264. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Scientific and
Technological Affairs (Pollack) to the Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs (Johnson)1
2
Washington, May 5, 1971.
SUBJECT:
- House Discussions on Post-Apollo Cooperation with Europe—BRIEFING
MEMORANDUM
Attached is a memorandum of talking points on the foreign policy
considerations bearing on post-Apollo cooperation with Europe. These
were prepared by. SCI and EUR for your use in the White House
discussions which will take place, presumably next week, on this
subject.
I hope it will be possible for Marty Hillenbrand and me to review this subject with you
briefly at a 10:00 AM meeting on Monday, May 10.
[Page 2]
Attachment
Talking Points for Ambassador
Johnson on Post-Apollo Cooperation
- 1.
- Foreign Policy Considerations May be
Decisive
- --The State Department believes cooperation with
Europe in the development of the space transportation
system would be of considerable value to relations with
our European allies. In the absence of other decisive
factors, foreign policy benefits may be determining in
the decision on whether we should proceed with the
proposed program of cooperation.
- 2.
- The Cooperative Program would Strengthen
Ties with Europe
- --Our ties with Europe continue to be the cornerstone
of our efforts to build a peaceful world.
- --Europe’s industrial, economic and technological
strength is critical to the existing balance of power,
and Europe is making substantial progress toward unity,
particularly in the economic sphere. As Europe gains in
unity and economic strength it becomes all the more
important that we aggressively seek closer ties in areas
of advanced industry and technology, where cooperative
efforts can continue to provide the Atlantic Alliance
with a solid foundation of common economic interests.
Space programs and space industries on both sides of the
Atlantic are still flexible enough to accomodate
themselves to meaningful cooperation. Achievements in
space, particularly in the Post-Apollo program, offer
highly visible and dramatic symbols of the fruits of
partnership.
- --Our negotiating position is strengthened by the fact
that the post-Apollo program appeals to Europe’s
strongly felt desire to stand in the front rank of
technological development. A successful joint effort of
this magnitude and importance would serve as a landmark
in the new and more mature partnership we must achieve
with the Europeans during the years ahead.
- --Europe will have a space program of significant
magnitude in the coming decade. Without post-Apollo
cooperation, Europe’s program will be organized around
France. We would have little input and little influence
on such a program. Post-Apollo cooperation, on the other
hand, would permit us to develop a common orientation
and common goals. At the same time the Europeans could
realize their national and regional goals while
participating in an historic effort of world importance;
our interest lies in this direction.
- 3.
- Set a Precedent for Cooperation in Other
Areas
- --In other areas of advanced technology, such as the
development of “breeder” reactors and uranium enrichment
facilities, Western Europe is on the brink of deciding
whether to advance in unison, perhaps in partnership
with the United States, or whether to drift apart and
pursue diverse goals. These decisions will have a
profound, long term effect on Europe and on its
relations with the USA.
Successful multi-national cooperation in post-Apollo
will improve our ability to influence Europe’s decisions
in these other fields.
- 4.
- Urgency of Continuing Discussions
- --Resumption of post-Apollo discussions with the
Europeans is a matter of some urgency. Our silence
during the three months since the February meeting with
Lefevre has
caused much of the previous momentum to be lost.
Friendly contacts in London and Bonn report that this
silence reinforces the French contention that
cooperation with the USA
on acceptable terms is not a real possibility, and
thereby strengthens the French campaign for the
development of a completely independent European launch
capability. If we are unable to resume negotiations
fairly soon, the opportunity for engaging substantial
European participation in the post-Apollo program may
evaporate completely.
