3. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1 2
SUBJECT:
- NPT Memorandum dated January 24, 1969
I think that this memorandum is a fair and comprehensive commentary on the provisions of the NPT.
In my view, the problems with the FRG are understated. In the first place, German reservations are not due only to reluctance to surrender a future nuclear option but to a more general uneasiness regarding the FRG’s position in the world and US attitudes. Moreover, with the German election approaching the NPT has become one of those issues which different people for different reasons do not wish to stand up and be counted on. I consider it questionable whether, even after our ratification, the Germans would be prepared to sign before their election. Excessive US pressure might become an issue in the election campaign. In any case, I would think that the Germans will want to pursue further their contacts with the Soviets, which have lately been resumed, to see what they might be able to obtain by way of assurances that the Soviets will not again assert their alleged intervention rights under Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter.
In short, I think the German problem is more complex than suggested in the Keeny paper.
You also asked whether I thought there was any problem about your circulating this document to members of the NSC. Apart from the German aspects mentioned above I have no particular substantive problem about circulating the paper. As a matter of tactics and style, however, I wonder whether it would not be better to ask the Secretary of State, as the Cabinet officer principally responsible for shepherding through the NPT, to provide the NSC with a commentary on the provisions of the treaty. Since Spurgeon has already done the work, he could perhaps give his paper informally to whoever would be assigned by the Secretary of State to prepare such a commentary.
If you prefer to circulate this paper yourself, I will be glad to provide a slightly expanded first paragraph to handle the German issues.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty through March 1969. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Haig, who wrote “Concur” next to his name on page one and initialed it.↩
- Sonnenfeldt commented on National Security Council staff member Spurgeon Keeny’s January 24 paper concerning the NPT. In it, Sonnenfeldt cautioned against Keeny’s simplification of what he saw as a more complex German problem.↩