130. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- Secretary of State William P. Rogers
- Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson
- Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green
- John H. Holdridge, NSC Senior Staff Member
SUBJECT
- President’s Discussion of Hawaii Talks with Members of Official Party
The President: (To Secretary of State Rogers) Bill, your conversation with Ohira is likely to be the most important of the whole meeting. Tanaka doesn’t know too much about his job, and Ohira has much more experience in foreign affairs.
Mr. Johnson: That’s right, Mr. President. Tanaka has no previous experience in foreign affairs. He made a deal with other leaders, including Ohira, to get the job. However, Tanaka and Ohira are very close. Ohira was Foreign Minister in, I believe, 1964.
Mr. Kissinger: When I met Tanaka in Tokyo last June, he talked mostly about economic matters. What he said about foreign policy was very sketchy.2
Mr. Johnson: Of course, it’s not too bad to have a man as Prime Minister who has an economic background. We are Japan’s biggest customer, and next to Canada, Japan is our biggest customer. Our most important export to Japan is agricultural products.
I have here the draft of the economic agreement which we expect to reach at Hawaii. Japanese purchases of over $1 billion are reflected here.3 Some of this is in agricultural products—an additional $50 million over what the Japanese had already agreed to buy—and there is also a purchase of $320 million worth of wide-bodied aircraft. Some of this will be paid in advance, but the question is how to arrange for it. There is also an item of $20 million for the purchase of helicopters.
[Page 467]The President: What about the peaceful use of atomic energy?
Mr. Johnson: Yes, Mr. President, there will be a purchase of $320 million worth of uranium, with some of this paid in advance also.
The President: It’s not so important what the individual items are on the list, the round figure is the important thing.
Mr. Johnson: The agreement speaks of Japanese investment of from $500 million to $1 billion in a uranium separation plant to be operated jointly with U.S. interests. AEC has seen a problem over this partnership arrangement and has held up the deal so far.
The President: Are the French and the Germans participating in gaseous diffusion technology with us?
Mr. Johnson: If they want to purchase gaseous diffusion technology, we are prepared to sell. There has been some talk of the Japanese going into partnership with the Canadians, too.
The President: On the key point of the Japanese recognizing the PRC and breaking off relations with Taiwan, how soon will they kick Taiwan out?
Secretary Rogers: It looks like if Japan wants to have diplomatic relations with the PRC, it will need to break up with Taiwan. What kind of relationship Japan will maintain afterwards with Taiwan depends on the PRC attitude, and what they’ll require. The Japanese want to keep private trade with Taiwan. I told Ushiba that this was important from our standpoint, but I made it clear that we anticipated nothing would happen at the Hawaii meetings which would delay things in their approach to the PRC.
The President: I agree.
Secretary Rogers: Mr. President, I told them it’s our position that it’s “your decision,” and we weren’t in any position to discourage or encourage what they did as long as they were not acquiescing in any arrangement which would interfere in our ability to use our bases in Japan to defend Taiwan. I also said, “you should keep quiet about this. It’s a hell of a problem for us, but if you brief the press that the President said it was okay for you to break relations with Taiwan, that would be very bad.”
The President: I agree—we can’t have them say that publicly.
Mr. Kissinger: Based on my experience with them, they’ll leak it to the press and tell the Chinese about it anyway.
Secretary Rogers: But we won’t look as if we made a silent gesture to them to go ahead. We should take the position that the U.S. explained our policy to them and they listened, and they did the same for us.
The President: Yes. We should tell them that “what you’re doing you’re doing in your own interests, and we’ve consulted our interests also.”
[Page 468]Mr. Green: We have told the Japanese that we assume they would do nothing to interfere with our ability to deliver on our commitments. We have also told the Japanese that they have a good bargaining position, and can stand up to the Chinese with respect to Taiwan. They (the Japanese) are beginning to catch on, although they will surely normalize relations with the PRC before the end of the year. But Peking is now anxious, and the Chinese haven’t maintained their preconditions for several months. Perhaps they are worried about better Japanese relations with the USSR.
The President: Who, the Chinese?
Mr. Green: Yes, they want to sew Japan up, and strike while the iron is hot—while there is a China mood in Japan. They are smart, too. They know that if there are too many preconditions, they will get the Japanese backs up. In addition, there are people in Japan such as Fukuda, Kishi, and Sato, who remember the Gimo.4 Peking appreciates this and is playing a more conciliatory line.
The President: What role are the Russians playing?
Mr. Green: The Soviets are being fairly quiet on this. They are standing back. They want to sign a peace treaty with Japan, but the Japanese won’t sign because of those four islands.
Mr. Kissinger: That’s right—the Japanese won’t sign unless they get those four islands.
The President: Are the Russians hoping to increase their trade with Japan?
(At this point there was a general discussion of Japanese interests in helping to exploit Siberian resources in cooperation with the Soviets and possibly with the U.S.)
Mr. Johnson: What the Japanese particularly want out of Siberia is to exploit natural gas and oil resources.
Secretary Rogers: Japan has more trade with China than all European countries put together.
Mr. Johnson: With respect to the Taiwan clause, and the effect of Japanese recognition of the PRC on our treaty (the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty), there is no problem in this joint communiqué.
The President: The Japanese can’t have it all their own way. They want to be independent, and do things on their own without telling us, but our access to the bases is essential. (To Secretary Rogers) I’ve read the papers which you sent me on this, Bill, and they were very good. We’ve gone pretty far, it seems to me, with respect to the Japanese.
[Page 469]Mr. Johnson: We made this evident in the past regarding the return of Okinawa, Mr. President. There would have been serious riots there had we not given it back.
Secretary Rogers: What can we do that we haven’t done so far to get over the idea that our relations with the Japanese aren’t all that bad?
The President: I agree that we should knock down the idea that we’re in trouble with the Japanese.
Secretary Rogers: For us to keep going around talking about “shocks” would be very bad.
Mr. Green: Public opinion in both countries (the U.S. and Japan) is about the same regarding China. We don’t have to break relations with Taiwan, though, because the U.S. has the power.
Secretary Rogers: There is no anti-Japanese feeling in the U.S.
Mr. Johnson: There is a lot said in the U.S. among businessmen about economic issues in U.S.-Japan relations, but the words they use are color words and don’t necessarily mean relations are bad.
Secretary Rogers: Yes, the businessmen always talk in a negative way.
The President: That’s because we’re so competitive with them (the Japanese)!
Mr. Kissinger: Sato got word to me when I was in Japan that he would like to come over to the U.S.
(The President and Mr. Kissinger exchanged brief remarks on the Emperor’s visit next year to the United States.)
Mr. Green: Mr. President, it’s an interesting thing that in Korea, our stand makes the Japanese the principle beneficiaries. This is also true in Southeast Asia. By the same token, even on our China policy the Japanese are the principal beneficiaries. We protect their interests on Taiwan, while they discuss normalization of relations with the PRC. They are also playing the Soviets against Peking, and as a result have better relations with both.
Secretary Rogers: You know, Mr. President, I don’t like all this talk of the “Nixon shocks.” This makes it seem that there are problems in our relations with Japan which just aren’t there.
The President: All this is done now.
Secretary Rogers: What we should talk about is how good our relations are, not about how bad they are.
The President: I think you’re right, Bill. A good place to do that would be at the dinner tomorrow night when we are all sitting around the table. I could subtly ease in the idea that we all know we’ve got good relations, but should say so publicly.
Mr. Johnson: Yes, only this might not be picked up by the press. The Japanese press is very anti-government.
[Page 470]The President: Like ours.
Mr. Johnson: Worse. One way for the Japanese press to attack the government is to attack us.
The President: The Japanese people read a lot, and have good newspapers.
Secretary Rogers: It’s humiliating the way Japanese have treated us on this matter of normalizing relations with the PRC. They have talked to us for months and months, but have told us very little.
Mr. Kissinger: We’ve certainly told them more about our intentions than they have told us.
Secretary Rogers: If everything we say is on the positive side, though, this will suggest that other things are all over.
Mr. Johnson: Just as the President said.
The President: We should steer around the problem areas.
Mr. Kissinger: There is one thing we should be very careful about. Although we might want to be good to Tanaka and Ohira in a general way, we should be tough on Taiwan. When I met with Tanaka in Karuizawa,5 he wanted to amend the Security Treaty. I said that this would affect our whole relationship.
The President: I agree, we should be tough on this point. We’re already paying the price for our military reductions in that area. A $30 billion defense cut would leave us with no policy at all.
Mr. Johnson: With respect to economic policy, my approach to Diet members who call on me is that maintaining the market in the U.S. is very important in Japan, and that it’s in their interests to continue to do so.
Secretary Rogers: This is a good rationale, but they’ve heard it so much they don’t believe it anymore.
Mr. Kissinger: Tanaka is good on economics, and is determined not to get into the same fix that Sato found himself in over textiles. He doesn’t want to get pinned down to a specific commitment on cutting down Japan’s trade imbalance with us, but he will try very hard to get a substantial decrease in the imbalance.
Mr. Green: Japanese trade with Taiwan is more than that with Mainland China. In addition, the Japanese sell much more to the Chinese on Taiwan than they buy from them—they have a very favorable trade balance.
[Page 471]The President: The Japanese must realize that if they continue on their present route, they will have serious problems with the American Congress and are likely to end up with quotas.
Mr. Johnson: This is what I’m trying to tell them!
Mr. Green: The Japanese are weak on Korea and on Taiwan. Right now, we’re trying to keep the Republic of China in the IFI’s—the issue is coming up on September 25, when the Executive Committee meets, and we’re working behind the scenes to head it off. We are trying a strategy of keeping it from coming to a substantive vote. If there is a vote, the ROC would be out. Bob McNamara and Schweitzer are cooperating with us on that. On the Japanese side, this is a matter where we would deal more with Tanaka than with Ohira. It’s a place where the Japanese are weak.
One other thing we are trying to do is to keep the Korean issue out of the U.N. this fall.
(Mr. Green reviewed for the President the Korean situation and the elements of the Korean issue in the U.N.) This also is a case where the Japanese tend to stand back and not take a position. It’s a subject for Ohira, not for Tanaka.
Secretary Rogers: What is the situation now?
Mr. Green: The Japanese say that they will support postponement of the debate.
Mr. Johnson: How strong are the Chinese on this (the PRC)?
Mr. Kissinger: Pretty strong. (To Mr. Johnson) We talked about that at Karuizawa.
Mr. Green: The Japanese are looking toward closer relations with North Korea, and get the South Koreans very nervous over this. It is a situation where they are prepared to go faster than we think is wise.
Secretary Rogers: When the two Koreas are getting along better, the worst thing we could have happen is to get the issue into the U.N.
Mr. Kissinger: The Chinese will insist on having a debate. I understand that the North Koreans called in Ambassadors of the countries which maintain relations with Pyongyang and told them that they might be obliged to depart unless they supported the North Korean resolution. This was to keep these countries from falling off. I don’t think that Tanaka will understand all of the details of this issue, but Ohira will. But one thing that Ohira was very strong about when I talked with him in Tokyo was that we should keep our forces in Korea.
Mr. Johnson: I agree that this is his position.
The President: It’s an interesting thing. I’m sitting here thinking that just three years ago I was on my way to Midway, where we made our first stinking little increment in our withdrawal from Vietnam of [Page 472] 25,000 men, and the Chiefs screamed. Today we have less men in Vietnam than we have in Korea.
Mr. Kissinger: This is because of the improved situation.
The President: Three years is a long time. How many troops do we have in Korea? 43,000? (The others assured the President that this was the correct figure.)
Mr. Green: It’s all to your credit, Mr. President, that the South-North talks are taking place. Without your approach to the PRC, this never would have happened. The North Koreans and South Koreans have even gotten together at the Olympics.
Secretary Rogers: With respect to withdrawals from Vietnam, the military are now your strong supporters.
Mr. Johnson: On the security issue, Mr. President, there is talk now among the Japanese that with the relaxation of tensions they don’t need the Security Treaty. The line I’ve taken is that the developments taking place in the area, such as your approach to the PRC and the Korean talks, are not despite the Security Treaty but because of it. Therefore, we don’t want to dismantle it permanently.
The President: I agree. All these things are very inter-related. If we didn’t have the Security Treaty, the North Koreans would not be worth talking to.
Mr. Johnson: I agree, Mr. President, and the people I’ve talked to understand this. They agree that NATO is important and that we should not withdraw our forces, and the same is true with respect to Japan. Tanaka talks about no withdrawal of forces, but of maintaining our troop levels.
The President: Let me say, if we do withdraw from Japan, Japan has had it!
Mr. Kissinger: Everytime I talk to Tanaka, he speaks about the great humiliation we gave to them during the Occupation. He talks about elements in the Constitution which were forced upon them by political scientists working on MacArthur’s staff, for example the anti-war clause, and made it plain that he personally resented this.
Mr. Johnson: Henry, you’ve said one thing to me about Tanaka which is very important. Hitherto all the Japanese leaders we’ve dealt with have been in the Yoshida tradition, in which maintaining good U.S.-Japanese relations was an emotional thing. Tanaka comes to this same conclusion about good U.S.-Japanese relations, but more from intellectual than emotional reasons.
(At this point the President dismissed those present and the meeting broke up.)
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 926, VIP Visits, Tanaka Visit (Hawaii) 31 Aug–1 September [1972] [1 of 4]. Secret; Sensitive. Presumably drafted by Holdridge. The conversation was held aboard the Spirit of ʽ76 en route from California to Hawaii.↩
- Tanaka met with Kissinger on June 12. See Document 121.↩
- On August 9, Kissinger, Flanigan, Eberle, and several members of the NSC staff met to discuss the economic agreement. See Document 124.↩
- Reference is to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China.↩
- Kissinger met with Tanaka at Karuizawa on August 19. See Document 126, footnote 2, and for a summary of the conversation, see Document 128.↩