12. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Nixon and Chancellor Kiesinger1 2
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the NPT.]
NIXON: We must look at the long sweep of history, and isolating any one is a mistake. That will be my policy—to make clear that I want the closest communications with your people. We have talked it over. We have established a “line of credit.” The line of communication must be very clear and direct.
CHANCELLOR: When the NPT issue was raised soon after I came into office, I was given a very hard time. I remember an article by Foster in which he said that if you want the treaty yon have to risk an erosion in our alliance. I think that would be a terrible mistake.
NIXON: I couldn’t agree more. What I feel and reiterate because of our future relations—and as you know, I have suggested that the Congress ratify the treaty and eventually it will be passed—or on any problem you face, arms limitation or anything that we may talk about with the Soviets, the alliance is, as we say in the United States, the Blue Chip, the heart of the defense of Europe and the free world. As far as the Soviets are concerned, all their actions are designed to break up that alliance. We shall not fall into that trap. We will talk but we won’t get trapped. Let us not weaken the alliance. We have to think about what they want and then look at our alliance and particularly at Germany. We know their aim and are keenly aware [Page 3] that we “play the same game”. I think therefore they appreciate us more.
CHANCELLOR: We must be firm but not hostile, open to discussion. We are prepared to maintain our rights but we and our people are realistic. The people are firm and will not waiver, but they are not emotional. They know very well whether our friends are with us or are not interested in us; but the people don’t want the impossible. The fact that you are going to Berlin is of the greatest value to us. The NPT situation is still difficult; there is division in my country and in my party, but we now should be discussing [sic] it on a higher level. There are the two UN resolutions that the Soviets want to utilize against us and there is the problem of control. We (Chancellor and President) should not deal with that now, but if that could be treated satisfactorily, also for public opinion, that would be a step in the right direction.
NIXON: Do you need some reassurances from the Soviet Union on those two UN resolutions?
CHANCELLOR: Our public opinion would not understand why we signed the treaty if the Soviet Union claims the right of military intervention at their pleasure. On control, for example, we have a common work plan with the Dutch on a centrifuge. So the Soviet Union says we cannot do that after the treaty is signed. Therefore the control question has to be cleared up. I am sure we can satisfy the Offset question satisfactorily and would like to do it over the longer haul.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the NPT.]
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 834, Name Files, Staff Memos, Sonnenfeldt, Helmut. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, which is labeled “Uncleared-For Embassy Use Only.” The memorandum was forwarded to National Security Council Operations staff member Sonnenfeldt by Russell Fessenden, Charge d’Affaires at the Embassy in West Germany, under cover of a March 10 letter in which he indicated that the memorandum of this “private session” between Nixon and Kiesinger was drafted by interpreter Hans Holzapfel. (Ibid.) The memorandum of conversation in its entirety is published as Document 14 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972.↩
- In this private conversation between Nixon and Kiesinger, the two leaders discussed the need for an open “line of communication” connecting the two countries so as not to fall into the trap set by the Soviets to break the alliance. The NPT would prove to be a key component to that relationship. At the heart of this discussion was the need to maintain a “firm but not hostile” regarding the NPT and any subsequent Soviet action.↩