52. Paper Prepared by Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff1
Diego Garcia: The initial reaction around the Indian Ocean littoral to the announcement of our intention to set up a small communications facility on Diego Garcia has been fairly much as expected.2 Most of the governments did not seem to be particularly disturbed, at least at first blush, although there did seem to be considerable suspicion that we would be developing more than an austere facility. The most negative reaction not unexpectedly came from Somalia which was “strongly opposed.” The Indians, in what appeared to be a prepared statement, also registered a negative response insisting that Diego Garcia was a “base” and deploring the whole operation.
We have not yet heard the last word on Diego Garcia since there is likely to be a second, and in some cases more important, wave of reaction. When the final results are all in we should have an interesting test of sentiment around the Indian Ocean against which to judge possible naval moves we might wish to make in the future.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–176, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 104. Secret. A typed notation reads “For HAK.” This paper was prepared for, but not included in, the President’s December 18 briefing. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 29, President’s Daily Briefing Files, December 16–31, 1970)↩
- On December 15, the Department of State released information that the United States would begin construction of an austere naval communications facility on the Diego Garcia atoll in the Chagos Archipelago, British Indian Ocean Territory, in March 1971. This was in concurrence with a 1966 bilateral agreement. Both British and American flags would fly over the facility and the United Kingdom would assist in its manning. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Unfiled Material, Country “Cy–E” 1953–1977, Diego Garcia) Circular telegram 202722, December 14, contained a copy of the public announcement and a long listing of anticipated questions and approved answers. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 727, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. IV) Attached but not printed is a December 16 letter from Eliot to Kissinger transmitting a summary of reactions to the announcement. Australia, Iran, and Malawi had favorable reactions; India and Somalia had unfavorable reactions; Indonesia, Kenya, South Africa, the Malagasy Republic, and New Zealand were noncommittal; and U.S. notifications to Bahrain, Ceylon, the Maldives, and the Seychelles were delayed. No reaction had yet been received from Moscow.↩