1. Memorandum of Conversation

During a January 2 meeting, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Counselor at the Soviet Embassy Boris Sedov discussed the ratification of the NPT.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 66, Country Files, Europe-USSR, Soviet Contacts (Sedov) 1968–1969. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place at the Pierre Hotel. The attachment at Tab A is not published.

2. Memorandum From Spurgeon Keeny of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

In this memorandum, Kenny analyzed each paragraph of the NPT provisions and provided a nuanced discussion of the potential problems of the proposed treaty. He focused his analysis specifically on those issues that were likely to effect U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany relations, IAEA/EURATOM safeguards arrangements, and PNEs (Peaceful Nuclear Explosives).

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty through March 1969. Secret. The attachments are not published. Copies were sent to Halperin and Sonnenfeldt. The memorandum was forwarded to the President by Kissinger under cover of a January 28 memorandum in which Kissinger suggested Nixon would want to skim through the memorandum prior to the NSC meeting the next day.

3. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Sonnenfeldt commented on National Security Council staff member Spurgeon Keeny’s January 24 paper concerning the NPT. In it, Sonnenfeldt cautioned against Keeny’s simplification of what he saw as a more complex German problem.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty through March 1969. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Haig, who wrote “Concur” next to his name on page one and initialed it.

4. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Vice President Agnew

In this memorandum, Kissinger briefed recipients on the NSC meeting scheduled for the following day and attached a ten-page issues paper on the NPT.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–19, NSC Meeting, 1/29/69 Meeting. Secret. It was also sent to Rogers, Laird, and Lincoln. A copy was sent to the Wheeler, Helms, and Richardson.

5. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting

The meeting was devoted to a detailed discussion of the NPT. Over the course of the two hour meeting, the participants examined the articles, debated various problems associated with the ways in which the treaty would affect U.S. interests, and discussed strategies for presenting the treaty to the U.S. Senate to ensure its ratification.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, National Security Council, Meetings, NSC, January–March 1969. Top Secret

6. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Kissinger forwarded a list of actions resulting from the January 29 NSC meeting. He specifically requested that the President respond with his comments on U.S. security capabilities and potential strategies for dealing with non-nuclear countries.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–19, NSC Meeting, 1/29/69 Meeting. Top Secret; Sensitive.

7. Memorandum of Conversation

In a meeting with Secretary of State Rogers, German Ambassador Pauls discussed the FRG’s concerns with the NPT. In this meeting, Pauls indicated FRG Chancellor Kiesinger’s support of the non-proliferation agreement, but indicated that it would be easier for the FRG to sign the NPT if the Soviets gave an assurance that the FRG would not be discriminated against but treated as other parties to the treaty.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted on February 3 by Gleysteen (ACDA/IR) and approved on February 4 in S.

8. National Security Decision Memorandum 6

This memorandum announced President Nixon’s decision to go forward with ratification of the NPT. Although the U.S. would ratify the agreement, Nixon directed that no efforts be made to pressure other nations, specifically the FRG, to follow suit. Instead the U.S. Government “should reflect a tone of optimism that other countries will sign or ratify,” and emphasize that the Treaty would not “broaden or modify U.S. commitments abroad.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDM’s (1–50). Secret. The President submitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification the same day. For text of his message to the Senate, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, p. 62. The Senate gave its consent on March 13 by a vote of 83–15. For text of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, see Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 78–97.

9. National Security Study Memorandum 13

The President directed that a study be made reviewing the positions of key countries on the treaty and the alternative courses of action available to the U.S. to influence their signature or ratification of the treaty.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–34, Senior Review Group Meeting, 3/6/69. Secret

10. Memorandum of Conversation

In this conversation, Soviet Ambassador to the United States Dobrynin and President Nixon discussed the ratification of the NPT and the corresponding situation developing in Berlin. The ensuing discussion outlined the mutual desire to work together to bring about an “era of negotiations, not confrontation,” and illuminated multiple domestic and international outcomes for the NPT.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files POL 1 US–USSR. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Malcom Toon. The conversation was held in the Oval Office. The memorandum of conversation is published in its entirety as Document 14 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970.

11. Note From Soviet Leaders to President Nixon

In this note, Soviet leaders emphasized the need for cooperation between the U.S. and the USSR to ensure international security. Moreover, they stressed their belief that all possible efforts should be made to have the NPT start operating effectively and as soon as possible.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 340, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Memcons. No classification marking. The note was given to President Nixon by Dobrynin during their February 17 meeting. The note is published in its entirety as Document 15 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, 1969–October 1970.

12. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Nixon and Chancellor Kiesinger

In this private conversation between Nixon and Kiesinger, the two leaders discussed the need for an open “line of communication” connecting the two countries so as not to fall into the trap set by the Soviets to break the alliance. The NPT would prove to be a key component to that relationship. At the heart of this discussion was the need to maintain a “firm but not hostile” regarding the NPT and any subsequent Soviet action.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 834, Name Files, Staff Memos, Sonnenfeldt, Helmut. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, which is labeled “Uncleared-For Embassy Use Only.” The memorandum was forwarded to National Security Council Operations staff member Sonnenfeldt by Russell Fessenden, Charge d’Affaires at the Embassy in West Germany, under cover of a March 10 letter in which he indicated that the memorandum of this “private session” between Nixon and Kiesinger was drafted by interpreter Hans Holzapfel. (Ibid.) The memorandum of conversation in its entirety is published as Document 14 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972.

13. Study Prepared by Ad Hoc Interagency Group

Prepared in response to NSSM 13, the study outlined three courses of action that the U.S. could utilize to secure the signing and ratification of NPT that ranged from a passive approach to a uniquely tailored and intensive treatment. In the 28-page discussion, not published here, the Ad Hoc Interagency Group recommended courses of action on a country-by-county basis.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–34, Senior Review Group Meeting, 3/6/69. Secret.

14. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Kissinger informed President Nixon that during a March 11 conversation, Soviet Ambassador to the United States Dobrynin handed him a copy of a note that the Soviets intended to deliver to Bonn to meet some of its concerns about the NPT. Kissinger attached an analysis of the note and copies of exchanges.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, 489, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger1969 (Pt. 2). Secret; Nodis. In a March 6 memorandum, Kissinger informed the President that in a March 3 conversation he had told Dobrynin, “If the Soviet Union could give the Germans some reassurance on Article 2 [of the UN charter], either through us or directly, it would ease the problem of signature considerably.” (Ibid.)

15. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers

In this memorandum, Kissinger told Rogers that President Nixon wanted Rogers to explore the feasibility of synchronizing the completion of ratification and the deposit of procedures for the NPT with the Soviet Union.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty (through March 1969). Secret; Nodis. In a March 28 memorandum to Kissinger, Acting Executive Secretary John Walsh indicated that Rogers would meet shortly with Soviet Ambassador to the United States Dobrynin to propose simultaneous deposit. (Ibid.) For a record of that meeting see Document 17.

16. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Sonnenfeldt briefed Kissinger on instructions given the Department of State regarding NPT ratification and on his conversation with the German minister.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty (through March 1969). Confidential. Sent for information. Brigadier General Haig initialed the memorandum and a handwritten notation indicated Kissinger saw it.

17. Memorandum of Conversation

Secretary of State Rogers and Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kuznetsov discussed the benefits and drawbacks surrounding simultaneous ratification and the issues associated with Germany’s signing of the NPT.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted on April 2 by Krimer (OPR/LS) and approved on April 9 in S. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office at the Department of State.

18. Memorandum of Conversation

Secretary of State Rogers and German Foreign Minister Brandt discussed the NPT, focusing primarily on the continuing FRG concerns and the Soviet response to simultaneous ratification.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted by Johnpoll (EUR/GER) and approved on April 15 in S. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office at the Department of State.

19. Editorial Note

20. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

In this memorandum, Sonnenfeldt briefed Kissinger for the Under Secretaries Committee meeting scheduled to take place that afternoon that was to review an options paper prepared by ACDA on the NPT ratification. Sonnenfeldt attached the options paper for Kissinger’s consideration.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 66, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69–March 70. Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum at Tab B is not published. Written in the right hand margin of page 2 of the attachment is, “But Senate itself asked for simultaneous ratification.” An arrow points to the last sentence in paragraph (b). The attachment cited in the footnote to page one of Tab A is not published.

21. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg)

In this office diary entry, Seaborg recounted the discussion of the NPT at the May 1 Under Secretaries meeting. The Commission focused on easing German concerns, creating a strategy for depositing the ratification at the most advantageous time, and the status of other nations with regards to the NPT.

Source: Department of Energy Archives, Records of the U.S Atomic Energy Commission, Job 65–42, Seaborg Diary, pp. 101003–101010. Confidential 5/1/69–3

22. National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee Decision Memorandum 7

The memorandum listed the follow-up decisions on the NPT, including the issue of Soviet-U.S. simultaneous ratification and the status of other national positions on the NPT, which had been made at the NSC Under Secretaries Committee meeting on May 1.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–89, Atomic 388.3. Secret; Exdis.

23. Memorandum of Conversation

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary of State Rogers discussed the U.S. proposal for joint action in the ratification of the NPT.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSR-Memcon’s, Dobrynin/Secretary, Mar 69. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on May 8 by Toon.

24. Letter From Premier Kosygin to President Nixon

In Kosygin’s response to Nixon’s March 26 letter, Kosygin reiterated the Soviet readiness to enter “into an era of negotiations” with the United States and their desire to improve relations with the FRG. The problem, according to Kosygin, lay with the West Germans whose “stubborn refusal” to accede to the NPT greatly impeded its entry into force. He then encouraged the U.S. to use its influence “to secure the most rapid accession to the treaty.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, 765, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, USSR, Premier Alexei Kosygin, Correspondence. Kissinger forwarded Kosygin’s letter to Nixon under cover of a May 28 memorandum in which he stated: “on Europe, he bears down hard on the demand that the FRG sign the NPT and appears to rule out Soviet ratification until then. He asks us to press the German and other countries allied with us (presumably meaning Japan and, by Soviet definition, Israel.” (Ibid.) Kosygin’s letter and Kissinger’s memorandum are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, 1969–October 1970.

25. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) and the Commissioner for the European Communities (Haferkamp)

The two men discussed the scope of the EURATOM safeguards and the process of negotiating compatibility between the Treaty of Rome and the NPT.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, AE 13 EURATOM. Confidential. Drafted on June 3 by H. Malin (ACDA/IR). The attached list of participants is not published.

26. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and Foreign Minister Gromyko

Rogers and Gromyko discussed simultaneous ratification and deposit of the NPT.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL US–USSR 5/1/69. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William D. Krimer and approved on September 24 by R. L. Brown. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers in New York City.

27. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Kissinger discussed the issue of joint U.S.-Soviet ratification in light of Secretary of State Rogers’ meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 280, Agency Files, Department of State, 6/1/69 Vol. III. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information

28. Telegram 14146 From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

The telegram transmitted the text of the talking points that the German NPT delegation intended to use in its upcoming talks in Washington. The points indicated a positive FRG appraisal of the NPT, even in light of the less than satisfactory German-Soviet discussions the previous March. The FRG then listed several requirements before it would consent to sign the NPT. Among those were requests to the U.S. Government to issue a statement denying the Soviet alleged “right of intervention” as noted in Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, for its continued support of NATO and the subsequent safeguards agreements, and its willingness to publicize its position in support of these requests to “avoid any subsequent disagreement” concerning the interpretation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Confidential. It was repeated to Moscow, US Mission Geneva, and USNATO.

29. Telegram 14209 From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

The telegram reported on Chancellor Brandt’s decision to “push ahead” on the NPT. Brandt intended to approach the Soviets and requested Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s assurances of the expansion of peaceful atomic energy use in writing, so that Brandt could distribute it to the German Bundestag.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Confidential. It was repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, Rome, Berlin, USNATO, USMission Geneva, and USUN.

30. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Eliot discussed the prospects for German signature of the NPT now that Brandt had been elected Chancellor, noting they had improved considerably as the result of the lack of U.S. to sign the agreement and encouraging the continuation of that policy.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Confidential. Drafted by Sutter (EUR/GER); cleared in draft by Katz (EUR/RPE), Hillenbrand (EUR), and Glysteen (ACDA). R.C. Brewster signed for Eliot.