Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

63. Memorandum From Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security AffairsHaig)¹

Washington, October 15, 1971.

Al:

Henry asked for this NSSM at the Indian Ocean SRG meeting.² I want to express my serious reservation that this might be a source of embarrassment. The fact of the study could be leaked by:

• —Those opposed to any naval limitations to embarrass the President and bring down the wrath of public opinion,
• —Those who favor a defense budget cut in the interest of showing that the President really is looking for ways to counter Navy and Defense pressures for increased Navy expenditures.

Either case could be embarrassing in the charged atmosphere of the coming year. The counter argument of course would be that such proposals are being surfaced from a variety of foreign sources and in a variety of forms. The US, therefore, must be in a position to effectively deal with such proposals on their merits rather than be caught with counter arguments which won’t wash, unprepared entrance into some sort of discussions forced by others, or opposition which the other side could call intransigence.

I wanted to flag this for you in the event you thought Henry should focus again on this.³

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–178, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 110. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. Sent for action.
2. See Document 61. The draft NSSM is attached but not printed. Entitled “Concepts of Naval Arms Control,” it stated: “while directed specifically at bilateral arms control arrangements between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., the study should also consider multi-lateral arrangements (similar to MBFR) on both a global and a regional basis. The importance of NATO and Warsaw Pact fleets should be considered in both instances.” The study was to assess “the relative balance of U.S. and U.S.S.R. (and NATO–Warsaw Pact) fleets existing and projected in the foreseeable future… . The assessment should include both military implications and the role of naval forces in alliances and general foreign policy.”
3. On another copy of this memorandum, Haig wrote: “HAK—I agree this is wrong Kissinger initialed and a handwritten notation reads: “HAK agrees.” (Ibid., Box H–176, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 104)