Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

223. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan and the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, September 11, 1970, 0027Z.

148727. Subject: British Idea of UN Presence in Jordan; British Evacuation from Jordan.

Summary. British Emb Counselor Moberly under instructions informed Dep Assist Secy Atherton Sept 10 that (1) UK sounding out U Thant on stationing of UN civilian presence at Dawson’s Landing, and (2) London exploring possibility of evacuation under ICRC auspices of British and other foreign nationals from Jordan starting morning of Sept 12. Moberly said Iraqis informed British Sept 10 that Iraqi Govt has decided to work for release of passengers, crew, and hijacked aircraft in Jordan. Assist Secy Sisco later informed British Amb Freeman we do not consider the idea of a UN presence a good one and gave our reasons. Freeman said he agreed entirely and would make use of US analysis. End summary.

1. Moberly said British are taking soundings on following scheme with U Thant and Bern powers. UN civilian presence would be established at Dawson’s Landing to (a) exert some restraint on PFLP, (b) focus world attention further on hostages, and (c) provide basis for further international action to obtain release of hostages if ICRC gives up. London considers GOJ and PFLP agreement would be needed and also that of Rochat. It especially important not to make his task more difficult.

2. Moberly continued London thinks Security Council directive to SYG may be necessary, assuming SYG agrees with scheme. Or perhaps SYG could bypass UNSC and send representatives to Jordan for humanitarian reasons on his own authority. UK UN has been instructed to seek SYG’s views. Moberly did not know if this has been done yet. If SYG favorable, London would formally consult in Bern with all concerned. UK Ambassador in Bern has already been instructed to inform others of scheme.

3. Atherton said we would study British idea and would be interested in SYG’s views, which Moberly undertook to pass on promptly.

4. Moberly said Embassy was instructed to inform USG of new development in UK evacuation plans from Jordan. London has agreed with British Ambassador Amman to begin steps to obtain additional aircraft for removal of Britons under ICRC auspices. British have discussed matter with ICRC in Geneva. ICRC ready to accept responsibility, but said details should be worked out on spot. British have determined Middle East Airlines has charters available if needed.

5. Moberly continued British Ambassador Amman wondered if Red Cross reps in Jordan would want to involve themselves in evacuation before finishing with passengers and hijacked aircraft. London has sent fresh instructions to him to take any opportunity to reduce numbers of Britons in Jordan and has told Ambassador to request Red Cross reps to make arrangements with GOJ and also fedayeen, whose forebearance will be required. Ambassador is to consult his US and other colleagues and then approach Red Cross.

6. Moberly answered Atherton’s question affirmatively that evacuation would be for any and all nationals who would want to join. Moberly said evacuation is to start not later than morning of September 12. UK will arrange additional charter aircraft for Red Cross.

7. Atherton thanked Moberly for information and said we would await judgment of US Chargé in Amman about situation on ground. Moberly suggested matter be further discussed between US and British sides in Bern and Amman.

8. Moberly said Embassy had just received telegram from British Chargé in Baghdad reporting his conversation Sept 10 with Iraqi Foreign Ministry official Jamali. He told Chargé that Revolutionary Command Council had been sitting and he had been authorized to say that Iraqi Government disapproved of hijackings on principle. They would, though not themselves involved, exert every effort with fedayeen to obtain release of all “civilians” detained in Jordan as a result of the hijackings. When Chargé sought clarification Jamali explained that this meant all passengers and crew irrespective of nationality. Iraqis would also work for release of the aircraft. Jamali said that he would be conveying same message to representatives in Baghdad of countries which were members of Security Council.

9. Subsequently Sisco called Ambassador Freeman to express our judgment that we did not consider idea of a UN presence, made up of two or so representatives of the SYG, as a good one. ICRC rep has non-political image, is an outstanding man, and doing a highly effective job. To introduce reps of the UN, which inevitably would bring with it background of the political debates in New York, would be to add both a superfluous and complicating factor to a situation which seems to be moving reasonably well. It would have to be explained to the ICRC, which in turn may misunderstand the situation as casting doubt on the excellent efforts it is making. Finally, as Ambassador Freeman knew Israeli position is key: injection of a UN element would hardly encourage a positive reaction on part of Israelis. Freeman agreed wholeheartedly with this analysis, thanked Sisco for it, and said he would make very good use of it.

10. Later same evening, Moberly called Atherton to report that UKUN had raised UN presence idea with SYG whose reaction had been negative. Moberly assumed idea was now dead.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12. Confidential; Priority. Drafted on September 10 by Walter Smith (NEA/UAR) and approved by Atherton. It was repeated to London (Priority), Bern, Bonn, Geneva, Beirut, USINT Cairo, Tel Aviv, Moscow, and Paris.