243. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird1 2
SUBJECT:
- Technical Assistance Support for Iran
The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you of the status of initial planning to provide increased technical assistance support to Iran and to seek approval for continued planning actions.
You will recall that this assistance requirement dates from the visit by President Nixon to Iran in May of 1972. In talks with the Shah on 30–31 May, the President made commitments (Tab A) for U.S. support of Iran, including the assigning of an increased number of U.S. military technicians to work with the Iranian Services. In response to a White House request in this regard, we advised on 5 July 1972 that requirements would be obtained from the Embassy and MAAG in Iran preliminary to country-to-country negotiations on uniformed teams (Tab B). This proposed action was approved by White House Memorandum of 25 July 1972 (Tab C). Subsequently, coordinated DOD/State guidance was furnished (Tab D) for in-country collaboration with the Iranians.
As a result of MAAG/Iranian discussions, the skills and numbers of personnel were initially defined. In these discussions, the initial Iranian request was reduced from approximately 2,000 to 1,000, within which spaces were identified that were appropriate for filling with USG civilians. Following Washington review of the initial MAAG proposed list of requirements by OSD and the services, a DOD/State team visited Tehran 27 November–3 December 1972, to validate projected requirements. Particular attention was given to the development of logistic support needs and costs, full pricing data, and policy guidelines for deployment of technical personnel as Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFTs). Memorandum of team visit is at Tab E. Based on discussions between DOD/State Team, the MAAG and the Ambassador, the MAAG again refined the lists of personnel requirements. These lists were received 15 December by OSD and service staffs and are undergoing further review at this time.
[Page 2]Although this review may result in minor changes, the requested personnel strengths, at 1974 peak deployment, are:
| USA | USAF | USN | US TOTAL | LN | |
| Tech Teams | 497 (a)(b) | 238 | 22 | 757(b) | 4 |
| Supt Elm | 129 | 17 | — | 146 | 80 |
| Totals | 626 | 255 | 22 | 903(b) | 84 |
Of the strengths shown above, the U.S. Army total at (a) includes 155 positions which are validated for either military or DOD civilian fill, depending on availability of skills; 88 additional positions are planned for fill by DA civilians vice military. Further, the strengths at (b) are subject to reduction by approximately 230, if a satisfactory civilian contract can be negotiated for an Iranian Army aviation support activity at Esfahan.
While virtually any of the TAFT positions could be filled by a civilian possessing the necessary skill and experience, in-country and Washington planning to date has followed the Shah’s stated preference for “bluesuiters,” particularly in control and supervisory positions. Under any civilian/military mix, pricing would be carefully derived to insure full U.S. compensation for direct and indirect costs of the technicians deployment and activities in Iran. We are working closely with OSD and DSAA Comptrollers in this regard.
We do not know what number of uniformed military technicians the President has in mind in the “blue suiter” approach. The Shah has, however, established his negotiating position that the President’s agreement permits “any number that is needed in Iran”; a statement which has not been contradicted by the USG. It is useful to note that prior to the President’s visit the Shah indicated a desire for “a few hundred” U.S. military technicians (Tab F).
While we will obviously respond to the President’s desires, we have serious reservations about the very large number of uniformed personnel currently proposed, which would be additive to the 605 U.S. military personnel now in-country in 18 separate organizations (Tab G). We also are concerned about the morale and retention problems related to the unaccompanied and/or isolated tours proposed for more than half the personnel. An early definition of this commitment is required in order that we may continue our planning and take the long lead-time steps necessary to insure an orderly deployment of both the support and technical personnel. Relative to the magnitude of the President’s commitment, your guidance is requested on the alternatives outlined below.
[Page 3]Continue planning and negotiating toward a TAFT, Iran, in order of magnitude as presented above (i.e., 903 DOD military/civilian TAFT personnel at peak deployment, with approximately 780 in uniform).
[check mark here] Modify joint plan by (a) conversion to civilian contract of 265 lower grade technical/administrative spaces in Esfahan Ground Forces Aviation Center/School while retaining a supervisory cell of about 10 uniformed; and (b) proportionate reduction of 44 DOD support spaces. DOD military/civilian TAFT strength at peak deployment would be about 594, with approximately 500 in uniform.
If neither of the two above alternatives is acceptable, request you establish below overall ceilings for TAFT planning; subsequently we will direct revised planning in-country on expedited basis.
DOD Civilian/Military Total
Military
Sub-total
- Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 330–75–125, Iran 000.1–333, 1972. Secret. Of the first option, Laird wrote on the memorandum “This plan would never fly with Congress!!” Of the third, he wrote, “This would be best-but you may have gone too far.” Of the second, which he approved on December 31, he wrote, “If this is the best you can work out and Services see no trouble, I’ll approve.” Laird added a last comment at the bottom of the memo: “Warren: We are under orders from a co-equal branch of our government to civilianize as many positions in all four services as possible—This applies equally but even more so in our technical help to our allies. We have many civilian employees out of work.”↩
- Nutter advised Laird of the status of planning for greater technical assistance support to Iran.↩