Office of the Historian

258. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (David) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1 2

Washington, March 17, 1971.

I would like to offer the following thoughts in preparation for our discussion about Post-Apollo cooperation with the European Space Organization.

I see the following negative factors:

1)
There is likely to be substantial high technology transfer to the Europeans in return for a small (10%) European contribution.
2)
The management of the shuttle project will be complicated by the necessity to satisfy partners before decisions are made.
3)
The proposed arrangements will lock us into the shuttle program, depriving us of the flexibility to tailor the program to our evolving needs.
4)
The European financial contribution is of dubious value since the cost of doing business with them as partners will be greater and because we will probably have to undertake back-up programs for those elements or systems being developed abroad.
5)
The proposed arrangement develops competition for our own commercial exploitation of our satellite technology.

These were the factors which led me and Peter Flanigan to conclude that a joint effort with the Europeans is not in our best interests. In my conversation with the President on February 22nd I got the impression that this was in line with his general thinking. I am looking forward to having your advice and views so that we can determine how to proceed.

Edward E. David, Jr.
Science Adviser
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 393, Subject Files, Space Programs, 1971. Sensitive; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Flanigan.↩
  2. Prior to another round of talks, David communicated to Kissinger his concerns about negative factors of space cooperation with the Europeans.↩