62. Editorial Note
During her October 1971 trip to the United States, Ceylonese Prime Minister Sirimayo Bandaranaike spoke to both the United Nations General Assembly and to top U.S. officials concerning the proposal to turn the Indian Ocean into a “zone of peace” along the lines of the Ceylonese aide-mémoire (see Document 60). Although Bandaranaike had submitted a draft of her upcoming speech to the U.S. Embassy, according to telegram 3007 from Colombo, October 14, the version she delivered to the General Assembly was less compatible with U.S. policy than had been her original draft, as she had made changes after her arrival in New York. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–6 IND)
On October 19, Madame Bandaranaike met with President Richard in Washington. Neither the memorandum nor the tape of the conversation indicates that Bandaranaike or Nixon raised the issue of the Nuclear Free Zone proposal. (Memorandum of conversation, October 19; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Ceylon Vol. I, and ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation No. 596—4) At a working lunch with Secretary of State William Rogers that same day, Rogers asked about the proposal and noted that the United States was studying it. (Telegram 195054 to Colombo, London, and USUN, October 23; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–6 IND) However, according to a later report on her trip, Nixon expressed interest in the proposal and Bandaranaike talked at length on its origins stemming back to 1964. Bandaranaike was also reported to have discussed it with Rogers and to have said that both Rogers and Nixon had [Page 207] indicated they would study it further. (Memorandum from Helms to Kissinger, November 16; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Ceylon, Vol. 1)
Subsequently, the Departments of State and Defense rejected the Indian Ocean declaration as a basis for negotiation because it meant a special Law of the Sea regime for the Indian Ocean, put the General Assembly behind a declaration that was inconsistent with the Law of the Sea, reduced strategic mobility, and affected the security interests of any state that relied on a military balance of power for its stability. The U.S. Delegation at the UN was to seek the cooperation of the Soviet Delegation on the grounds that the United States agreed to the principle of avoiding military competition, as Gromyko had brought up July 28, but outside of the General Assembly. (Joint State/Defense telegram 200345 to Indian Ocean Embassies, November 3; ibid.)