129. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1

SUBJECT

  • Your Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka in Honolulu on August 31 and September 1

I. Purpose

We have four principal objectives at the Honolulu meeting:

—To reaffirm the US-Japan alliance, not only as a general proposition—which Tanaka accepts—but also as a relationship which requires concrete contributions by both sides to keep it going. E.g., while we furnish nuclear protection, the Japanese must make it possible for us to use Japanese bases. This reaffirmation will be especially important coming just before Tanaka’s Peking visit and Japan’s opening of peace treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union.

—To assure that Japan’s moves to normalize relations with Peking will not inhibit our use of our Japanese bases in fulfillment of our defense commitments to Taiwan and South Korea. (We also want to encourage Japan to preserve its economic and cultural ties with Taiwan.)

—To agree on a Japanese commitment to reduce our bilateral trade deficit to less than $3 billion by the end of this Japanese Fiscal Year [Page 462] (March 31, 1973), and receive from Japan specific measures by which Japan will bring about this reduction.2

—To establish via your personal contacts with the new Japanese leaders an atmosphere of “lift” in US-Japanese relations which will carry us into a mature and close relationship over the long term.

II. Background, Participants, Press

A. Background

US-Japanese relations are now in transition between an era of dependency and an era of greater Japanese self-assertion. Particularly with Japan’s vigorous new leadership, parallelism of policy is no longer automatic—even though Tanaka considers US and Japanese ultimate interests as “identical.” There is a danger of Japan’s moving in a nationalist direction, and responding to domestic pressures, behind a facade of continuing friendship for us. This has shown up, for example, in:

—increasing restrictions on movements of our forces in Japan.

—the new government’s haste to normalize relations with Peking.

—leaks in the press hinting at the need for changes in the US-Japan Security Treaty.

At the same time, the fundamentals of the US-Japan relationship are sound:

—Japan’s interests were not at all impaired by your Peking visit, and you in fact reaffirmed our tie with Japan in the Shanghai Communiqué. This was well received in Japan.

—Okinawa Reversion, a basic Japanese goal, was accomplished on schedule, in fulfillment of your promise.

Sato’s succession by Tanaka was accomplished in a way that did not directly or significantly embroil the US. And Tanaka has repeatedly reaffirmed the continuity of LDP policy.

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—The Japanese are beginning to accept responsibility for a significant share of the US-Japan trade deficit, and to assist in our determination to reduce it substantially.

Thus your principal task at Honolulu is to make sure that the Japanese are aware of our interests and that they understand that our common objectives must be the basic framework for our respective independent policies. You should try to convey this more by your demeanor than by explicit words—which they might leak. The Japanese may be seeking an atmospheric harmony at Honolulu which they would then use as a mandate to go off on their own. Tanaka lacks experience in foreign policy and is susceptible to domestic pressures. But the US alliance has always been Japan’s secure anchor in the world. Thus Honolulu is a timely opportunity for you to impress upon Tanaka the importance of preserving the substantive harmony of our policies over the long term.

1. Reaffirmation with Tanaka of the US-Japanese Alliance. Both in his public statements and in his conversation August 19 with me, he leaves little doubt that in principle he understands the importance of the alliance to Japan’s national interest. On several occasions he has invoked the metaphor of the “closely-knit family relationship.” But it still needs to be established that Tanaka will conduct his policy concretely in a way that preserves this unity. This is particularly true on the security side, where we cannot acquiesce in further Japanese restrictions on our access to our bases. On the other hand, Tanaka is quite conversant with the basic economic issues (from his experience as Finance Minister and Minister of International Trade and Industry), and can discuss them in considerable detail. (A biographical piece on Tanaka is at Tab G.)

The role of Foreign Minister Ohira adds an additional area of uncertainty to the equation. Tanaka depends on him very heavily for advice on the political and security areas of foreign policy, due both to Tanaka’s inexperience and to the instrumental role that Ohira played in Tanaka’s election. This last factor alone gives Ohira an important voice, and it is possible that he would like to succeed Tanaka as Prime Minister. He gives the impression of being an ambitious and uncommunicative man.

Ohira, having served both as Foreign Minister (1962–64) and as International Trade and Industry Minister (1968–70), is well-acquainted with the intricacies of the issues. Substantively, he also subscribes to our alliance as the major premise of Japan’s foreign policy. Within the past year, however, he has been urging that Japan act more independently of the US, in the interests of Japanese “equality.” Ohira can be difficult to deal with, given his extreme caution and avoidance of taking controversial positions; he frequently resorts to studied ambiguity.

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A major objective at Honolulu, therefore, should be to try to keep the basic relationship firmly on the tracks, not only by getting their commitment to it as a general proposition, but also by:

—Clarifying its meaning on major issues such as China policy and economic relations (this only by affirming what will already have been achieved).

—Indicating our willingness to ameliorate frictions in our relationship in areas such as security (US basing in Japan, where we will be more attentive to observance of Japanese laws and regulations) and trade (adjustment of certain US trade procedures).

—Reviewing major international issues of common concern such as the Korean Peninsula, relations with the Soviets, Indochina, South Asia and the Middle East.

—Stressing our intention to consult closely with the Tanaka Government on all issues of common concern.

—If the Japanese raise it, reiterating our support in principle for a Japanese permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

—Reiterating your invitation to the Emperor and Empress to visit the US next year.

(Background papers on Korea, relations with the Soviets, and the US military presence in Japan are at Tabs D, E, and F, respectively.)

2. Japan’s Normalization of Relations with the PRC. This is a process upon which the Japanese are irrevocably embarked, and it would do us no good to call on them to “go slow” (as Taiwan has asked us to do). Tanaka now plans to be in Peking about the end of September. On the other hand, we have a definite interest that Japan not agree to possible PRC requirements which would further restrict our access to bases in Japan and inhibit our ability to fulfill our defense commitments, particularly with respect to Taiwan and Korea. We also want to see Japan maintain its economic and cultural ties with Taiwan.

The Tanaka Government has given us clear assurances that it will not compromise its obligations under the Mutual Security Treaty, and will not try to disavow the section of the 1969 NixonSato Communiqué which holds that the defense of Taiwan is a “most important factor” for the security of Japan. Further, we have indications that Peking itself may not raise the Mutual Security Treaty in coming negotiations with Japan. There is some reason to believe that while Peking will insist on Tokyo’s breaking diplomatic relations with Taipei (which Tokyo has publicly committed itself to do), Peking will not pressure Japan to sever economic and other ties with the ROC.

The Chinese appear very anxious for Japan to normalize relations, and this should give Tanaka a good deal of bargaining flexibility.

The major possible sticking point might be a PRC attempt to have Japan acknowledge that the settlement of the Taiwan problem is an [Page 465] internal Chinese problem. The Tanaka Government is working on a formula to elude this question, and agrees with us that it should try to avoid getting bogged down in the legalities. The PRC has dropped its earlier insistence on the three pre-conditions for negotiations (recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China; recognition of Taiwan as an integral part of China; and abrogation of the Japan-ROC Peace Treaty of 1952), and Tokyo wants to leave these questions for the later negotiation of a peace treaty with Peking.

At Honolulu, you should try to get from Tanaka and Ohira confirmation of the assurances already given us on the sanctity of our Mutual Security Treaty and to sound out their intentions toward Japan’s future ties with Taiwan. (A background paper is at Tab B.)

3. US China Policy. Some of Japan’s anxieties over relations with the PRC stem from continued suspicions that the US has made secret deals with Peking regarding Taiwan which could include a guarantee from us that we would not invoke the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty in the event of a PRC attack on Taiwan. You will want to emphasize to Tanaka and Ohira that there absolutely have been no secret deals and that our policy with respect to Taiwan was and is as outlined in the Shanghai Joint Communiqué and Dr. Kissinger’s press conference thereafter when he stated that our defense treaty with Taiwan will remain in effect. It is our impression that the PRC does not intend to use force to gain control of Taiwan.

[Omitted here are subsections on U.S.-Japan Bilateral Economic Relations (see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Document 98), and subsections on participants and press plans, and section III, which contained the schedule. Attached but not printed are tabs on recommended talking points, Japan’s normalization of relations with the PRC, Economic Issues, the Korean Peninsula, relations with the Soviet Union, U.S. military presence in Japan, biographical material on Tanaka, and memoranda to Nixon from Rogers and Laird.]

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 926, VIP Visits, Tanaka Visit (Hawaii) 31 Aug–1 September [1972] [1 of 4]. Top Secret; Sensitive. A notation on the memorandum indicates Nixon saw it. He extensively underlined Section I and Section II A of this document. On August 10, Holdridge had sent Kissinger a memorandum concerning his upcoming meetings with Tanaka and Ohira. Holdridge suggested that Kissinger would want “to work out with them in as concrete terms as possible a) language for the post-meeting joint statement which will give it some lift and establish the maintenance of close U.S.-Japanese ties as Japan’s highest priority (this against the backdrop of Tanaka’s moves to normalize Japan-PRC relations); and b) agreement on what Tanaka will be able to say or announce at Honolulu, or that we would jointly announce elsewhere in conjunction with Honolulu, on Japanese measures to help reduce the great imbalance in U.S. trade with Japan.” Holdridge also remarked that Kissinger should “if possible steer him [Tanaka] away from courses which could weaken the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty via Japanese moves to limit its effectiveness with respect to the defense of Taiwan. We would also like to see Japan maintain at least cultural and economic relations with Taiwan.” In response to Japanese concerns, Holdridge indicated, “you will want to touch on some of the irritations in the U.S.-Japan relationship where some action by us might make Tanaka’s position easier in the eyes of the Japanese people. This would involve elements in the Security Treaty relationship where we might be more forthcoming (e.g. adequate prior notification of weather diversion of B–52s to Okinawa), and amelioration of some of our economic and commercial policies with respect to Japan.” (Ibid., [3 of 4])
  2. In an August 17 memorandum to the President, Shultz asserted, “The strength of the Japanese economy requires that they assume greater responsibility for global equilibrium. This responsibility can be best met by an increased effort on their part to open Japan’s market to the world. There is great danger that domestic pressure will force the U.S. to take more restrictive measures against Japanese imports unless they move more quickly. Clearly this would have an adverse impact on our political relations at this critical period.” (Ibid.) A second memorandum from Shultz to Nixon, concerning “Economic Aspects of this Month’s Negotiations with the Japanese,” warned against symbolic actions that appeared to resolve U.S.-Japanese trade conflicts without actually doing so, and advised Nixon against committing his prestige to support of the present dollar-yen exchange rate. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Document 97.