Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

126. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, August 19, 1972.

SUBJECT

• Highlights of my Second Visit to Japan

My second visit to Japan occurred at a period when the new Tanaka Government is moving rapidly and inexorably toward a normalization of relations with Peking, and my visit was strongly affected by this. Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira² were very reticent as to the timing and substance of Tanaka’s visit to Peking, and confined their comments to generalizations—there was a consensus in Japan on a quick normalization, this could not be denied, Japan might thus find itself with diplomatic relations with the PRC before the U.S. does, etc. It is not impossible that Tanaka will be in Peking for the October 1 PRC National Day.

In consequence, Japanese relations with Taiwan will receive little or no consideration, though some effort will be made to retain cultural and economic ties. So preoccupied are the Japanese with normalization that they displayed to me only passing interest in other political questions, including even Vietnam.

It is highly likely, on the other hand, that Tanaka will be reasonably forthcoming on U.S.-Japanese economic matters. Tanaka told me he has personally ordered his Minister to come up with an economic package before Honolulu which would reduce Japan’s balance of trade surplus by next March 31 by as close to $1 billion as possible. He does not want to be required to discuss economics at Honolulu, and this is a positive incentive. He also may feel that it is worth it to get U.S. acquiescence in his approach to the PRC. At any rate, he spoke in general terms of purchases of U.S. grain, enriched uranium aircraft, military equipment, and other agricultural and industrial products to meet our needs.

However, Tanaka did not want to be pinned down as to exact amounts or time frames because the effects of some Japanese purchases would not be felt until after March 31, 1973, and some items would be listed in the services account rather than the trade account. The important thing, he said, was to keep working toward the goal of a $1 billion balance of trade reduction, which he and his Ministers would do. He wanted to avoid the situation, too, in which Sato had found himself: being accused of a breach of faith when he had only promised in effect to “do his best.”

I believe that we should accept the current situation both respecting Japan’s approach to the PRC and our economic relations. On China, the Japanese are determined to plunge ahead, and any U.S. attempt to slow the pace will only cause them to leak the fact we were doing so to the PRC and to the Japanese people. On economics, Tanaka wants a successful Honolulu meeting, and will certainly try hard to deliver as much as he can. Tanaka and I have now agreed to let our respective representatives (a Deputy Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Ingersoll) work out the details of an economic package prior to the Honolulu meeting.³ I have also indicated, and Tanaka has concurred, that the contents of this package should be released publicly in connection with the Honolulu meeting. Of course, Peter Flanigan and Ambassador Eberle will work on the package from the Washington end.

On balance, on the political side I believe that Japan’s preoccupation with China will result in reduced consultations with us despite pious protestations to the contrary. Nevertheless, our basic close relationship should survive, even if somewhat diminished. Economically, the Japanese appreciate the value of their access to the U.S. market, and indeed of a stable world monetary system. They will take the necessary steps to assure these goals.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 22, HAK Trip Files, HAK’s Secret Paris Trip, August 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. On August 29, Kissinger wrote a second memorandum to Nixon describing his August 19 conversation with Tanaka. See Document 128.
2. During the morning of August 19, Kissinger met with Tanaka. Economic aspects of this conversation are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Document 96. The entire conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 926, VIP Visits, Tanaka Visit (Hawaii) 31 Aug–1 September [1972] [3 of 4]. During the afternoon of August 19, Kissinger met with Foreign Minister Ohira at the Japanese Foreign Ministry. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid.)
3. Ingersoll met with Foreign Office Deputy Vice Minister Tsurumi and Head of the Economic Section of the Foreign Ministry’s North American Bureau Ukawa to discuss the economic package that the Japanese government would offer to the United States prior to the Nixon–Tanaka meeting in Honolulu. (Telegram 8964 from Tokyo, August 22; ibid., Box 538, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. VIII, May-Dec 1972) Additional various information on their discussions after August 19 are ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL JAPAN–US.