Office of the Historian

224. Telegram From the Embassy in Switzerland to the Department of State1

Bern, September 11, 1970, 0300Z.

2168. 1. In long meeting which broke up at 0200 Sep 11, following emerged:

A.
We considered approved PFLP counterproposals transmitted by Rochat (Bern 2162).2
B.
Drafted and transmitted agreed comments to Rochat (Bern 2163).3
C.
Drafted and transmitted a separate telegram to Rochat at UK Prime Minister Heath’s telephoned request asking for the immediate unconditional evacuation of all women and children (Bern 2164).4

2. Israeli Ambassador did not attend although invited and available. He communicated by telephone Israeli response to Bern Group request for a statement of position. The Israeli Government has discussed the matter, he said, the answer is negative. No one in the Israeli Government is prepared to liberate fedayeen.

3. Although there are a few hopeful elements in Rochat’s last report, the Bern Group was seriously disturbed by the progressive escalation of PLFP demands. There was serious discussion, led by Swiss, of outright rejection of entire PLFP counterproposal. Agreement was reached on text transmitted Rochat (Bern 2163) only by restating what [Page 656] was not acceptable in order to leave Rochat some power of action. Recall that ICRC Geneva has made clear early on both to Rochat and to Bern Group that this counterproposal, even in earlier incarnation, was unacceptable to ICRC (para 2 Bern 2160).5

4. UK, on instructions British Cabinet, raised question of contingency planning in event ICRC was forced abandon its mission. They suggested UN civilian presence, perhaps personal representative of UN SecGen. We understand Washington has received details of this directly from UK.6

Thalmann, as former UN personal representative of SecGen did not favor. Lack of clear direction and low prestige of UN in area seemed to rule this out. He suggested quadripartite group on Middle East at UN in NY. Failure of Rochat mission could well lead to new dangerous and major crisis situation and representation by major powers could be stabilizing force. Coordination with Swiss and Germans as non-UN members posed no insurmontable problems. Important thing was to have someone waiting in the wings with real authority and prepared to step in immediately should ICRC mission fail. Otherwise there would be an immediate tendency to settle bilaterally with a potentially dangerous residue.

We agreed seek government views on these contingency thoughts. Thalmann’s views represent Swiss Government thinking.

5. UK also announced British Cabinet decision to seek evacuation of British civilians from Jordan if ICRC agrees. They hoped begin not later than morning of September 12. Despite extended rationale, this announcement went over like a lead balloon.

6. In view major difficulties with text, accuracy and distribution of last two PFLP proposals through ICRC Geneva, Bern Group decided and arranged with ICRC for immediate telex transmission from Geneva to FPD with immediate distribution of written text to four powers and Israelis here. This will preclude some of the confusion arising today from different texts.

Davis
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PS 7–6 JORDAN. Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated to Amman (Immediate), Beirut, Bonn, London, Tel Aviv, and Geneva.↩
  2. Telegram 2162 from Bern, September 11, 0040Z. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Telegram 2163 from Bern, September 11, 0140Z. (Ibid.)↩
  4. Telegram 2164 from Bern, September 11, 0150Z. (Ibid.)↩
  5. See footnote 5, Document 222.↩
  6. See Document 223.↩