Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

36. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Turkey, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and Iran¹

Washington, December 28, 1972, 1:32 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Assessment of the Situation in the CENTO Area

A–12456

Enclosed are copies of papers prepared in response to the decision of the CENTO Council of Ministers in London last June for an “assessment of the situation” in the CENTO area.²

Embassy Ankara may submit the paper to the CENTO Secretariat as the United States’ contribution to the proposed study.

Johnson

Attachment³

Assessment of the Situation in the CENTO Area

[Omitted here are sections dealing with Syria and Iraq.]

The Persian Gulf

Saudi Arabia is committed to an ambitious program of modernizing its defense and internal security forces although it will remain heavily dependent upon outside military advice and technical assistance for some years. To block further Soviet encroachment into the Peninsula the Saudis are providing economic and some military aid to Yemen and have under consideration requests for similar aid to Oman. The Saudis have also continued to provide arms and money to the National Unity Front and to Southern Yemeni tribal dissidents in their bid to topple the extreme leftist regime in Aden. The Saudi leadership is also aware of the need for closer cooperation with Iran and with the Lower Gulf states if stability in the Gulf is to be preserved. Closer relations with the UAE will have to await, however, resolution of the lingering Saudi territorial dispute with Abu Dhabi.

The overall stability in the area has not been greatly affected since the nine formerly British-protected shaykhdoms of the Lower Gulf gained independence in 1971. The immediate effect of the British relinquishment of their treaty obligations to manage the defense and foreign relations of the shaykhdoms has been small, aside from the withdrawal of British troops from their former bases in Sharjah and Bahrain. Many British officers, on contract or secondment, have remained behind to assist the new states, particularly in defense and internal security matters. Except for occasional visits by Soviet naval units to Iraq and Iran and the special relationship they have established with Iraq, Soviet presence in the Gulf remains restricted. The Soviets (as do other communist countries including China) have an embassy in Kuwait. Following an approach to the UAE early in 1972, they have an agreement in principle to open an embassy in Abu Dhabi but this has not to date been implemented. Similar approaches to Oman, Qatar and Bahrain have been turned down.

Kuwait

Kuwait’s relative calm belies the many external and internal destabilizing forces in the country. Internally, more than half the population is non-Kuwaiti and is in the country on sufferance—its continued presence is predicated upon periodic renewal of residence and working permits. Many in this group are Palestinian white collar workers, who, in their deep-rooted opposition to Israel, would like to see Kuwait more firmly committed to the anti-Western camp of radical Arab nationalism. Externally, Kuwait faces the hostility of Iraq, which from time to time has pressed its claim that Kuwait, formerly a part of the Ottoman Sanjak of Basrah, is Iraqi Territory. So far, at least, Kuwait has been able to counter these pressures by liberal wages for its workers (at least by regional standards) and by including potential opponents among the Arab states which receive generous Kuwaiti development loans and subsidies. As a result, many of these states—including Iraq—have too great a stake in the continued largesse of Kuwait to initiate or countenance moves against it.

Bahrain

Of the nine Lower Gulf shaykhdoms, Bahrain has the largest, most sophisticated population and also the greatest potential for dissidence. About a half dozen dissident groups have been organized in Bahrain, including the Marxist National Liberation Front–Bahrain (NLF–B), the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), Ba’thi groups of both the Syrian and Iraqi brands, and elements of the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). In addition, various Palestinian fedayeen groups are also active in Bahrain. Further growth of its small (by Gulf standards) oil industry is not to be expected, making the need for economic diversification more pressing in Bahrain than in the other oil exporting states of the area. Over the longer run, if employment opportunities decrease there may be considerable unrest. However, in spite of a rash of labor protest demonstrations in March 1972, Bahraini security forces currently appear to have internal security reasonably well in hand.

Qatar

Although there has already been a coup since independence last year, the political stability of Qatar does not seem to have been adversely affected. In February 1972, Shaykh Khalifa bin Hamid al-Thani ousted his cousin Shaykh Ahmad bin Ali al-Thani and took over as Head of State. The coup was a family affair; however, most residents of Qatar consider the enlightened Khalifa to be a much more competent ruler than his predecessor. The coup has thus increased the popularity of the ruling family in Qatar which like Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, has a large alien population. The growing oil wealth of the country is a stabilizing factor, and an efficient police security force remains alert to counter any subversive activities, particularly any which might be undertaken by the former ruler or his supporters.

The UAE

The seven shaykhdoms of the UAE appear to be relatively stable for the short term. A long-standing border dispute between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia remains unresolved and continues to becloud relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. However, the Central Government under UAE President Shaykh Zayid has recently moved to establish diplomatic relations with Iran. In the poorer shaykhdoms, population is too limited and political awareness still too restricted to pose a threat. In the two oil-rich shaykhdoms, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, comparatively good wages and competent security forces appear adequate for the present to maintain stability. The failure of a coup attempt in Sharjah in January 1972, which cost the life of the Ruler, can be viewed as an example of the stabilizing forces at work within the UAE. Shaykh Zayid immediately dispatched troops from his Abu Dhabi Defense Force who, in cooperation with the Union Defense Force (formerly the Trucial Oman Scouts), quickly put down the coup. This suggests that the various UAE member states can cooperate if the need arises.

Over the long run, the Lower Gulf shaykhdoms will have to be able to maintain their own security without British or other major power assistance. Like Kuwait, they face serious problems—fluctuating relations with much larger neighbors, a large alien population, including numerous Palestinians, and radical Arab groups supported from the outside.

Saudi Arabia has a major interest in maintaining Gulf stability, as well as in finding a solution to its territorial dispute with Abu Dhabi. The latter also involves the question of accessibility to the Lower Gulf of Saudi oil discovered in the Empty Quarter. On balance, however, Saudi Arabia has been slow to show the concern with Gulf affairs that its interests would seem to indicate; it is more preoccupied with its opposition to the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).

The interest of outside powers in the Gulf is derived largely from its position as the world’s major petroleum exporting region. While Gulf oil is of great strategic interest to the West, and will probably become increasingly important to the Soviets, there does not presently appear to be any significant external military threat to the area states. The greatest present challenge to Gulf stability is from dissident and subversive activities generated in the Gulf states themselves and from their increased exposure to the political and nationalist cross-currents of the Arab world which independence has brought them.

The main political objective of the Soviets in the area is to increase their influence at the expense of the West. It is extremely doubtful that, in the pursuit of this objective, they would intervene overtly in the politics of the area, whether through military action or through support of a military adventure by an Arab radical regime. The political costs of such tactics would be very high in terms of the adverse reaction of the other regional states with which the Soviets are trying to increase their influence. The use of force by the USSR, for example, in support of Iraq or a radical group trying to seize power in a lower Gulf state, would probably so frighten local leaders that they would move closer to the West for support.

In the regional context, Iraq’s ambitions to play a leading role in the Gulf are opposed by the conservative Arab littoral states and by Iran.

Oman

All indications are that Sultan Qaboos is succeeding in curbing the rebellion in his Western province of Dhofar, which is supported by South Yemen with some Chinese assistance. The Sultan’s armed forces are stretched thin but are effective in interdicting rebel supply lines from neighboring South Yemen. Rebel defections continue. However, the war remains a costly burden, especially since the Sultan has embarked on an ambitious development program for his country, which only recently opened its doors to the outside world. Although unfulfilled Omani expectations have led to some criticism, Sultan Qaboos appears to have widespread support and to be firmly in control.

The Yemens

In September–October 1972, the two Yemens came as close to full-scale war as they had at any time since the People’s Democratic Republic of the Yemen (PDRY) became independent in 1967, but they quickly did an about-face and announced plans for unifying the PDRY and the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). In fact, neither effective unity nor all-out war seems very likely at present. Unity has always been the avowed aim of both Yemens, but the obstacles are great. The ruling group in each country sees in union a means of extending its sway over the other rather than establishing a true collaboration. Also, the present leadership of the YAR has become cooler toward the Soviet Union and leans slightly toward the West. The PDRY regime, by contrast, has its antecedents in the radical Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), is militantly Marxist and relies on close cooperation with the USSR.

Despite their basic mutual hostility, however, both sides probably realize that a prolonged war would strengthen the always potentially dissident tribal elements in both countries and greatly overtax their threadbare economies.

The unity talks thus provide a welcome respite for both sides and have served to defuse the border situation. However, Saudi Arabia, deeply worried about the radical orientation of the PDRY regime, has continued to support PDRY exile groups which are based in the YAR. These groups, collectively called the National Unity Front (NUF), sparked the recent fighting through border incursions during September, and they may again be instrumental in provoking armed conflict. For the time being, at least, both sides will probably try to keep border incidents from escalating, but the situation in the southwest part of the Arabian Peninsula remains far from stable.

The Soviets and Arab radical groups will probably rely on political subversion in the lower Persian Gulf rather than on direct intervention. Even so, the Soviets are likely to be cautious in the manner in which they participate in subversive activities and in their support of subversive groups, in an effort to avoid an anti-Soviet reaction among the local leaders.

Attachment⁴

SITUATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE

The Soviet Naval Presence

Over the past five years the Soviets have developed a virtually continuous naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Soviet naval auxiliaries and specially equipped merchant vessels began operating in the Indian Ocean on a more or less continuous basis in August 1967 in connection with the Soviet space program. Soviet combatants, a cruiser and two destroyers, appeared for the first time in the spring of 1968. The combatants were in the Indian Ocean almost four months although they spent about half their time visiting ports in India, Somalia, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, the UAR, Yemen and Ceylon. Submarines were added to the next deployment of surface combatants in November 1968. Since then, except for one week in the spring of 1968, there has always been at least one Soviet combatant in the Indian Ocean.

Soviet naval presence increased slowly from 1968 through 1970. There was an upsurge during the Indo-Pakistani war in December 1971 but the current Soviet naval presence appears to be approximately at the pre-December 1971 level if Soviet ships engaged in harbor-clearing operations in Chittagong, Bangladesh, are excluded from calculations.

While Soviet naval deployment varies from time to time a typical group at present could include some or all of the following:

• 2 surface combatants, 1 of which might be missile armed
• 1 amphibious ship
• 1 diesel powered attack submarine
• 1–2 repair ships
• 2 or 3 oilers
• 1 ocean rescue tug or salvage rescue vessel
• 1 small refrigerator cargo vessel
• 3 space vehicle recovery ships and 1 oceanographic research vessel

In addition the Soviets have about 10 ships presently engaged in the Chittagong operation including a varying number of minesweepers.

The combatant presence is augmented by the large Soviet fishing and merchant fleet operating in the Ocean which can provide emergency support and supply to Soviet naval vessels and perform intelligence functions.

Airpower: Soviet airpower in the Indian Ocean is limited by the absence of shore-base or aircraft carrier capability but the Soviets have flown naval TU–95 reconnaissance aircraft over the Arabian Sea from bases in southern USSR since August 1968 in support of space vehicle recovery operations.

Logistics: The Soviet naval presence is designed to be self-sustaining. Necessary minor repairs and supply operations are conducted primarily in international water at anchorages established near Socotra; Cargados Carajos, about 200 nautical miles north/northeast of Mauritius; Fortune Bank and in the area of the northeast Seychelles. The Soviets also make port calls which are not essential for logistic purposes but do lighten the burden. They have access to a number of ports in which supply and repair operations could be conducted and apparently have made limited logistic use of some of these, for example, in Somalia, Mauritius and Singapore. Despite reports of Soviet interest in acquiring port facilities in various countries of the area there is no evidence that Moscow has acquired or pressed for formal base rights.

Current Soviet Naval Operations

Soviet development of a naval presence in the Indian Ocean is related to both Soviet global naval policy and to Soviet political interest in the region. The Soviets desire a naval capability in all oceans as an appropriate element of great power status, seeking parity with western naval power. Great power strategic naval competition is not present in the Indian Ocean and the Soviets have not seen it necessary to develop a major strategic force. Nevertheless, they apparently take the view that because they are a great power, and a prominent maritime power in the Indian Ocean with large shipping and fishing interests, a naval force to protect their sea lanes is required. The naval force also performs space program support functions. At the same time the Indian Ocean operations offer an opportunity to enhance on-going Soviet naval capability in the area by providing oceanographic and other scientific research data, intelligence collection, training and familiarization benefits for Soviet ships and crews and opportunities to “show the flag.”

The Soviets have played their naval presence in low-key to the regional powers. Port visits have remained at roughly the same level since 1969 despite the gradual increase in Soviet naval operations in the Ocean. The Soviets have avoided implying any potential regional interventionist mission for the Indian Ocean force. This stance can be explained merely as good politics but it also is consistent with an evolving status quo Soviet policy in Asia, a desire to avoid creating anti-Soviet fears among littorals which might be exploited by the Chinese and a fear that any image of gun-boat displomacy would erode rather than enhance Soviet influence. On two occasions the Soviets did go beyond the mere “presence” function. A Soviet naval visit to Somalia coinciding with the April 1970 threatened coup was extended apparently as a gesture of solidarity with the incumbent regime. There is no evidence, however, that the Soviets considered naval intervention. During the Indo-Pakistan war of December 1971 the Soviets temporarily built up their Indian Ocean force but some elements appeared primarily assigned to track the movements of US ships.

Prospects for Expansion of Soviet Naval Strength

A major expansion of the Soviet naval presence is limited in the first instance by the logistical problems inherent in operations far from home ports. Assuming that the Soviets continue to expand their overall logistical strength they could sustain a steadily increasing combatant presence if their priorities dictate. Reopening the Suez Canal would reduce logistical problems and allow for expanded self-sustained operations, but the Soviets do not seem to assign a high priority to this.

Beyond logistic restraints on major Soviet naval expansion there are political constraints. Rapid expansion of Soviet naval power would risk reaction among regional countries against potential Soviet imperialism, a theme which the Chinese have already delighted in playing. Littoral sensitivity to Great Power naval presence is real. For example, the Indian Chief of Naval Staff on July 24, 1972 cited the Soviet ship presence along with that of the Japanese, Americans and Chinese as an object of concern for the Indians. Littoral powers, particularly Sri Lanka who are pressing for an Indian Ocean zone of peace would vocally oppose a Soviet (or western) buildup.

Furthermore, the Soviets may calculate that a rapid Soviet buildup would lead to a naval arms race with western powers in the region and there is no present indication that they would want to take this risk. In this regard, twice in the past 18 months the question of avoiding military competition in the Indian Ocean has been briefly touched upon in US/Soviet talks, but not seriously pursued. The last occasion was in July 1971 and the subject has not since been raised by either country.⁵

Although a major expansion of the Soviet naval presence is not likely under present circumstances, the limited Soviet fleet could serve as a nucleus for a larger strategic force, should the USSR consider an expanded presence desirable because of a perceived threat to Soviet interests in the region or possibly if the Soviets were presented with an unusual opportunity to advance their interests.

The Soviets have built assets for such a contingency. They have gained experience in Indian Ocean operations, established a visible presence and have cultivated friendly access to a number of ports in the region. This has permitted their personnel to familiarize themselves with port facilities in a region which for a long time was barely visited by Russian men-of-war. In addition, the Soviets have provided assistance in building or expanding port facilities at Berbera, Somalia; Hodeyda, Yemen Arab Republic; Umm Qasr, Iraq; and Vizakhapatnam, India. They are helping to clear war debris from Chittagong, and the port of Aden has a Soviet harbor master among several foreigners so employed. These activities not only help the familiarization process, but also build up good will and get the population used to at least intermittent presence of Soviet ships and/or naval personnel.

Impact on Free World Interests

Soviet naval influence on Free World interests in the Indian Ocean appears to be potential rather than a clear and present danger whether viewed in terms of Soviet forces in being or of Soviet priorities. Soviet appreciation of regional sensitivity to gun-boat diplomacy makes Soviet naval intervention in the region a likely contingency only in the case of developments which the Soviets would consider as a threat to their vital interests or possibly if they were presented with an unusual opportunity to expand their influence. Under present circumstances the Soviets are likely to continue to rely primarily on economic and military assistance and diplomacy to advance their interests in the area.

Soviet successes in expanding their political influence in the region will, however, serve to enhance their naval capability by allowing greater and more useful access to regional ports. Soviet access to littoral airfields for reconnaissance operations likewise would enhance their naval capability.

Furthermore, the Soviet naval presence offers psychological if not tangible support to various littoral powers and may encourage them to increase efforts to undermine neighboring regimes.

In conclusion, it appears prudent to maintain a careful watch on Soviet naval facilities in the Indian Ocean to assure that the current limited use of this force remains limited. Special attention must be paid to any indications that Soviet policy has begun to focus on developing naval-oriented assets in the Indian Ocean as a primary rather than ancillary goal of Soviet activities in the region.⁶

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 4 CENTO. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Chase (NEA/RA); cleared in NEA/IRN, NEA/PAB, NEA/TUR, EUR/NE; and approved in NEA/RA.
2. See footnote 3, Document 33. In a December 9 memorandum to Moorer, Colonel J. Angus MacDonald, member of the JCS Staff Group, wrote that “judging from the quality of the drafts, I suspect that the UK version will be more acceptable as the matrix for the final report than would the U.S. version. That, however, will be a matter for the SYG to decide.” (National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Admiral Thomas Moorer, Box 125, Misc. File, CENTO Minutes, April 1972)
3. CENTO; Secret.
4. CENTO; Secret.
5. For documentation on these talks, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971.
6. Another attached paper dealing with India is not printed.