233. Telegram 6687 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1 2

Dept pass Saigon

Subj:

  • Enhance Plus

Ref:

  • (A) State 199893
  • (B) Tehran 6520
1.
Ambassador will use next available occasion to convey to Shah our thanks for his cooperation in supporting our efforts to find peace settlement in Vietnam, to assure him that his help in time of need will not be forgotten and to convey to him our profound apologies over press flap affecting Iran’s security which developed without advance notice to GOI. To this we propose add reference to outstanding cooperation of IIAF at Vahdati Air Base which made possible extremely successful execution of Operation Enhance Plus by USAF crews and teams. Working closely with IIAF personnel, these teams accomplished their mission in record time and left behind record of efficiency and effective working relationships with IIAF personnel which will further enhance the very close rapport ARMISH/MAAG has with its Iranian counterparts.
2.
In this connection we wish commend USAF teams for their outstanding performance which advanced both US interests and US/Iran relations. Given limited distribution of these messages and high classification of project, we do not know how best to convey our commendation and congratulations, and appreciate recipients this message seeing that this gets to right people.
3.
Now that this phase of Operation Enhance Plus appears to be satisfactorily completed and while exercise remains actively on front burner and very much in Shah’s mind, we strongly urge that we come up as soon as possible with comprehensive proposal to credit Shah for 32 aircraft he has made available. We welcome opportunity provided in State 199893 to rethink elements of package we should put to Shah. Our thoughts are as follows: [Page 2]
(A)
First we urge letter from President to Shah which would incorporate points outlined in para one, with exception of reference to press flap which we believe has been contained and which we do not think need be part of a presidential letter. We urge such a letter be sent to Shah because of close personal relationship between President and Shah which undoubtedly more than any other consideration was reason which led Shah to respond so generously and promptly to our request.
(B)
We implement proposals already put to Shah as outlined in para six Tehran 6520 to insure that:
(1)
Delivery of F–5E’s be advanced to start August 1973;
(2)
Joint State/DOD team visit Iran to discuss build-up of military personnel here. In this connection State 201954 is very helpful and we look forward to arrival of team in late November.
(3)
We give Iran’s military support needs expeditious handling. As one element of this aspect of our military relationship with Iran visit of DOD team chaired by L.A. Alne of OSAA has been extremely valuable and is excellent example of how we can contribute constructively to increasingly close military cooperation with Iran as well as helping us significantly in our balance of payments problems;
(4)
Increase IIAF quota at Air Command and Staff School from one to six officers per session;
(5)
Satisfy all Iranian F–5E instructional training requirements at Williams Air Force Base; and
(6)
If Iran wishes, credit presently released eight F–4E’s to Iran’s total buy of those aircraft.
4.
All of foregoing helps substantially to strengthen package we will be putting to Shah as credit for 32 F5A’s. As helpful as it is, it still does not rpt not address fundamental problem with which we have been wrestling and which is brought about [Page 3] by major gap created in IIAF’s inventory by release of 32 F5A’s. This problem has weighed on Shah’s mind because he is concerned about his national security requirements and it has been further complicated by press leak which Shah believes has bearing on Iran’s security. Over weekend at inaugural ceremony in south Iran Shah told Ambassador that now that world knew that Iran’s air force capability had been reduced by release of F–5 aircraft, it was more imperative than ever that these F–5A’s be replaced as soon as possible. Shah said Iran’s air space must not be left uncovered and while he agreed replacement aircraft should be phased in in orderly manner, process should start promptly. Reverting to formula outlined in para four of Tehran 6520, Shah again suggested that F–5’s be replaced by F–4’s with exact ratio subject to negotiations.
5.
Given Shah’s concern, we do not think that Shah will find attractive suggestions in earlier messages from Washington that Iran receive financial credit for F–5A’s it has released. As Shah has consistently said from outset (ref para 7 Tehran 6317), he has been concerned with replacement aircraft, not credit, and his agreement to release 32 F–5A’s was subject to early replacement.
6.
For essentially the same reasons we believe that proposal in State 199893 to return F–5A’s from Vietnam is non-starter. Iranians would have justifiable apprehension as to operating conditions and effects of climate and SVN maintenance of aircraft. Additionally, by time F–5A’s would be returning they would probably be phased out of IIAF inventory which is converting to F–5E models. Most importantly, movement of F–5 aircraft has never been presented to Shah as loan to SVN but rather as transfer which will be compensated in some form by USG. After our failure to advise GOI prior to making public statement on Iran’s involvement in exercise, it would severly test Shah’s confidence in USG if we now inform Shah that transfer was in fact loan of aircraft which he will be getting back. We conclude from this that if we are not to forget Shah’s help in time of need we must focus on replacement aircraft in addition to offers enumerated in para 3(B) above. Best way to respond to Shah is to advance delivery date of F–5E’s and F–4E’s which Iran has on order.
7.
Finally, we recommend Ambassador be authorized to tell Shah USG has approved Maverick missile for release to Iran and we will make every effort to insure that new F–4’s for Iran are equipped with weapon and F–4’s now in IIAF inventory retrofitted as soon as possible. Assurances on Maverick may help alleviate security concerns Shah feels with transfer of F–5A’s.
Farland
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US-IRAN. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.
  2. The Ambassador recommended a package of benefits that the Shah should receive as reward for his cooperation regarding the F–5As.