258. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (David) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1 2
I would like to offer the following thoughts in preparation for our discussion about Post-Apollo cooperation with the European Space Organization.
I see the following negative factors:
- 1)
- There is likely to be substantial high technology transfer to the Europeans in return for a small (10%) European contribution.
- 2)
- The management of the shuttle project will be complicated by the necessity to satisfy partners before decisions are made.
- 3)
- The proposed arrangements will lock us into the shuttle program, depriving us of the flexibility to tailor the program to our evolving needs.
- 4)
- The European financial contribution is of dubious value since the cost of doing business with them as partners will be greater and because we will probably have to undertake back-up programs for those elements or systems being developed abroad.
- 5)
- The proposed arrangement develops competition for our own commercial exploitation of our satellite technology.
These were the factors which led me and Peter Flanigan to conclude that a joint effort with the Europeans is not in our best interests. In my conversation with the President on February 22nd I got the impression that this was in line with his general thinking. I am looking forward to having your advice and views so that we can determine how to proceed.
Science Adviser
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 393, Subject Files, Space Programs, 1971. Sensitive; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Flanigan.↩
- Prior to another round of talks, David communicated to Kissinger his concerns about negative factors of space cooperation with the Europeans.↩