Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972

17. Memorandum of Conversation¹ ²

Washington, April 1, 1969, 3:40–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT:

• Non-Proliferation Treaty

PARTICIPANTS:

• U.S.S.R. Participants
  • Vassily V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
  • Yuri N. Chernyakov, Minister-Counselor
  • Alexander I. Zinchuk, Deputy Chief of USA Division, MFA
• U.S. Participants
  • William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
  • Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
  • Malcolm Toon, Deputy Assistant Secretary
  • Adolph Dubs, Acting Director of Soviet Union Affairs
  • William D. Krimer, Interpreter

The Secretary suggested to Mr. Kuznetsov that in view of the fact that the U.S. Senate had approved the Treaty, it might be helpful if the final act of putting it into force, that is the deposit of the instruments of ratification, were performed at one and the same time in Washington and in Moscow. He thought that this would be helpful in getting other countries to accede to the NPT. The final act here included signing of the Treaty by the President and deposit of the instrument of ratification.

Mr. Kuznetsov said that the United States and the Soviet Union had exerted very great efforts to prepare the draft of the Treaty. Last year, at the resumed session of the UN General Assembly we had worked “like hell” to get the Treaty into final form. Therefore the Soviet Union was anxious to have it enter into force as soon as possible. But, he noted that there were some unnamed countries in Western Europe (one in particular, whose government is headed by a Chancellor) which have taken a very reluctant position with respect to the Treaty. Therefore the Soviet Government was very carefully watching the situation, though it knew that the U.S. Government was keen on having the Treaty enter into force. Ratification in the Soviet Union has not yet started officially, but is in preparation. Members of the Soviet Government and the Central Committee know the Treaty in all its details. The government will present a report to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet with a recommendation that the NPT be ratified. The Presidium then decides whether the Treaty should be presented to the Supreme Soviet at a Plenary Session or whether ratification by the Presidium is sufficient, followed by the signing on the part of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. In any case, the Treaty will be considered by the two Soviet committees dealing with foreign affairs, one in the Council of Nationalities and the other in the Council of Soviets, before it goes to the Presidium. Replying to the Secretary’s question as to the time element involved, Mr. Kuznetsov said that he could not fix a precise date; this procedure varied, depending upon the importance of the Treaty and the press of other business. In any case, he thought, the process would be eased if other countries showed their willingness to participate in the NPT. He thought that some of these other countries should be watched carefully and that something should be undertaken by the United States to persuade them to sign the Treaty.

The Secretary pointed out that here, too, some people, particularly in the Congress had asked pointed questions about why the Soviet Union had not yet ratified the Treaty, if it was true, as we believe, that the Treaty is as much in the interest of the USSR as it is in the interest of the U.S. He thought that the situation would be helped if such final ratification could take place simultaneously.

Mr. Kuznetsov recalled that during the preparation of the draft of the Treaty a great deal of attention had been devoted to the need for certain other countries to participate in the Treaty. There had been a definite understanding, based on assurances given by representatives of the United States that a certain West European country would be a party to the NPT. But now, he was not certain; in that country some officials had spoken in favor of signing the Treaty, for example, the Foreign Minister of that country; but he could not fail to note that it did not take long for the Chancellor of that country to stress that the Foreign Minister had not been authorized to make his statement. The Soviet Union did not want to be deceived, did not want to be in a position where that country he had mentioned did not become a party to the Treaty. The USSR was not afraid of that country. It was not only capable of defending itself against attacks from that quarter, but could also defend its allies. But here we were dealing with an important question of principle: during the negotiations the USSR had received assurances from U.S. representatives that that West European country would be a party to the NPT. The proposal now that we do something together in order to induce that country to join was not in accord with the tacit understanding he was referring to. After all, the United States bore the main responsibility for getting the FRG to be a party.

The Secretary said that he was anxious not to be misunderstood. He was not imposing a condition, but rather was suggesting that the Soviet Government consider the possibility of simultaneous ratification. After all, our two countries had worked hard to arrive at the final text, were equally interested in having the Treaty enter into force as soon as possible; and if we were to do something together now, it would provide added impetus to getting other countries to join in.

Mr. Kuznetsov replied that he would take this proposal under consideration. He had just wanted to explain the history of how the Treaty had been arrived at. He and his government were constantly thinking about the Treaty and all of its aspects.

In parting Mr. Kuznetsov explained that he was leaving for New York tomorrow, for a one-day stay, and was then returning to Moscow. He expressed regret that he had not been able to visit his old alma mater, Carnegie Tech in Pittsburgh.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Secret. Drafted on April 2 by Krimer (OPR/LS) and approved on April 9 in S. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office at the Department of State.
2. Secretary of State Rogers and Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kuznetsov discussed the benefits and drawbacks surrounding simultaneous ratification and the issues associated with Germany’s signing of the NPT.