Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

121. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Tokyo, June 12, 1972, 8 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
• Kakuei Tanaka, Minister of International Trade and Industry, Japan
• Mr. Itoh, Mr. Tanaka’s Private Secretary
• Mr. Maroumoto, Interpreter
• (One additional Japanese interpreter)

SUBJECT

• Mr. Kissinger’s Discussions of U.S.-Japan Political and Economic Relations with Mr. Tanaka

Mr. Kissinger: I want you to know that Mr. Holdridge is my trusted assistant and that you can rely on him to maintain the confidential nature of our talk.

Mr. Tanaka: I myself have long had two trusted assistants. I told the Ambassador that I would have one of them with us today—Mr. Itoh.

I know that you have visited both China and Japan, but between these two countries I think Japan is the best. It’s a pity that your time here is so limited—you should see more of our country.

Mr. Kissinger: It is a pity, but I am touched by the reception I have received here. I have established deep personal bonds here now. Of course, I have always considered Japan as America’s basic friend in the Pacific.

Mr. Tanaka: A quarter of a century ago you wouldn’t have seen anything like what you see today when you look out the window.

Mr. Kissinger: I was here 20 years ago, and at that time there was still great destruction; so I know what great achievements you have made, and the enormous courage and discipline you have shown in doing all this.

Mr. Tanaka: This hotel was built 11 years ago, just in time to accommodate a meeting of the IMF. This was the third time such a meeting had been held in Japan. It was the year Japan assumed a new status under Article VIII of the U.N. Charter.

For what we have become today we are very grateful to the United States. I remember when I was Finance Minister, I negotiated a loan from the U.S. of $20 million.

Mr. Kissinger: They tell me that as a Minister you’re a very tough negotiator.

Mr. Tanaka: I may have been in two or three tough negotiations in the past, but I still have a feeling of gratitude toward the U.S.

Mr. Kissinger: Our feeling is the same, based on great respect for your achievements and your people.

Mr. Tanaka: I first started my political activities under Prime Minister Shigehara, who was one of the disciples of the late Prime Minister Yoshida. Since then I have remained a good student of the Yoshida school of political training. In the over 25 years of Japanese recovery, I know how much we are indebted to the U.S. Government. Between our two countries the problems are not so much on the general posture of our relations but on individual issues. Because we were occupied for some years, we still have the philosophy that we’re occupied and this might come up from time to time. But on major issues, we can always agree.

Mr. Kissinger: We both start from the assumption that we are together—that we have a basic friendship in the Pacific, and whatever differences come up are family differences.

Mr. Tanaka: We share common interests. Japan would like to see U.S. leadership, economic or otherwise, become stronger. Any difficulties the U.S. may find herself in are not in Japan’s interests. The Japanese people see this, and though the Liberal Democratic Party is in some difficulties, it has been supported by the people for 25 years.

Mr. Kissinger: I read in the newspapers that you are one of the leaders who may succeed Prime Minister Sato. I don’t know if this is accurate.

Mr. Tanaka: The newspapers are usually 100 percent wrong.

Mr. Kissinger: Are there differences of policy between the various contenders or is it mostly a question of personalities?

Mr. Tanaka: Mostly personality. I would say that there is a religious difference between Tanaka, Fukuda, Ohira, and Miki.

Mr. Kissinger: Are these the leading candidates?

Mr. Tanaka: Yes. Among the four, three have experiences as Foreign Minister, and both Fukuda and I have been Finance Minister. All Prime Ministers in the past, Shigehara, Yoshida, Ikeda, and Sato, have been loyal members of the Liberal Democratic Party—that’s how they became Prime Minister. Of course, I’ve always been a member of the LDP, and so has Ohira. By contrast, Fukuda did not belong to any party when he first sought a seat in the Diet. He went into politics this way: Kishi was depurged, and came back into political life; Fukuda came with him and only entered the Party after he (Kishi) was elected. In some respects, though, he is in the Mainstream of the Party.

Miki is not from the Liberal Democratic Party, but from the National People’s Party.

Mr. Kissinger: When did he join?

Mr. Tanaka: About ten years ago. At that time, his party merged with the Democratic Party, which later merged with the Liberal Party, which then became the Liberal Democratic Party.

Mr. Kissinger: I see that a former student of mine, Nakasone, is going to run, too.

Mr. Tanaka: He is not expecting to be elected—that is not his purpose. He’s looking at two elections in the future.

Mr. Kissinger: Is he holding his people on the first ballot so that he can move later?

Mr. Tanaka: Actually, he will not announce his candidacy officially because he won’t be able to get ten percent of the total vote.

Mr. Kissinger: He’s thinking of the time after next?

Mr. Tanaka: Yes, I agree. He is hopeful he will be a strong candidate later.

Mr. Kissinger: Is that because the man who gets elected next time can’t run again?

Mr. Tanaka: Like your President cannot run for a third term we have the same sort of ban. We have two six year terms.

Mr. Kissinger: Has an incumbent Prime Minister ever been defeated for election as the President of his party?

Mr. Tanaka: No.

Mr. Kissinger: So whoever gets elected President wins the Prime Ministership?

Mr. Tanaka: Mr. Hatoyama was Prime Minister but did not seek re-election. Kishi served two terms, Ikeda three, and Sato four, but Sato was there too long so the Party passed a new rule to prevent a Prime Minister from being in office so long.

Mr. Kissinger: I have found in Washington that one may think four years is a long time, but it is amazing how quickly this period is over. I spent my first year learning the job and getting to know the key people, but from the middle of the second year we were already in the election again. But it is a little different in Japan, because you know all the key people already, and whoever gets elected knows what it’s all about.

Mr. Tanaka: Yes, that’s the difference in our parliamentary system. All members of the Cabinet must be members of the Diet, and while your President serves four years, our Prime Minister averages two years. We have had 11 elections in 22 years.

Mr. Kissinger: I didn’t know a single member of our Cabinet when I was appointed, even though on the President’s behalf I had to deal with them every day. They want me to be Ambassador to Outer Mongolia without communications, because it’s my job to say no. The President does all the pleasant things and I do all the unpleasant ones.

Mr. Tanaka: We, for example, know every last member of the Opposition party—the governors, the Diet members, etc. So whenever someone, somewhere has an interview with me, I know exactly what’s on his mind. I’m known in the press as a very rapid processor of people seeking interviews. They say I use a computer, but I don’t—I know peoples’ minds.

Mr. Kissinger: What is the biggest problem for Japan now?

Mr. Tanaka: China, because it’s very challenging to establish a consensus and unify the view within the Party on relations with China. After all, we had two thousand years of interchange between Japan and China, culturally we are heavily indebted to China, China was our enemy in two wars, and World War II started in China, so China to us is not so simple as Cuba is to you.

Mr. Kissinger: The Cuban problem is a little larger than that for us.

What precisely is the nature of the China problem for Japanese policy?

Mr. Tanaka: What to do with Taiwan. It is a very delicate matter to attain a national consensus on what attitude we should take with respect to Taiwan, not only because Taiwan was a part of Japan for three-quarters of a century, but because there are other connections between Japan and Taiwan. This is an extremely sensitive problem.

Mr. Kissinger: Precisely what do you believe your attitude should be?

Mr. Tanaka: We need to have full agreement between Japan and the U.S. on the Taiwan issue. This is a difficult issue for Japan and China alone to settle. The U.S. and China between them can afford to solve the issue, and in a more rational manner than we in Japan can afford, and that’s why at this meeting I am looking forward to hearing your views on Taiwan.

Mr. Kissinger: Does this mean that you won’t take steps independently from us regarding Taiwan?

Mr. Tanaka: With respect to the Taiwan problem, it would be more logical and rational to have the U.S. involved in the solution rather than to have Japan act independently. As in the case of a man and his wife having a fight, sometimes a family friend can come in and solve the problem.

Mr. Kissinger: Who are the man and the wife, and who is the friend?

Mr. Tanaka: For sure, the good friend is the U.S. Historically speaking, the man and wife are Japan and China, but for the last three-quarters of a century Japan and Taiwan are the couple.

Mr. Kissinger: As I understand it, your view is tantamount to saying that on the disposition of the relationship with Taiwan, Japan and the U.S. should have a common policy. Is this correct?

Mr. Tanaka: I think that this would be the best thing.

Mr. Kissinger: We are prepared to do that. Incidentally, I’m not fully acquainted with the rules here in Japan—what are the rules of our conversation? Will you have a press conference? How will our conversation be reported?

Mr. Tanaka: I will have to have a press conference, but I will never reveal what we said about Taiwan.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we agree about what we’ll say at the end?

Mr. Tanaka: Yes, let me talk to you about this. What I will say is that we had a very general discussion; that I wanted to get Dr. Kissinger’s view on very broad international matters, but instead he pressured me to buy more from the U.S.

Mr. Kissinger: That’s very good. You can also tell them that he said you should stop selling so much!

Mr. Tanaka: Excellent.

Mr. Kissinger: Then they will have to double the guard on my way to the airport.

Mr. Tanaka: I will tell the press that since Dr. Kissinger pressured me to buy more from the U.S., I was driven here this morning by a Dodge.

I won’t touch on Taiwan.

Mr. Kissinger: That would be good.

We want you to know, Mr. Minister, that whoever becomes Prime Minister, we want to establish a very close and confidential relationship with him from the White House.

Mr. Tanaka: I appreciate that comment, and plan to keep my mouth very tightly closed about it. When the late Robert F. Kennedy visited Japan, we talked about Okinawa and there was some leak; the press played this up and I was embarrassed. Therefore, I will be very strict.

Mr. Kissinger: That wasn’t the reason why I said it. I was not referring to this conversation. We will have many important issues to settle with the next Prime Minister, and so the President will want to set up a very close relationship with him. I didn’t say what I did as a warning, but as an indication of what we want to set up in the future.

Mr. Tanaka: I am convinced that there is no problem too difficult for the two of us to solve. To do so is not only in the interests of both of us, but in the interests of the world. It was with this spirit of determination that I was able to solve the textile problem which was nagging at us for two or three years.

Mr. Kissinger: This was very much appreciated.

Mr. Tanaka: If I could solve the textile problem, I can solve anything else. Occasionally there might be tough words in the course of the negotiations, but we can solve anything. With that spirit in mind, I’m not as concerned at your leap-frogging over our head regarding China as so many people here seem to be. I have not minded this because I knew it was difficult for Japan to establish this channel with China and that in a way you are acting on our behalf.

Mr. Kissinger: We didn’t leap-frog all that much, because in many respects you have had more trade and contact than we have—and you have them still. We had the drama and you had the contacts.

Mr. Tanaka: I just want to make sure that when I speak of leap-frogging, you don’t misunderstand what I’m saying.

Mr. Kissinger: I understand.

Mr. Tanaka: In my heart, I’m glad that you did what you did and I said so at the time. No matter how much Prime Minister Sato wanted to go to Peking, they wouldn’t open a window or a door; however, by the President’s going to Peking, they would want to smooth their relationship with Japan.

Mr. Kissinger: In some respects this is true.

Mr. Tanaka: In this regard, I would welcome your returning to Peking and solving the Taiwan problem.

Mr. Kissinger: How would you like to see the Taiwan problem solved?

Mr. Tanaka: This is a very delicate issue which must be kept strictly confidential. If it leaked there would be a scandal.

First, it is absolutely necessary that the Soviets will not be able to intervene in Taiwan the way that they have intervened in Bangladesh and North Vietnam.

Second, it should be solved as a domestic Chinese issue. This might be time-consuming, but it must be accepted.

Third, it is best solved by the Chinese people themselves.

Mr. Kissinger: With or without the use of force? The big question is whether it can be solved peacefully or through the use of force.

Mr. Tanaka: A solution by force cannot be effected and should not be effected. When you compare the Sino-U.S. relationship with the Sino-Soviet relationship, you can see that the U.S. is not an enemy of China, while the Soviets, who have a very long border with China, are shelling China. For two to three hundred years the Chinese and the Russians have had a history of border conflicts, and the Chinese people are beginning to find out that those who are trying to contain China are not the Americans but the Soviets, as illustrated by Bangladesh and North Vietnam.

What aggravated the Sino-U.S. relationship as it concerned Taiwan was your crossing the 38th parallel in Korea, and then the presence of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait. At that time, the Chinese felt that what the U.S. was up to was containing them. However, since then Soviet activities have been stepped up and have become so serious. Now the Chinese feel that if the Seventh Fleet was withdrawn the Soviets would immediately step in. So in the eyes of the Chinese, the Seventh Fleet is not an enemy but can even be a friend. That’s why I believe that when the wills of the Japanese, American, and Chinese peoples spontaneously become unified, the Taiwan problem will be solved. It seems to me that until such a time further clarification can be sought in the U.S.-China relationship, and for us, we can leave the Taiwan question more or less in your hands. I believe that this is what the Chinese have in mind, but they would never tell us or Mr. Sato.

Mr. Kissinger: It seems to be such an easy problem.

Mr. Tanaka: In the interests of a peaceful solution of this problem, it makes good sense to divide the labor between friends. In exchange, we are willing and are prepared to cooperate on your defense problems, and to maintain a strong international position.

Mr. Kissinger: That reminds me of a story of a husband-and-wife relationship. Someone asked the wife who decided the big questions and who decided the little ones, and she said that the husband decided all the big questions. Asked what kinds of questions she decided, she said such things as what house to live in and where the children should go to school. She was then asked what does he decide? Oh, she said, questions such as war and peace, and international relations.

Mr. Tanaka: (Laughing) I can understand that. In Japan, and in the Orient, we say that whatever concerns there are outside the home are the husband’s job, and whatever are inside the home, are the wife’s. Another thing we believe in is that bilateral solutions are difficult, and that a multilateral approach is better. That is why we are making an appeal to GATT on some trade issues with the U.S.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree with the Minister that in some of the basic foreign policy problems today we have a major responsibility, and that Japan can help in economic and other relationships.

Mr. Tanaka: Yes, we can do that. Under the kind of Constitution you’ve so kindly left us, we can do that—we can help out economically.

During the days when the Constitution was being drafted in Japan, I insisted that Japan should have armed forces befitting our place in the world; the U.S. refused, so that’s why we have Article IX. So, under the Constitution, we were very happy to yield to the husband, the U.S., and have him deal with all of the problems outside the house. With respect to economic problems, though, we can help.

Mr. Kissinger: During the Occupation we exported many professors, who put into execution many theories they could never put into effect at home. I have studied the Occupation, and I must say you handled us with great skill. I admire your ability to use the Occupation for Japanese purposes. You gave us the illusion that we were giving you orders when we were actually carrying out your wishes.

Mr. Tanaka: You very generously provided Japan with technology and capital resources. This was very much appreciated, and we know we owe you a royalty for what you have done in the past. But I advise you to collect in a neat manner, not like a loan shark or on a balance figure, but in the spirit of friendship.

Mr. Kissinger: We can’t construct a relationship on the basis of gratitude, but rather on the basis of interest. We know you are a great country, and it would be a big mistake for us to come to you and say that you owe us something. We should come and discuss as friends what we both want, and work it out. It can’t be worked out on the basis of the Occupation relationship. What we really should do is to look at the problem, and see what is the best for the future and forget the debts. In fact, there aren’t many debts.

Mr. Tanaka: You have given an admirable exposé. I respect very much what you have said—I am very impressed. In that spirit we should face up to and solve whatever problems there are between our two countries on a rational and positive basis.

Mr. Kissinger: You can be sure that is the spirit of our Administration. We have tremendous problems in the world, in foreign policy and in economic matters, but neither of us, Japan and the U.S., can conduct an independent policy without doing damage to both.

Mr. Tanaka: What we need is cooperation and good, constant consultations.

Mr. Kissinger: Let me ask the Minister something about economics, which is not a field I usually address in great detail. I have been impressed by the fact that issues arise only when there is already some crisis, and then businessmen come to the White House and complain about the Japanese. The next thing is that we have a confrontation, in which you think that your industry is being penalized for efficiency, and we think that you are conducting unfair practices. My major interest in economics is to make sure it doesn’t disturb foreign policy, so I am not here to urge you to do anything in particular. I wonder, though, whether the Minister has thought about how to prevent these problems from developing—whether we can take steps ahead of time to keep them from arising?

Mr. Tanaka: This is indeed a very important matter. Since we are both democratic nations, we can’t prevent industries coming to governments with complaints—we have this too. Perhaps there may be institutional differences between us or different interpretations of facts, but these should be prevented from coming to the surface. That’s why at San Clemente I proposed meetings of experts from our two countries at the heads of division level and more consultations between our two countries, even monthly ones. By such methods we can prevent troubles from developing, both at the public and private levels. We need mechanisms, both public and private, and on our side we are trying to establish them.

I believe we need more dialogue between our experts. There are institutional differences based on different customs and conventions. You have anti-dumping restrictions, which are a matter of course for you but to Japan look like court cases with somebody being tried. And if you have something like this between two members of a family, you will never have friendship between the two for three generations. With respect to the textile issue, I felt that I was being sued. If beforehand I had been given two months warning, and if there had been close consultations, I believe that this situation could have been avoided.

I expect to remain active in political life for ten more years, although the Japanese retirement age is 55. I was surprised when Vice President Agnew visited to hear from a member of his staff, a former U.S. diplomat who had served in Tokyo and had been an ambassador somewhere else, that he was retiring; I asked how old he was, and was surprised to hear that he was 65. Maybe like him I’ll stay until I am 65, which means 10 more years. Perhaps if I stay, there won’t be any bad Japan-U.S. economic problems while I’m around.

There are both good and not so good factors in Oriental philosophy. We generally believe that when a difficult problem arises, like the problem between a husband and wife, you should take time. Give it a night or two, and it will be solved. But this does not work in economic matters, for if you take time, the problem will be aggravated. It is better to settle it quickly, to reach an agreement acceptable to both in the interests of a mutual solution. The same thing can be said about diplomacy. In problems affecting the East-West relationship, time is of use, but problems between friends should be settled quickly.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree with your general approach, but as the Minister knows Americans are very impatient people and want to settle things quickly. However, our bureaucracy is such that even if we wanted to get a quick solution, we couldn’t.

Yesterday some Japanese friends suggested to me that in economic fields some machinery should be set up so that if a certain point is reached in an issue, some automatic restraints can be put into effect. Do you think that this is a useful approach?

Mr. Tanaka: In Japan, we of course believe that our basic legal instruments should handle trade and economic problems, but our bureaucracy is ineffective and not always able to handle such matters. Therefore, I would like to see the executive branch handle them because it would bring more flexibility on matters such as curbing exports, restraints on imports, managing foreign exchange reserves, etc. Already some bills have been introduced in the Diet to this effect.

Can I ask a couple of questions regarding the Soviet Union?

I think that you know the Soviets have made an offer to us on the development of the Tyumen oil fields. Some time toward the end of this month, a large Japanese private mission will go to the Soviet Union to explore the Soviet proposal. What the Soviets will ultimately want is a loan from international banks of $1 billion, in return for which they will supply 25,000 to 40,000 kiloliters of oil in the period 1977–1987. Japan must of course consider this with great care and caution because the Chinese don’t approve of what is going on. Once the Soviets have developed these Siberian lands, they can station tanks and aircraft along the border with China, and can also make Nahodhka a great naval base. But Japan wants crude oil, and wants to consummate the deal. So as I mentioned at San Clemente, I believe that U.S. cooperation is called for. Esso and Gulf have expressed a desire to subcontract some of the work. What is your view?

Mr. Kissinger: There are three problems in this: first, the immediate economic one; second, a long-term economic problem; and third, a political problem. Most businessmen only look at the immediate economic problem, but it’s easy to make investments and hard to get the money back. Accordingly, in terms of the immediate economic problem, we think it is a worth while project. However, with respect to the long-term economic problem, we have already seen in the Middle East what weak countries can do once they have foreign investments on their territory. In these terms, what a big country can do, when it has several billions of dollars of investment, is really a serious matter to decide.

Of course, there is the political problem, which the Minister has already explained and to which I can add nothing in terms of China or other matters. We’re studying right now how to prevent the Soviet Union from blackmailing us if we put large amounts of capital in there.

I have noticed that your businessmen are afraid we may want to maneuver you out of the oil fields and get exclusive possibilities there. That just proves your businessmen are as short sighted as ours. I can tell you that we don’t want exclusive investment possibilities in Siberia, and wouldn’t take them if we could get them. If you want exclusive possibilities, though, you’re welcome. If you want all those headaches alone, you won’t get any quarrel from us. And if you want to deal with the Soviets and China yourself, you’re welcome. Our approach is—we are now studying the problem, and will have Secretary Peterson going to Moscow in July for general discussions, and he will discuss this project among others. His instructions from us are not to do it on an exclusive basis. My view is that we should do it jointly, but if your people get ahead of us I will congratulate you. I’m being very frank now, and don’t want you to say this to the newspapers. We will do it together with you if you want, but you should think very carefully how to do it because this is not a joke.

Mr. Tanaka: I fully agree, and share your view. That’s why I asked you this question.

Mr. Kissinger: I think that after Peterson has been in Moscow we should send somebody to Tokyo, or you should send someone to Washington, whichever you think better.

Mr. Tanaka: I would like to see that kind of consultation. When I mentioned Gulf and Esso, what I had in mind was not an exclusive Japanese deal; in San Clemente, my interest was in getting a reading of your reaction.

Mr. Kissinger: At that time, I hadn’t studied the problem very carefully. What did we say?

Mr. Tanaka: I was fully aware at that time that you had more pressing issues on your mind than the Tyumen oil field.

Mr. Kissinger: That was true at the time. If I can tell the Minister this, it was very refreshing to meet him in San Clemente. He’s very direct.

Mr. Tanaka: I really think I’m good timber for managing things, although I am not a great politician because I speak directly.

Mr. Kissinger: You’ll end up running the world if you are as good a diplomat as you are a politician.

Mr. Tanaka: I want to talk about the Cuba problem with perfect candor.

Mr. Kissinger: Cuba?

Mr. Tanaka: We buy $200 to $300 million worth of sugar from Cuba every year, but have nothing to invest there and our vessels come back with empty bottoms. The Cubans want to buy trucks and loaders from us, but we don’t want to do such business without American understanding. We don’t want to get a cold eye from the Americans for engaging in this kind of business.

Mr. Kissinger: Not for anything less than $1 billion.

Mr. Tanaka: (Laughing) Maybe we Orientals are too naïve. Another question is the importation of uranium ore.

Mr. Kissinger: On the question of Cuba, I’ll be candid. The Cuban issue is partly diplomatic, and partly a U.S. domestic political issue. Quite candidly, with the U.S. elections coming up, this is not a good time to discuss it rationally. I tell you honestly that if you do it before November, there will be a problem. Somebody would raise it, and we would have to take a formal position which otherwise would be unnecessary. After the elections, I think we can talk about it in a constructive way. I’m speaking very frankly.

Mr. Tanaka: Of course, in the political world we are always subject to hearsay and rumors. I have heard some report that the President won’t seek re-election. I’m sure that this is groundless.

Mr. Kissinger: It’s about as likely as your not running as a candidate for the Prime Ministership. In 1976 he won’t run for re-election, but that’s only because the Constitution prohibits it. I can tell you a joke going around in the U.S. Question: What will Mr. Nixon do if he gets elected President for life? Answer: He’ll immediately start running for a second term. If you repeat this, Mr. Minister, I’ll be without a job.

Mr. Tanaka: If only the LDP rules were changed, I’m sure I could run for three or four terms. However, I don’t care about that.

My next topic is uranium ore. Japan is interested in purchasing 5,000 tons worth $300 million. We are not ready yet to give a concrete commitment, but negotiations are going on with private firms and Japan is willing to go ahead. I’m interested in your passing this along to Mr. Peterson. Just like when Japan buys gold—we buy it from the U.S. Government and leave it in a bank vault in New York City—we’re willing to buy the uranium from you and have you keep it in storage for us. We’ll look into it this week.

Mr. Kissinger: This is not handled by Peterson, but by the Atomic Energy Commission. How can I get word to you without having 1,000 copies made of my answer?

Mr. Tanaka: All you need to do is to get government-to-government negotiations started.

Mr. Kissinger: We’ll send our Ambassador privately to let you know our reaction, and then we will act formally. We’ll give you our informal attitude first.

Mr. Tanaka: Ambassador Ingersoll and I have agreed to maintain a very informal relationship. He’s a businessman, a Chicago businessman, and like Mr. Kennedy, who went to Europe, I’ve known him for some time and understand his language.

Mr. Kissinger: Mr. Ingersoll has a direct relationship with the White House, and if you want to get a message to the President or to me, just say to him to send it directly to the White House and I will see it.

Mr. Tanaka: Thank you, I’ll do that.

Mr. Kissinger: Mr. Minister, you have been very frank, and I have appreciated the opportunity of talking to you. I’ve tried to be frank with you.

Mr. Tanaka: I pray that in the future you will consider talking to me with candor, and I will do the same with you.

Mr. Kissinger: I consider this the beginning of a long relationship, except that Mr. Minister will be in politics longer than I—I can’t be involved beyond 1976.

Mr. Tanaka: My political future is nebulous.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we just agree briefly on what you, Mr. Minister, will tell the press?

Mr. Tanaka: First, I would like to be able to tell the press that if the Tyumen oil field is to be developed Japan and the U.S. would like to cooperate; however, whether we will be involved in this project is yet to be determined.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, you can say that we haven’t yet made a decision, but in principle would like to discuss it.

Mr. Tanaka: Secondly, I would like to say that I found an expression of U.S. interest in our buying 5,000 tons of uranium ore.

Mr. Kissinger: But I don’t know anything about it, I just don’t know—.

Mr. Tanaka: Could I say that I raised this matter with Your Excellency, and that it will be raised with others in the U.S. Government?

Mr. Kissinger: It’s very unusual for me to say that there is a matter outside my expertise.

Mr. Tanaka: I’m sorry to make you look like a nonexpert on this one thing. But the press will be hard on us to get some news, so we must feed them something. Can I say that economic problems between our two countries can be solved—anything and everything?

Mr. Kissinger: (Nods)

Mr. Tanaka: I would like to be able to say that we exchanged views on U.S.-China, U.S.-Taiwan, U.S.-Soviet, and U.S.-South Korea relations, but I can’t reveal the content of our discussions.

Mr. Kissinger: Good. Excellent.

Mr. Tanaka: As a fifth item, I would like to say we agreed that Japan and the U.S. should forget debts and loyalties going back to Occupation days, but should take a new stand on problems of the world today and have close consultations and cooperation.

Mr. Kissinger: You can also say that our meeting was conducted in a very friendly atmosphere, but this is up to you.

Rather than saying “debts” of the Occupation, say “atmosphere” of the Occupation, and in a spirit of cooperation.

Mr. Tanaka: I will say “as true friends”—as true friends, Japan and the U.S. should take a new world view.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1026, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcon—Henry Kissinger, Kakuei Tanaka—Minister of International Trade and Industry—Japan, Jun. 12, 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Presumably drafted by Holdridge. The meeting took place in the Okura Hotel.