s Wednesday Briefing. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1282, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran Military 1/1/72–12/31/72)
241. Telegram 7769 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The Embassy reported the local reaction to the appointment of former CIA Director Richard Helms as Ambassador-Designate to Iran.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1282, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran 10/1/72–12/31/72. Confidential. Repeated to Islamabad, Jidda, Kuwait, London, and EUCOM.
242. Telegram 7770 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Farland conveyed the Shah’s increasing anxiety for progress on the President’s promise for U.S. technicians to Iran.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 602, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. IV, 9/1/71–4/73. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to SECDEF, USCINCEUR, and JCS.
243. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird
Nutter advised Laird of the status of planning for greater technical assistance support to Iran.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 330–75–125, Iran 000.1–333, 1972. Secret. Of the first option, Laird wrote on the memorandum “This plan would never fly with Congress!!” Of the third, he wrote, “This would be best-but you may have gone too far.” Of the second, which he approved on December 31, he wrote, “If this is the best you can work out and Services see no trouble, I’ll approve.” Laird added a last comment at the bottom of the memo: “Warren: We are under orders from a co-equal branch of our government to civilianize as many positions in all four services as possible—This applies equally but even more so in our technical help to our allies. We have many civilian employees out of work.”