Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

312. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 22, 1970, 8:30–9:05 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Middle East

PARTICIPATION

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State—
• U. Alexis Johnson
• John N. Irwin II (briefly at beginning of meeting)
• Talcott Seelye
• Defense—
• David Packard
• G. Warren Nutter
• James H. Noyes
• CIA—
• Richard Helms
• David Blee
• JCS—
• Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
• LTG John W. Vogt
• NSC Staff—
• LTG Alexander M. Haig
• R/Adm. R.C. Robinson
• Col. Richard T. Kennedy
• Harold H. Saunders
• Samuel M. Hoskinson
• Peter W. Rodman
• Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that:

1. State would modify the diplomatic scenario to take into account the Soviet response to our approach and the question and answer exchange with the Israelis, as well as the possibility of an Israeli move against Syria;

2. Defense would provide today an aid package for Israel that we might use to augment their capability if they should become involved in military action;

3. JCS will prepare a list of actions we might take, in the Middle East and worldwide, in two sets of circumstances: (a) if the Israelis intervene, and (b) if the Soviets make threatening moves.

Mr. Helms briefed orally from the attached notes.²

Mr. Kissinger: How do you explain that the Israelis are more confident at the same time we are getting hysterical appeals from the King?

Mr. Seelye: The Jordanians are just more emotional, giving to blowing hot and cold.

Mr. Helms: The Israelis are more objective about the situation. [3 lines not declassified]

Mr. Packard: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Johnson: Their intelligence is better. [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: The Iraqis say they will stay in their own area and are moving merely to protect their flank but a move to Jarash would be stretching their flank considerably. The King would not be paranoid if he saw a real threat in an Iraqi movement toward Jarash.

Can we have a rundown on the diplomatic side?

Mr. Johnson: Rabin gave us a note verbale yesterday asking us various questions.³ We have replied to these questions. (Mr. Johnson read aloud the questions and answers from an outgoing State Department telegram, which is attached.)⁴

We have also received the Soviet reply to our representations of Sunday⁵ (telegram attached).⁶ The response contains virtually no polemics. There is no assertion that the Syrians are not involved. They did note the buildup of the Sixth Fleet.

Mr. Kissinger: I thought it was very mild. Either they are tricking us or they are sincere.

Mr. Johnson: We have independent information that seems to confirm what they are saying.

Mr. Helms: Yes, they are making some effort with the Syrians.

Mr. Kissinger: It is not in the Soviet interest to trigger an action here unless they are looking for a pretext for a showdown.

Mr. Johnson: It is very tough dealing with the Syrians.

Mr. Helms: There is no worse government than the Syrian government.

Mr. Kissinger: But the Soviets have advisors with Syrian units. They must have known Syrian intentions.

Mr. Seelye: Their advisors do not go as far down in the command structure as in the UAR—they are at the higher levels. Of course, they might still have known what Syria intended to do.

Mr. Johnson: We had advisors in Vietnam and we still did not know some of their intentions, or at least could not control them.

Mr. Kissinger: They are two separate things—knowing about them and controlling them.

Mr. Johnson: We did not know. I am not trying to justify the Soviets. I am merely pointing out they do not have absolute control of the Syrians. At least the situation in Amman looks more stable.

Mr. Kissinger: What is the likely outcome of the Arab summit meeting?⁷

Mr. Seelye: Words; nothing very conclusive. It will give a face-saving opportunity for the parties to come to some resolution in Arab fashion. I don’t really expect them to resolve the problem, but it is possible.

Mr. Johnson: The Tunisians took the lead.

Mr. Seelye: They might get a North African mediation group which could get the Syrians to withdraw for some quid pro quo.

Mr. Kissinger: Some aspects of our diplomatic scenario have been modified by the answers to the Israeli questions. For example, the fact that we are now committed to a veto should be cranked into the UN scenario.⁸

Mr. Johnson: We will also have to redirect our approach to the Soviets in the light of their response.

Mr. Seelye: These are being done. We are also redoing the public statements to take care of a possible Israeli move in Syria rather than in Jordan. They don’t require much change.⁹

Mr. Kissinger: Have we the two aid packages ready—for Jordan and Israel? Do we have the directive ready on the anti-SAM package? It should go out today.

Mr. Saunders: We have the Jordanian aid package but we still need the Israeli package.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we have it today?

Mr. Noyes: Depends on what the Israelis are asking for.

Mr. Kissinger: We put a package together for Jordan last week, without a Jordanian request, to give us an idea as to what they might need in various contingencies. We need the same thing for Israel today. We won’t show it to anybody. I thought Mr. Pranger and the Israelis were supposed to get together on this. We have two separate problems here: one, to put together an anti-SAM package in response to Mrs. Meir’s conversations with the President; the second, to get a package for Israel if their military activity should make it necessary for us to move to augment their capability. This second package was to be discussed by Mr. Pranger with the Israelis. I would have no objection if we want to do it unilaterally. Can we get it today?

Mr. Packard: Yes.

Mr. Seelye: We have a disturbing rumor that the Kuwaitis have decided to withhold their contribution to Jordan. The Libyans are withholding their $60 million, and if the Kuwaitis withhold their $105 million, it will cut Jordan about in half.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we make it up?

Mr. Johnson: No, not without a separate supplemental appropriation.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we get an appropriation?

Mr. Johnson: I have asked our people to discuss the question of a supplemental with ISA. (to Packard) Secretary Laird was less firm on the fact of a Presidential decision on a supplemental when he discussed this with Secretary Rogers than I had understood from you yesterday.

Mr. Kissinger: I think the President will be willing to do it. After the package has been put together, and if Secretary Laird recommends it, the President will probably do it.

Mr. Johnson: So the next stage is to get the package ready.

Mr. Packard: It is practically ready.

Mr. Seelye: We have a draft of an economic package for Jordan but it still needs some work.

Mr. Johnson: It does not set out clearly the trade-offs. It says assistance for Jordan would have to be at the expense of other high priority programs, but it does not tell the President specifically which other programs.

Mr. Kissinger: I am sure he would be sympathetic to an economic assistance package for Jordan.

Mr. Johnson: It is a question of finding the money.

Mr. Nutter: Is this supporting assistance?

Mr. Seelye: Yes, grant aid for budgetary support.

Mr. Kissinger: Could we look at our contingency actions—our answers to ourselves on what readiness measures might be needed?

Adm. Moorer: Within our fiscal and political restraints, we have done about everything we can now. Our forces are on the alert, including the 82nd Airborne; we have augmented the Sixth Fleet; we have stepped up the alert in Europe.

Mr. Kissinger: But only of one brigade in Europe?

Adm. Moorer: Yes, but we have also moved additional aircraft to Europe.

Mr. Kissinger: Has this been noticed?

Adm. Moorer: Yes. We have put all unified commands on increased intelligence alert.

Mr. Kissinger: Is this likely to be noticed?

Adm. Moorer: Probably. In addition, we have outlined the actions we might have to take with increasing tension, including the deployment of additional forces. We would also have to do some things in the U.S.: reserves; changes in personnel policy; obtain a supplemental appropriation; increase the draft; increase SIOP readiness.

Mr. Kissinger: We need a list of things, in the first place, when things get tense, and in the second, in response to Soviet moves.

Mr. Packard: I agree—we should put some priorities on these things.

Mr. Johnson: We have two situations: what do we do if the Israelis move, and what do we do if the Soviets move.

Adm. Moorer: We have two categories of actions: those associated with the Middle East and those in other parts of the world.

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s get these broken down. We might want to make it clear when the Israelis move that the Soviets won’t get a free shot at them. This might be the time to move that ASW group to the Mediterranean.

Mr. Packard: We could move the ASW group, possibly put more fighters into Turkey.

Mr. Johnson: If the Turks agree.

Adm. Moorer: We can move up to 36 fighters into Incirlik under our present agreement; we have 18 there now.

Mr. Nutter: Are these part of our NATO forces?

Adm. Moorer: In one sense.

Mr. Johnson: I would like to have Rodger Davies sit down with the JCS staff and go over the list.

Mr. Kissinger: Could we have today (1) those measures we should take in the Mediterranean and worldwide if the Israelis intervene; and (2) the measures we might take in the Mediterranean and worldwide if the Soviets make threatening moves.

Adm. Moorer: Yes. We can get the military moves within our current capabilities. As things build up, however, it would take domestic action in fiscal augmentation, personnel policy changes, obtaining overflight and base rights, etc.

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s get your checklist broken down in relation to the two contingencies. (to Adm. Moorer) We are not trying to second-guess your contingency planning; we are trying to see what we could do in the form of signals to the other side. Could we meet later today, possibly at 4:30 p.m. to go over these?¹⁰

All agreed.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. Not attached and not found.
3. See footnote 10, Document 307.
4. Document 311.
5. See footnote 2, Document 276.
6. See footnote 3, Document 307.
7. See footnote 2, Document 303.
8. See footnote 10, Document 304.
9. See footnotes 6 and 7, Document 304.
10. The next WSAG meeting did not take place until the next day; see Document 317.