Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972

260. Memorandum From Robert M. Behr of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹ ²

Washington, March 24, 1971.

SUBJECT:

• Post-Apollo Space Cooperation

This memorandum supplements your talking points for your scheduled meeting with Dr. David this evening.

Two developments have arisen which you should be aware of in conjunction with Item 5 on your agenda—Post-Apollo Space Cooperation.

Secretary Rogers has sent a memorandum (Tab A) to the President advising him of the status of the post-Apollo negotiations and seeking assurance that the State/NASA efforts are on the right track. The purpose of the memorandum is to obtain clarification of the President’s wishes with respect to post-Apollo cooperation.

My initial reaction is to suggest to you that we are not in a position at this time to ask the President either to commit to a specific program or to make any sort of decision which weighs one program against the other—that is, INTELSAT versus post-Apollo. If such decisions are needed farther down the road, they have to be based on analytical work that hasn’t even begun.

(FYI: The main reason for Secretary Rogers’ concern is that he has been told that Ed David and Peter Flanigan are convinced that the President is not a strong supporter of the post-Apollo program, despite his public record to the contrary.)

A meeting of European ministers responsible for telecommunications matters that took place on Monday (22 March). According to State, the ministers reached a consensus on a modification to the INTELSAT “definitive arrangements” which, if it can be sold to the INTELSAT conference beginning in April, will go a long way toward removing the stumbling block regarding launch services.

In brief, the formulation is this: major questions such as whether a regional telecommunications satellite will cause economic harm to the consortium will be decided by the INTELSAT Board of Governors

(where weighted voting applies—i.e., the US will have roughly 40% based on a usage/contribution formula). This vote can be overruled only by a 2/3 negative vote in the INTELSAT Assembly (one nation, one vote).

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 393, Subject Files, Space Programs, 1971. Confidential. Sent for information. Tab A is Document 259.
2. Behr updated Kissinger on the question of European cooperation in the post-Apollo program prior to a meeting with the President’s Science Adviser David. He also recommended that Kissinger advise the President not to take a position at this time.