25. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) and the Commissioner for the European Communities (Haferkamp)1 2


  • EURATOM and the NPT (U)


  • (See attached list)

At Mr. Smith’s request, Mr. Haferkamp began by describing briefly the scope of EURATOM safeguards—an inspector corps larger than that of IAEA and still expanding; a precise materials accountability system; a requirement that all movement of fuel within, between, or out of member countries be reported; unlimited access by inspectors to all facilities, both with advance notification and unannounced; and a record of close cooperation with the US AEC. He said that, for the first time, funds had been budgeted for safeguards research. As a beginning, $600,000 would be available, to provide for 30 researchers. EURATOM would not duplicate research being carried out in individual states, but would coordinate with existing programs.

Mr. Haferkamp described the problems of assuring compatibility between the Treaty of Rome and the NPT. He said with some pride that he had been able to overcome Dutch and French opposition to early establishment of an internal EURATOM safeguards position for negotiations with the IAEA, and that all six member countries had now agreed to technical talks for this purpose, to begin in Brussels May 29. He predicted that all technical problems would be worked out during these talks before the summer vacation. To Mr. Smith’s question, Mr. Haferkamp said that EURATOM could then be in a position [Page 2] to move ahead with negotiations with the IAEA around the end of the year, once France and Germany had formed new governments and Germany had reached a decision on NPT signature. Since the Commission was not likely to receive a mandate from the member countries for negotiations before those two changes in government, he thought it all the more important to proceed with the technical talks.

Mr. Smith said the US stood ready to facilitate the conclusion of a satisfactory safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and Mr. Haferkamp indicated that EURATOM would also want to exchange views with the AEC during the technical talks, which of course could not completely avoid the political aspects of the safeguards question.

When Mr. Haferkamp asked whether the US would use its influence during IAEA negotiations to maintain the integrity of the EURATOM safeguards system and to prevent duplication or replacement of safeguards, Mr. Smith disclaimed expertise on past exchanges on this subject, but, speaking personally, said he was impressed by the size and scope of the EURATOM system and thought it made sense to make maximum use of existing systems. It was recalled that US delegate Adrian Fisher had publicly stated three interpretations of NPT Article III during a speech in Geneva in January 1968, which paralleled closely the five principles on safeguards, which EURATOM itself had worked out in 1967.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, AE 13 EURATOM. Confidential. Drafted on June 3 by H. Malin (ACDA/IR). The attached list of participants is not published.
  2. The two men discussed the scope of the EURATOM safeguards and the process of negotiating compatibility between the Treaty of Rome and the NPT.