242. Telegram 7770 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1 2
Subject:
- GOI Request for Temporary Military Technicians
Summary: Buildup in Iranian armed forces, assisted by temporary US technicians and massive injection of US equipment, is matter of highest political importance to Shah. As we are regularly reminded, he is anxious to receive some signal that USG agencies are taking action on Presidential assurances concerning requested US technicians. We are having difficulty responding to GOI queries re status of program. End summary.
Action requested: Two things:First, what may we tell Shah in response his repeated inquiries regarding status of program and target dates for first arrivals? Second, we request price per man figure for financing of any TAFT type teams that may arrive in January-March period so that GOI can prepare requisite legislation for Majlis. These figures required by GOI in next ten days. End action requested.
- 1.
- On three occasions during past week Shah has relayed through highest military channels to Chief, ARMISH/MAAG, his concern for status of Iran’s request for military technicians to assist in buildup of armed forces. We feel certain that at this time no other US-Iranian program has higher priority in a Shah’s thinking than our agreement to sell Iran services of military technicians in support of [Page 2] vast amount of military equipment Iran is buying from us.
- 2.
- Shah’s original request was approved in principle by President in their meeting last May and specifically affirmed in Kissinger memorandum of June 15. During summer months, Iranian military and MAAG service sections carefully reviewed GOI requests for assistance and were able to reduce number of personnel requested by two-thirds. Shah was understanding of that process and several months later also accepted, albeit with some doubt, need for visit of MG Moench team for study of housekeeping problems. His doubts centered on necessity for team’s visit. According to his line of thought, why not compute costs, bill GOI and simply bring in new personnel on terms similar to those afforded MAAG staff? Through efforts of Ambassador and MAAG Chiefs we thought we made persuasive case for requirement for Moench team analysis of large-scale and complex program. It was helpful in that period to have fresh restatement of President’s commitment which we presented in writing to Shah in context of Operation Enhance Plus.
- 3.
- Now, six months after President’s decision and three weeks since Moench team’s departure, Shah and staff, without further information, are showing serious concern. We have repeatedly attempted explain these delays as essential processing for large operation, but we are running out of persuasive reasons.
- 4.
- There are practical aspects to Iranian concern. First, GOI will pay all costs of program which will be no small undertaking. Total sum will have to be financed with authority of Majlis. Special legislation covering program expenditures in January–March period must be prepared within ten days for presentation to current session. Thus, GOI should have ASAP reasonable estimates of costs of technicians who, according our predictions, are expected arrive in first quarter 1973. Second, GOI moving ahead on its buildup in such areas as increased training school capacities, training schedules, etc., which must parallel our buildup. Programs to this end are underway on assumption technicians will start arriving soon. These are highly welcome steps by Iran [Page 3] and should be encouraged, but we risk upsetting Iranian timetable which it in our mutual interests to promote. Need for prompt US input into their timetable is evident.
- 5.
- Action requested. (A) In order cope with increasing restlessness of Shah and his planners regarding status of buildup and target dates when first TAFT-like teams are expected in country, please advise what we may tell Shah. We have run out of answers and are beginning lose credibility. (B) We request dollar figure per technician covering January–March period which we may pass to GOI. If this not available in precise detail in order of magnitude figures would be acceptable.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 602, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. IV, 9/1/71–4/73. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to SECDEF, USCINCEUR, and JCS.↩
- Farland conveyed the Shah’s increasing anxiety for progress on the President’s promise for U.S. technicians to Iran.↩